Narrative:

We were on a flight from eddf to vabb. This was my first trip ever into the mid-east and india. It was only the second trip ever for the captain. The other first officer was out of the cockpit when the incident occurred. He was going on rest break. He had recently flown the route. I had just returned from rest break and was just settling in to the seat as PF and establishing my situational awareness as to the tasks upcoming, knowing we were approaching the nicosia fir, and that things were going to get busy. Our company had provided us with a 'script' of the expected radio calls and the timing of the calls for transiting the area from ankara, to nicosia and on to damascus. We had been flight planned at FL290, with a note to expect a level change to FL270 at vesar intersection in the flight plan. We were also supposed to initiate contact with nicosia control approximately 10 mins prior to vesar intersection. When I determined our position after the crew change out, I realized we were only about 7 mins out from vesar, and that the captain (as PNF) had not yet initiated contact with nicosia. I told him he needed to do this. He hesitated and seemed confused as to just what exactly needed to be done and who he needed to talk to, even though it was spelled out north the script. At this point, I also noted we were still at FL290, anticipating we had to be at FL270 prior to entry into nicosia airspace, due to restrictive altitudes on the route. At this point, I offered to use the second radio, and make initial contact with nicosia, while he made the request with ankara to change our flight level to FL270. I made contact with nicosia about 4-5 mins from the fir and informed them of our estimate at vesar and that we were at FL290. Shortly thereafter, we got approval from ankara to descend to FL270. After confirming this with the captain, I started descent, and advised him to sign off with ankara and switch over to nicosia and report vesar, while I made the preliminary call to damascas with our estimate for nikas (damascas fir). Flight time from vesar (nicosia fir) to nikas was only 11 mins. By this time, it became obvious that I would have to 'lead' the captain through the sequence of radio calls, not only as to the timing and requirement, but he was not making these calls in the expected ICAO format. This also led to some confusion on the part of the controllers, as well as additional radio xmissions being made to acquire the necessary information. I leveled off at FL270 approximately 2-3 mi before the vesar intersection. While I was talking to damascus, the captain reported at vesar intersection to nicosia. I did not hear the transmission or response, but the captain said that he was real unhappy with us being at FL270. I had anticipated that our altitude change was coordinated from ankara to nicosia, but apparently this was not the case. Time compression and sequences of events precluded a 'warning call' to nicosia to update them on our entry to their airspace at FL270. The following contributed to the event in my opinion: 1) not being at FL270 well prior to the vesar intersection (prior to the 10 min out call to nicosia). If this had occurred prior to crew change out (as I feel it should have, in retrospect), we would have been at the correct altitude as expected, and it would have just been a matter of making the required radio calls. 2) lack of familiarity on the procedures and routing for this flight segment having never been there before. 30 a 'glitch' in the flight plan, which doesn't direct at altitude change until the vesar intersection, when in fact the altitude change should occur well prior to vesar. 