An LJ60 crew, departing jyo, violated iad's class B airspace.

Attributes
ACN	531080
Time
Date	200111
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : jyo.airport
State Reference	VA
Altitude	msl single value : 3000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Weather Elements	Rain Fog
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : iad.tracon
Operator	general aviation : corporate
Make Model Name	Learjet 60
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : corporate
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : multi engine
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 6200 flight time type : 2200
ASRS Report	531080
Person 2
Affiliation	company : corporate
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	airspace violation : entry non adherence : far non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance
Consequence	faa : reviewed incident with flight crew
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Airspace Structure Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

In preparing to depart jyo runway 17, we contacted iad clearance for our IFR clearance. We were given substantial route changes from our filed routing and a release time within 5 mins even though we had not yet started engines. I declined this release window and was issued a release that extended our release window by 3 mins. Departure instructions included a right turn direct mrb after takeoff. I started engines and began to taxi while my first officer loaded the flight plan into the FMS and set the avionics. We arrived at the end of the runway with 1 min left in our release window. We quickly accomplished the before takeoff checklist and took off on runway 17 (jyo). The first officer was flying. Climbing through 1000 ft on the way to 3000 ft, I contacted iad approach control. The controller responded that he had radar contact and we continued our climb to 3000 ft. Shortly, the controller directed an aircraft (not our call sign) to turn 330 degrees. He then asked our heading. I responded '171 degrees.' he then again directed a 330 degree heading (not our callsign, again). The controller then directed that we correct our IFF code and directed that we turn to 330 degree heading. We complied with his direction. At that time, we were 7 mi south of jyo. At no time did we conflict with other air traffic (no TCASII warnings). Of these causes, rushing to get airborne was the most significant and contributed to most of the other failures.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LJ60 CREW, DEPARTING JYO, VIOLATED IAD'S CLASS B AIRSPACE.

Narrative: IN PREPARING TO DEPART JYO RWY 17, WE CONTACTED IAD CLRNC FOR OUR IFR CLRNC. WE WERE GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL RTE CHANGES FROM OUR FILED ROUTING AND A RELEASE TIME WITHIN 5 MINS EVEN THOUGH WE HAD NOT YET STARTED ENGS. I DECLINED THIS RELEASE WINDOW AND WAS ISSUED A RELEASE THAT EXTENDED OUR RELEASE WINDOW BY 3 MINS. DEP INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED A R TURN DIRECT MRB AFTER TKOF. I STARTED ENGS AND BEGAN TO TAXI WHILE MY FO LOADED THE FLT PLAN INTO THE FMS AND SET THE AVIONICS. WE ARRIVED AT THE END OF THE RWY WITH 1 MIN LEFT IN OUR RELEASE WINDOW. WE QUICKLY ACCOMPLISHED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND TOOK OFF ON RWY 17 (JYO). THE FO WAS FLYING. CLBING THROUGH 1000 FT ON THE WAY TO 3000 FT, I CONTACTED IAD APCH CTL. THE CTLR RESPONDED THAT HE HAD RADAR CONTACT AND WE CONTINUED OUR CLB TO 3000 FT. SHORTLY, THE CTLR DIRECTED AN ACFT (NOT OUR CALL SIGN) TO TURN 330 DEGS. HE THEN ASKED OUR HDG. I RESPONDED '171 DEGS.' HE THEN AGAIN DIRECTED A 330 DEG HDG (NOT OUR CALLSIGN, AGAIN). THE CTLR THEN DIRECTED THAT WE CORRECT OUR IFF CODE AND DIRECTED THAT WE TURN TO 330 DEG HDG. WE COMPLIED WITH HIS DIRECTION. AT THAT TIME, WE WERE 7 MI S OF JYO. AT NO TIME DID WE CONFLICT WITH OTHER AIR TFC (NO TCASII WARNINGS). OF THESE CAUSES, RUSHING TO GET AIRBORNE WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND CONTRIBUTED TO MOST OF THE OTHER FAILURES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.