Narrative:

Departing tul, we were vectored heading 260 degrees and told to maintain 5000 ft for traffic west at 6000 ft. As we completed our turn to 260 degrees and passing 4000 ft, the first officer reported traffic in sight (I saw it too), and tul departure control cleared us to climb to 15000 ft and to keep visual separation. Since I 1) saw the traffic, 2) had discretionary clearance to climb, and 3) had excess energy available (I had pulled power at 4500 ft, 250 KTS for an anticipated 5000 ft leveloff), I decided to continue climbing to 15000 ft. As we neared the 6000 ft traffic (a B737), it became apparent we were on converging headings, so I selected climb power and initiated a steeper climb to ensure adequate separation. TCASII RA directed a descent, but with a significant upward vector (15 degrees nose high at 220 KTS), and with traffic in sight, I disregarded the TCASII and continued the climb, as it seemed the safest alternative. I estimate we cleared the jet by 2000 ft vertically and 1/2 NM horizontally. The jet's subsequent rapid transmission suggested he was somewhat concerned about the incident. Contributing factors: 1) somewhat hazy (approximately 6 NM visibility) made aspect angle determination difficult. I initially thought our headings were within 90 degrees. As it turns out, we were converging, not diverging. 2) tul departure's issuing a clearance, albeit a discretionary one, that did not ensure 'clearance,' it seems that often in areas of less densely used commercial traffic, controllers have 'looser' rules regarding controling aircraft and seem to assume that commercial pilots are familiar with their airspace. I think departure control should have held us at 5000 ft regardless of our having sight of the traffic, because of the converging vectors, and our lack of instrumentation providing traffic, heading, or airspeed. 3) I was eager to keep our climb going, rather than being held at 5000 ft indefinitely, and I did not think we were going to create a potential conflict, nor did I anticipate flying within TCASII RA parameters. Supplemental information from acn 511716: the captain elected to continue the climb above the inbound traffic as he was the PF and the traffic was in view on his side (crossing aircraft left to right). Shortly after initiating the climb, TCASII issued a TA ('traffic') advisory, followed by a 'descend, descend' RA. As PNF, I felt the captain had a better sense of the situation from his side of the aircraft (with traffic in sight) as well as being more familiar with the climb capability of the B737. In retrospect, I think we were both under the impression that the B737 was going to begin a descent, when in fact it did not. I should have clarified this with ATC as PNF. Also, I think my timidity in expressing concern over a loss of separation was a contributing factor, but by the time I became uncomfortable, we were committed to climb.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC ARE CONCERNED WITH TUL DEP CTL'S TECHNIQUE WHEN APPLYING VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN THEM AND ANOTHER ACR JET.

Narrative: DEPARTING TUL, WE WERE VECTORED HDG 260 DEGS AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT FOR TFC W AT 6000 FT. AS WE COMPLETED OUR TURN TO 260 DEGS AND PASSING 4000 FT, THE FO RPTED TFC IN SIGHT (I SAW IT TOO), AND TUL DEP CTL CLRED US TO CLB TO 15000 FT AND TO KEEP VISUAL SEPARATION. SINCE I 1) SAW THE TFC, 2) HAD DISCRETIONARY CLRNC TO CLB, AND 3) HAD EXCESS ENERGY AVAILABLE (I HAD PULLED PWR AT 4500 FT, 250 KTS FOR AN ANTICIPATED 5000 FT LEVELOFF), I DECIDED TO CONTINUE CLBING TO 15000 FT. AS WE NEARED THE 6000 FT TFC (A B737), IT BECAME APPARENT WE WERE ON CONVERGING HDGS, SO I SELECTED CLB PWR AND INITIATED A STEEPER CLB TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SEPARATION. TCASII RA DIRECTED A DSCNT, BUT WITH A SIGNIFICANT UPWARD VECTOR (15 DEGS NOSE HIGH AT 220 KTS), AND WITH TFC IN SIGHT, I DISREGARDED THE TCASII AND CONTINUED THE CLB, AS IT SEEMED THE SAFEST ALTERNATIVE. I ESTIMATE WE CLRED THE JET BY 2000 FT VERTLY AND 1/2 NM HORIZLY. THE JET'S SUBSEQUENT RAPID XMISSION SUGGESTED HE WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) SOMEWHAT HAZY (APPROX 6 NM VISIBILITY) MADE ASPECT ANGLE DETERMINATION DIFFICULT. I INITIALLY THOUGHT OUR HDGS WERE WITHIN 90 DEGS. AS IT TURNS OUT, WE WERE CONVERGING, NOT DIVERGING. 2) TUL DEP'S ISSUING A CLRNC, ALBEIT A DISCRETIONARY ONE, THAT DID NOT ENSURE 'CLRNC,' IT SEEMS THAT OFTEN IN AREAS OF LESS DENSELY USED COMMERCIAL TFC, CTLRS HAVE 'LOOSER' RULES REGARDING CTLING ACFT AND SEEM TO ASSUME THAT COMMERCIAL PLTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR AIRSPACE. I THINK DEP CTL SHOULD HAVE HELD US AT 5000 FT REGARDLESS OF OUR HAVING SIGHT OF THE TFC, BECAUSE OF THE CONVERGING VECTORS, AND OUR LACK OF INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING TFC, HDG, OR AIRSPD. 3) I WAS EAGER TO KEEP OUR CLB GOING, RATHER THAN BEING HELD AT 5000 FT INDEFINITELY, AND I DID NOT THINK WE WERE GOING TO CREATE A POTENTIAL CONFLICT, NOR DID I ANTICIPATE FLYING WITHIN TCASII RA PARAMETERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 511716: THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE CLB ABOVE THE INBOUND TFC AS HE WAS THE PF AND THE TFC WAS IN VIEW ON HIS SIDE (XING ACFT L TO R). SHORTLY AFTER INITIATING THE CLB, TCASII ISSUED A TA ('TFC') ADVISORY, FOLLOWED BY A 'DSND, DSND' RA. AS PNF, I FELT THE CAPT HAD A BETTER SENSE OF THE SIT FROM HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT (WITH TFC IN SIGHT) AS WELL AS BEING MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE CLB CAPABILITY OF THE B737. IN RETROSPECT, I THINK WE WERE BOTH UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE B737 WAS GOING TO BEGIN A DSCNT, WHEN IN FACT IT DID NOT. I SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THIS WITH ATC AS PNF. ALSO, I THINK MY TIMIDITY IN EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER A LOSS OF SEPARATION WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, BUT BY THE TIME I BECAME UNCOMFORTABLE, WE WERE COMMITTED TO CLB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.