Narrative:

This trip was the second day of a continuous duty overnight for a regional carrier. The overnight was 5 hours 25 mins on the ground at lft. We departed lft for mei. Forecast WX did not require an alternate. As we started our descent into mei, approach informed us WX at mei was 100 ft broken and 1 1/2 mi visibility (fog) and getting worse. Since we didn't have an alternate, I contacted company dispatcher to ensure we had an alternate available and the fuel to get there. My first officer was flying while I talked with dispatch. As I was talking with the dispatcher, mei approach control informed us WX at mei was now 1/2 mi (fog). Still good enough for the ILS approach runway 1. At about 8000 ft MSL, I lost communication with my dispatcher because of our low altitude. Another company aircraft was in the area and relayed information between us about the alternate. Because of the time it took talking with the company dispatcher, I got behind taking back aircraft control from the first officer. This caused both of us to rush the approach into mei. We should've delayed the approach at this point, but because I was afraid the WX may go below minimums and we were currently in the clear above the fog/clouds, I elected to continue the approach. Approach cleared us for the ILS and told us to contact tower. Tower told us to call final fix inbound. It got extremely busy configuring the aircraft and completing the landing checklist just prior to or at the FAF. The first officer and I must have forgotten to call 'final fix inbound.' once we landed, we told tower we were clear of the runway. Tower then told us 'next time call final fix inbound so we can give you clearance to land.' both the first officer and I discussed the approach, but couldn't remember if we called final fix or received landing clearance. I guess because of the rushed approach, we never confirmed landing clearance. The error could've been avoided by not rushing the approach. We could've gotten extended vectors to delay the approach until we were both caught up with the aircraft and comfortable with the approach. Also, I could of made the decision to contact dispatch a bit earlier. This would've allowed more time for getting ready for the approach and also would of prevented losing communication with dispatch because of the low altitude. I do not believe fatigue was a factor. Both the first officer and I did not feel tired at the time, but this trip is avoided by many in the company because of the short ground times and long duty period. Supplemental information from acn 535294: outside of FAF, dispatch tried to call us and captain became distraction during approach. First officer offered to talk to dispatch and let captain fly approach. First officer, distraction by dispatch, forgot to call tower and inform tower that we were OM inbound.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB120 FLC LANDS THEIR ACFT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A LNDG CLRNC FROM THE TWR CTLR AT MEI, MS.

Narrative: THIS TRIP WAS THE SECOND DAY OF A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT FOR A REGIONAL CARRIER. THE OVERNIGHT WAS 5 HRS 25 MINS ON THE GND AT LFT. WE DEPARTED LFT FOR MEI. FORECAST WX DID NOT REQUIRE AN ALTERNATE. AS WE STARTED OUR DSCNT INTO MEI, APCH INFORMED US WX AT MEI WAS 100 FT BROKEN AND 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY (FOG) AND GETTING WORSE. SINCE WE DIDN'T HAVE AN ALTERNATE, I CONTACTED COMPANY DISPATCHER TO ENSURE WE HAD AN ALTERNATE AVAILABLE AND THE FUEL TO GET THERE. MY FO WAS FLYING WHILE I TALKED WITH DISPATCH. AS I WAS TALKING WITH THE DISPATCHER, MEI APCH CTL INFORMED US WX AT MEI WAS NOW 1/2 MI (FOG). STILL GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE ILS APCH RWY 1. AT ABOUT 8000 FT MSL, I LOST COM WITH MY DISPATCHER BECAUSE OF OUR LOW ALT. ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WAS IN THE AREA AND RELAYED INFO BTWN US ABOUT THE ALTERNATE. BECAUSE OF THE TIME IT TOOK TALKING WITH THE COMPANY DISPATCHER, I GOT BEHIND TAKING BACK ACFT CTL FROM THE FO. THIS CAUSED BOTH OF US TO RUSH THE APCH INTO MEI. WE SHOULD'VE DELAYED THE APCH AT THIS POINT, BUT BECAUSE I WAS AFRAID THE WX MAY GO BELOW MINIMUMS AND WE WERE CURRENTLY IN THE CLR ABOVE THE FOG/CLOUDS, I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH. APCH CLRED US FOR THE ILS AND TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. TWR TOLD US TO CALL FINAL FIX INBOUND. IT GOT EXTREMELY BUSY CONFIGURING THE ACFT AND COMPLETING THE LNDG CHKLIST JUST PRIOR TO OR AT THE FAF. THE FO AND I MUST HAVE FORGOTTEN TO CALL 'FINAL FIX INBOUND.' ONCE WE LANDED, WE TOLD TWR WE WERE CLR OF THE RWY. TWR THEN TOLD US 'NEXT TIME CALL FINAL FIX INBOUND SO WE CAN GIVE YOU CLRNC TO LAND.' BOTH THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE APCH, BUT COULDN'T REMEMBER IF WE CALLED FINAL FIX OR RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC. I GUESS BECAUSE OF THE RUSHED APCH, WE NEVER CONFIRMED LNDG CLRNC. THE ERROR COULD'VE BEEN AVOIDED BY NOT RUSHING THE APCH. WE COULD'VE GOTTEN EXTENDED VECTORS TO DELAY THE APCH UNTIL WE WERE BOTH CAUGHT UP WITH THE ACFT AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH. ALSO, I COULD OF MADE THE DECISION TO CONTACT DISPATCH A BIT EARLIER. THIS WOULD'VE ALLOWED MORE TIME FOR GETTING READY FOR THE APCH AND ALSO WOULD OF PREVENTED LOSING COM WITH DISPATCH BECAUSE OF THE LOW ALT. I DO NOT BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR. BOTH THE FO AND I DID NOT FEEL TIRED AT THE TIME, BUT THIS TRIP IS AVOIDED BY MANY IN THE COMPANY BECAUSE OF THE SHORT GND TIMES AND LONG DUTY PERIOD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 535294: OUTSIDE OF FAF, DISPATCH TRIED TO CALL US AND CAPT BECAME DISTR DURING APCH. FO OFFERED TO TALK TO DISPATCH AND LET CAPT FLY APCH. FO, DISTR BY DISPATCH, FORGOT TO CALL TWR AND INFORM TWR THAT WE WERE OM INBOUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.