Narrative:

From a right downwind I was cleared for a visual to runway 24R at lax. During my turn to base I mistook the south complex (runway 25L/right) for the north complex and began to fly toward runway 25R. Before I realized my mistake I had crossed the runway 24R final approach course. Although I did not reach the final course for runway 25R I did fly south of the runway 24R final. There was another aircraft on final for runway 25L but we never came close enough for concern (I estimate no closer than 2-3 mi). I corrected my flight path and landed on runway 24R uneventfully. Socal did broadcast an advisory. I believe one reason this incident occurred was my perception that the downwind leg was displaced laterally more than it really was. Therefore, as I rolled out on base, I saw the south complex where I expected to see the north complex. I failed to check the navaids I had previously set to runway 24R. Better CRM would have helped in this situation since the first officer had a better visual picture but was hesitant to comment. In the future I plan to make better use of navaids, especially on xcockpit approachs. I will also emphasize to first officer's the importance of speaking out when things don't look right. Supplemental information from acn 535129: captain's leg: heading south on a basic leg of runway 24R into lax. The runways were 'in sight' and we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R. As the captain started a gradual turn to runway 24R we continued to descend. The sun was contributing to reduce visibility with the haze. The first officer realizing we were going to go through final of runway 24R spoke up and stated 'you have runway 24R in sight, right?' the captain increased the rate of roll/turn and ended up lining up with the center of the airport complex always staying north of runway 25R. The controller verified our intentions at this point. We continued to realign with runway 24R without incident. No aircraft or TCASII alerts were observed on runway 25R. Contributing factors include sun and haze combination. Possibly the first officer not speaking up soon enough for fear of being a 'micro manager' and loss of sight for the intended and assigned runway. The capts have no problem speaking up early with the smallest hint of discrepancies. The first officer's, however, must be somewhat more diplomatic and tactful as they respond to a similar situation, so as not to come across as controling or overstepping their boundaries and raise doubt about who is in charge. That being said, the first officer's almost need to wait until the problem has surfaced before responding to a situation of this caliber. I suppose that even more diligence is required, although much was applied in this situation. But, normally at this point in the approach the approach controller hands off the flight to the tower, only increasing workload and distractions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B733 CREW, ON A VISUAL TO LAX, OVERSHOT FINAL TO ASSIGNED RWY, SPAWNING A QUERY FROM ATC.

Narrative: FROM A R DOWNWIND I WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 24R AT LAX. DURING MY TURN TO BASE I MISTOOK THE S COMPLEX (RWY 25L/R) FOR THE N COMPLEX AND BEGAN TO FLY TOWARD RWY 25R. BEFORE I REALIZED MY MISTAKE I HAD CROSSED THE RWY 24R FINAL APCH COURSE. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT REACH THE FINAL COURSE FOR RWY 25R I DID FLY S OF THE RWY 24R FINAL. THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 25L BUT WE NEVER CAME CLOSE ENOUGH FOR CONCERN (I ESTIMATE NO CLOSER THAN 2-3 MI). I CORRECTED MY FLT PATH AND LANDED ON RWY 24R UNEVENTFULLY. SOCAL DID BROADCAST AN ADVISORY. I BELIEVE ONE REASON THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WAS MY PERCEPTION THAT THE DOWNWIND LEG WAS DISPLACED LATERALLY MORE THAN IT REALLY WAS. THEREFORE, AS I ROLLED OUT ON BASE, I SAW THE S COMPLEX WHERE I EXPECTED TO SEE THE N COMPLEX. I FAILED TO CHK THE NAVAIDS I HAD PREVIOUSLY SET TO RWY 24R. BETTER CRM WOULD HAVE HELPED IN THIS SIT SINCE THE FO HAD A BETTER VISUAL PICTURE BUT WAS HESITANT TO COMMENT. IN THE FUTURE I PLAN TO MAKE BETTER USE OF NAVAIDS, ESPECIALLY ON XCOCKPIT APCHS. I WILL ALSO EMPHASIZE TO FO'S THE IMPORTANCE OF SPEAKING OUT WHEN THINGS DON'T LOOK RIGHT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 535129: CAPT'S LEG: HEADING S ON A BASIC LEG OF RWY 24R INTO LAX. THE RWYS WERE 'IN SIGHT' AND WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. AS THE CAPT STARTED A GRADUAL TURN TO RWY 24R WE CONTINUED TO DSND. THE SUN WAS CONTRIBUTING TO REDUCE VISIBILITY WITH THE HAZE. THE FO REALIZING WE WERE GOING TO GO THROUGH FINAL OF RWY 24R SPOKE UP AND STATED 'YOU HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT, RIGHT?' THE CAPT INCREASED THE RATE OF ROLL/TURN AND ENDED UP LINING UP WITH THE CTR OF THE ARPT COMPLEX ALWAYS STAYING N OF RWY 25R. THE CTLR VERIFIED OUR INTENTIONS AT THIS POINT. WE CONTINUED TO REALIGN WITH RWY 24R WITHOUT INCIDENT. NO ACFT OR TCASII ALERTS WERE OBSERVED ON RWY 25R. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE SUN AND HAZE COMBINATION. POSSIBLY THE FO NOT SPEAKING UP SOON ENOUGH FOR FEAR OF BEING A 'MICRO MGR' AND LOSS OF SIGHT FOR THE INTENDED AND ASSIGNED RWY. THE CAPTS HAVE NO PROB SPEAKING UP EARLY WITH THE SMALLEST HINT OF DISCREPANCIES. THE FO'S, HOWEVER, MUST BE SOMEWHAT MORE DIPLOMATIC AND TACTFUL AS THEY RESPOND TO A SIMILAR SIT, SO AS NOT TO COME ACROSS AS CTLING OR OVERSTEPPING THEIR BOUNDARIES AND RAISE DOUBT ABOUT WHO IS IN CHARGE. THAT BEING SAID, THE FO'S ALMOST NEED TO WAIT UNTIL THE PROB HAS SURFACED BEFORE RESPONDING TO A SIT OF THIS CALIBER. I SUPPOSE THAT EVEN MORE DILIGENCE IS REQUIRED, ALTHOUGH MUCH WAS APPLIED IN THIS SIT. BUT, NORMALLY AT THIS POINT IN THE APCH THE APCH CTLR HANDS OFF THE FLT TO THE TWR, ONLY INCREASING WORKLOAD AND DISTRACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.