Narrative:

The reported conflict was between an air carrier X CL65 regional jet and an air carrier Y B727-200. We (the crew of the rj) departed slc with clear WX and visibility unlimited and requested a VFR climb in order to facilitate the departure on course to rap via J154. The departure controller asked if we had the traffic ahead in sight-- the aircraft Y B727. We did and stated so. At this point the B727 was 10 mi out in front. We were then issued a VFR climb through 12000 ft to maintain FL230 and to turn right to 080 degrees and intercept J154 and maintain visual separation on the B727. The B727 had received a right turn also to 130 degrees for on course, which put us on crossing courses. My first officer was hand flying the aircraft and began the turn in the climb. We noticed that the B727 was not climbing through our altitude as quickly as we had anticipated and so we decreased our climb to allow him more space. The picture appeared to get worse on the separation so we turned further right to provide more time for him to climb through our altitude, but instead he began a descent, presumably from an advisory on TCASII they were receiving. We then received an RA -- without the voice message, only TCASII on the vsi to climb. This RA stopped. We began our climb again and received another RA which gave another climb message, and at this time the B727 passed under us on a crossing track. Aircraft Y stated to the controller that we could not have had visual separation and asked for the TRACON phone number to discuss. We also asked for the number and I spoke with the supervisor after arriving back in salt lake at XA30. He stated that there was not a violation of far, nor was there a pilot deviation, but that they pilot was mad and filling out an near midair collision report. He (the TRACON supervisor) also stated to me that there was sufficient separation between aircraft from his point of view after his review of the tapes. The problem arose due to the combination of the turn given to both aircraft by the controller and the poor climb performance by the aircraft. By the time that we realized there would be a problem the situation was too far advanced and TCASII was responding. Even though we had the B727 plainly in sight during the entire time it was difficult to judge altitude separation accurately. Therein lies the value of TCASII. The surprise also in the B727 descending rather than climbing did not give us the option of going beneath him. The presence also of the mountains and terrain separation requirements left us no alternative, but to alter heading. In retrospect, we should not have accepted the heading assignment from the controller until we could be sure of passing behind the B727. This would have alleviated the situation. I think that the turn suckered us into a predicament that we ended up regretting. I also believe that the controller could have given us more pertinent altitude information on the B727 during the conflict rather than just making sure that we had visual contact.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 AND A B727-200 CREW HAD TCASII RA IN ZLC CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: THE RPTED CONFLICT WAS BTWN AN ACR X CL65 REGIONAL JET AND AN ACR Y B727-200. WE (THE CREW OF THE RJ) DEPARTED SLC WITH CLR WX AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED AND REQUESTED A VFR CLB IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE DEP ON COURSE TO RAP VIA J154. THE DEP CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE TFC AHEAD IN SIGHT-- THE ACFT Y B727. WE DID AND STATED SO. AT THIS POINT THE B727 WAS 10 MI OUT IN FRONT. WE WERE THEN ISSUED A VFR CLB THROUGH 12000 FT TO MAINTAIN FL230 AND TO TURN R TO 080 DEGS AND INTERCEPT J154 AND MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION ON THE B727. THE B727 HAD RECEIVED A R TURN ALSO TO 130 DEGS FOR ON COURSE, WHICH PUT US ON XING COURSES. MY FO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND BEGAN THE TURN IN THE CLB. WE NOTICED THAT THE B727 WAS NOT CLBING THROUGH OUR ALT AS QUICKLY AS WE HAD ANTICIPATED AND SO WE DECREASED OUR CLB TO ALLOW HIM MORE SPACE. THE PICTURE APPEARED TO GET WORSE ON THE SEPARATION SO WE TURNED FURTHER R TO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR HIM TO CLB THROUGH OUR ALT, BUT INSTEAD HE BEGAN A DSCNT, PRESUMABLY FROM AN ADVISORY ON TCASII THEY WERE RECEIVING. WE THEN RECEIVED AN RA -- WITHOUT THE VOICE MESSAGE, ONLY TCASII ON THE VSI TO CLB. THIS RA STOPPED. WE BEGAN OUR CLB AGAIN AND RECEIVED ANOTHER RA WHICH GAVE ANOTHER CLB MESSAGE, AND AT THIS TIME THE B727 PASSED UNDER US ON A XING TRACK. ACFT Y STATED TO THE CTLR THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE HAD VISUAL SEPARATION AND ASKED FOR THE TRACON PHONE NUMBER TO DISCUSS. WE ALSO ASKED FOR THE NUMBER AND I SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR AFTER ARRIVING BACK IN SALT LAKE AT XA30. HE STATED THAT THERE WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF FAR, NOR WAS THERE A PLTDEV, BUT THAT THEY PLT WAS MAD AND FILLING OUT AN NMAC RPT. HE (THE TRACON SUPVR) ALSO STATED TO ME THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT SEPARATION BTWN ACFT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW AFTER HIS REVIEW OF THE TAPES. THE PROB AROSE DUE TO THE COMBINATION OF THE TURN GIVEN TO BOTH ACFT BY THE CTLR AND THE POOR CLB PERFORMANCE BY THE ACFT. BY THE TIME THAT WE REALIZED THERE WOULD BE A PROB THE SIT WAS TOO FAR ADVANCED AND TCASII WAS RESPONDING. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD THE B727 PLAINLY IN SIGHT DURING THE ENTIRE TIME IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE ALT SEPARATION ACCURATELY. THEREIN LIES THE VALUE OF TCASII. THE SURPRISE ALSO IN THE B727 DSNDING RATHER THAN CLBING DID NOT GIVE US THE OPTION OF GOING BENEATH HIM. THE PRESENCE ALSO OF THE MOUNTAINS AND TERRAIN SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS LEFT US NO ALTERNATIVE, BUT TO ALTER HDG. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE HDG ASSIGNMENT FROM THE CTLR UNTIL WE COULD BE SURE OF PASSING BEHIND THE B727. THIS WOULD HAVE ALLEVIATED THE SIT. I THINK THAT THE TURN SUCKERED US INTO A PREDICAMENT THAT WE ENDED UP REGRETTING. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR COULD HAVE GIVEN US MORE PERTINENT ALT INFO ON THE B727 DURING THE CONFLICT RATHER THAN JUST MAKING SURE THAT WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.