4) my failure to locate and review essential information concerning this route in the commercial chart briefing bulletin eddf 99-a-1/2. I was aware 'a bulletin' was published, but not aware it was a commercial chart product located in the supplemental commercial chart pubs issued to us prior to our departure from eddf. I had missed this reference in the flight plan NOTAMS. The captain was not aware of this either, and it was later I had brought it to his attention as I researched additional information on the route. 5) confusion and uncertainty onthe captain's part as to the timing, format, and content of the required radio calls. This necessitated my having to work 'all' the issues. 6) supplemental information that was a part of the flight package that was issued in eddf, that was removed and kept by the captain. I never saw it until after the event when he pulled it from a stack of papers on the glare shield in front of him. Although not critical, it may have given me a little more insight on the 'complete picture.' from available guidance, it is known that wbound traffic along uw-10 between nikas and vesar is restr to only between FL290 to FL410. By inference and available guidance, it is stated to plan or expect FL270 when traveling eastbound on uw-10 from vesar to nikas, but it does not preclude entry at vesar at FL290 or above, which further led to confusion. If FL270 eastbound is expected or desired making it mandatory prior to crossing vesar intersection would eliminate any conflicts with traffic wbound on uw-10 through nicosia airspace and eliminating the potential problems alluded to in commercial chart briefing bulletin eddf 99-A1/2 IATA communications/control procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FO RPT ON POS RPTING AND CLRNC PROBS ON A FLT FROM EDDF THROUGH THE NICOSIA FIR REGION AT VESAR INTXN, FO.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A FLT FROM EDDF TO VABB. THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP EVER INTO THE MID-EAST AND INDIA. IT WAS ONLY THE SECOND TRIP EVER FOR THE CAPT. THE OTHER FO WAS OUT OF THE COCKPIT WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. HE WAS GOING ON REST BREAK. HE HAD RECENTLY FLOWN THE RTE. I HAD JUST RETURNED FROM REST BREAK AND WAS JUST SETTLING IN TO THE SEAT AS PF AND ESTABLISHING MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS TO THE TASKS UPCOMING, KNOWING WE WERE APCHING THE NICOSIA FIR, AND THAT THINGS WERE GOING TO GET BUSY. OUR COMPANY HAD PROVIDED US WITH A 'SCRIPT' OF THE EXPECTED RADIO CALLS AND THE TIMING OF THE CALLS FOR TRANSITING THE AREA FROM ANKARA, TO NICOSIA AND ON TO DAMASCUS. WE HAD BEEN FLT PLANNED AT FL290, WITH A NOTE TO EXPECT A LEVEL CHANGE TO FL270 AT VESAR INTXN IN THE FLT PLAN. WE WERE ALSO SUPPOSED TO INITIATE CONTACT WITH NICOSIA CTL APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO VESAR INTXN. WHEN I DETERMINED OUR POS AFTER THE CREW CHANGE OUT, I REALIZED WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 7 MINS OUT FROM VESAR, AND THAT THE CAPT (AS PNF) HAD NOT YET INITIATED CONTACT WITH NICOSIA. I TOLD HIM HE NEEDED TO DO THIS. HE HESITATED AND SEEMED CONFUSED AS TO JUST WHAT EXACTLY NEEDED TO BE DONE AND WHO HE NEEDED TO TALK TO, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS SPELLED OUT N THE SCRIPT. AT THIS POINT, I ALSO NOTED WE WERE STILL AT FL290, ANTICIPATING WE HAD TO BE AT FL270 PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO NICOSIA AIRSPACE, DUE TO RESTRICTIVE ALTS ON THE RTE. AT THIS POINT, I OFFERED TO USE THE SECOND RADIO, AND MAKE INITIAL CONTACT WITH NICOSIA, WHILE HE MADE THE REQUEST WITH ANKARA TO CHANGE OUR FLT LEVEL TO FL270. I MADE CONTACT WITH NICOSIA ABOUT 4-5 MINS FROM THE FIR AND INFORMED THEM OF OUR ESTIMATE AT VESAR AND THAT WE WERE AT FL290. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE GOT APPROVAL FROM ANKARA TO DSND TO FL270. AFTER CONFIRMING THIS WITH THE CAPT, I STARTED DSCNT, AND ADVISED HIM TO SIGN OFF WITH ANKARA AND SWITCH OVER TO NICOSIA AND RPT VESAR, WHILE I MADE THE PRELIMINARY CALL TO DAMASCAS WITH OUR ESTIMATE FOR NIKAS (DAMASCAS FIR). FLT TIME FROM VESAR (NICOSIA FIR) TO NIKAS WAS ONLY 11 MINS. BY THIS TIME, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT I WOULD HAVE TO 'LEAD' THE CAPT THROUGH THE SEQUENCE OF RADIO CALLS, NOT ONLY AS TO THE TIMING AND REQUIREMENT, BUT HE WAS NOT MAKING THESE CALLS IN THE EXPECTED ICAO FORMAT. THIS ALSO LED TO SOME CONFUSION ON THE PART OF THE CTLRS, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL RADIO XMISSIONS BEING MADE TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY INFO. I LEVELED OFF AT FL270 APPROX 2-3 MI BEFORE THE VESAR INTXN. WHILE I WAS TALKING TO DAMASCUS, THE CAPT RPTED AT VESAR INTXN TO NICOSIA. I DID NOT HEAR THE XMISSION OR RESPONSE, BUT THE CAPT SAID THAT HE WAS REAL UNHAPPY WITH US BEING AT FL270. I HAD ANTICIPATED THAT OUR ALT CHANGE WAS COORDINATED FROM ANKARA TO NICOSIA, BUT APPARENTLY THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. TIME COMPRESSION AND SEQUENCES OF EVENTS PRECLUDED A 'WARNING CALL' TO NICOSIA TO UPDATE THEM ON OUR ENTRY TO THEIR AIRSPACE AT FL270. THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT IN MY OPINION: 1) NOT BEING AT FL270 WELL PRIOR TO THE VESAR INTXN (PRIOR TO THE 10 MIN OUT CALL TO NICOSIA). IF THIS HAD OCCURRED PRIOR TO CREW CHANGE OUT (AS I FEEL IT SHOULD HAVE, IN RETROSPECT), WE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE CORRECT ALT AS EXPECTED, AND IT WOULD HAVE JUST BEEN A MATTER OF MAKING THE REQUIRED RADIO CALLS. 2) LACK OF FAMILIARITY ON THE PROCS AND ROUTING FOR THIS FLT SEGMENT HAVING NEVER BEEN THERE BEFORE. 30 A 'GLITCH' IN THE FLT PLAN, WHICH DOESN'T DIRECT AT ALT CHANGE UNTIL THE VESAR INTXN, WHEN IN FACT THE ALT CHANGE SHOULD OCCUR WELL PRIOR TO VESAR. 4) MY FAILURE TO LOCATE AND REVIEW ESSENTIAL INFO CONCERNING THIS RTE IN THE COMMERCIAL CHART BRIEFING BULLETIN EDDF 99-A-1/2. I WAS AWARE 'A BULLETIN' WAS PUBLISHED, BUT NOT AWARE IT WAS A COMMERCIAL CHART PRODUCT LOCATED IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMMERCIAL CHART PUBS ISSUED TO US PRIOR TO OUR DEP FROM EDDF. I HAD MISSED THIS REF IN THE FLT PLAN NOTAMS. THE CAPT WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS EITHER, AND IT WAS LATER I HAD BROUGHT IT TO HIS ATTN AS I RESEARCHED ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE RTE. 5) CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY ONTHE CAPT'S PART AS TO THE TIMING, FORMAT, AND CONTENT OF THE REQUIRED RADIO CALLS. THIS NECESSITATED MY HAVING TO WORK 'ALL' THE ISSUES. 6) SUPPLEMENTAL INFO THAT WAS A PART OF THE FLT PACKAGE THAT WAS ISSUED IN EDDF, THAT WAS REMOVED AND KEPT BY THE CAPT. I NEVER SAW IT UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT WHEN HE PULLED IT FROM A STACK OF PAPERS ON THE GLARE SHIELD IN FRONT OF HIM. ALTHOUGH NOT CRITICAL, IT MAY HAVE GIVEN ME A LITTLE MORE INSIGHT ON THE 'COMPLETE PICTURE.' FROM AVAILABLE GUIDANCE, IT IS KNOWN THAT WBOUND TFC ALONG UW-10 BTWN NIKAS AND VESAR IS RESTR TO ONLY BTWN FL290 TO FL410. BY INFERENCE AND AVAILABLE GUIDANCE, IT IS STATED TO PLAN OR EXPECT FL270 WHEN TRAVELING EBOUND ON UW-10 FROM VESAR TO NIKAS, BUT IT DOES NOT PRECLUDE ENTRY AT VESAR AT FL290 OR ABOVE, WHICH FURTHER LED TO CONFUSION. IF FL270 EBOUND IS EXPECTED OR DESIRED MAKING IT MANDATORY PRIOR TO XING VESAR INTXN WOULD ELIMINATE ANY CONFLICTS WITH TFC WBOUND ON UW-10 THROUGH NICOSIA AIRSPACE AND ELIMINATING THE POTENTIAL PROBS ALLUDED TO IN COMMERCIAL CHART BRIEFING BULLETIN EDDF 99-A1/2 IATA COMS/CTL PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.