Narrative:

Subject: takeoff performance system inconsistencies at sea. On may/sat/02, we were flying an airbus 321 from sea. The takeoff and performance data (tps) received from our company load planners specifically contained the statement advising us to 'expect a departure on runway 34R, from intersection Q.' it also displayed the advisory that this was the normal departure point on runway 34R at sea. The intersection takeoff point on runway 34R at taxiway Q was defined on the tps as 'runway 34RY' with a useable distance of 9400 ft from taxiway runway 34R (taxiway Q). It is customary that when an intersection takeoff is defined on the tps, there is also a corresponding runway takeoff analysis, based on the specific intersection takeoff point, computed and designated on the tps analysis, indicating maximum takeoff weights for the runway intersection takeoff point and the second segment climb weight limits for the particular flap setting, weight and temperature. But not in this case! In this case, a full length analysis for runway 34L, with a full usable length of 9400 ft was listed alongside runway 34R with a full usable length of 11900 ft. It is important to note that the intersection data for runway 34R, defined on the tps as runway 34RY, was not listed on the tps (only the full length data for runway 34R was listed)! So, ATC taxied us to runway 34R at taxiway Q, as we were told to expect by both ATC and our company produced tps. A quick check of the runway 34R header for the runway analysis indicated that we were legal for takeoff. Or were we? Upon closer examination, 'runway 34RY' was missing! We had only been issued a full length runway analysis for 'runway 34R,' even though we had instructions on the tps specifically instructing us to expect an intersection departure from runway 34R at taxiway Q, and further defined as runway 34RY (note that the 'Y' suffix is the intersection designator for taxiway Q). So, although we would have been legal for a full length runway 34L takeoff with an available full length distance of 9400 ft of full length available, we did not have an analysis for an intersection takeoff from runway 34R'y,' with an available distance of 9100 ft, because it was omitted from the tps analysis. But why? Working through dispatch, I learned that although air carrier uses a central load planning system (clp) the local stations have some authority/authorized over selected weight and balance entries. In this case, they could control which runways were designated for analysis and they also controled the 'notes' section, which specifically instructed us (crews) to expect a runway 34R intersection departure and the tps information defining the runway 34R intersection takeoff point from 'Q' intersection. Simply put, the station told us to expect one thing, but gave us information for another, a potentially fatal error in this case. Working through the dispatcher training instructors to the station, I have advised those involved with the tps system of the potential pitfalls. I also am critical of air carrier X for eliminating pilot weight and balance data manuals, which we are used to carry in every aircraft as a means of planning and as a check and a balance to the central load planning system. There are other problem areas too, where the tps will not allow pilots to utilize optimum performance considerations for WX related safety concerns. For example, if the runways are wet with standing water, and I ask dispatch to show a contaminated runway, the reply I get is that they cannot, because the station is not reporting it! My 'tools' to safely conduct the flight are being taken away. So far, my copy of the air carrier X operation specifications have been taken away by the company as well as my ability to manually confirm airport analysis data. Successful airlines air carrier Y still allow their crews to perform the weight and balance runway analysis calculations in the cockpit. Other airlines still allow their materials to manually compute and validate the takeoff analysis information and the optimum takeoff confign based on weight, desired flap setting and conditions, by flight crew's. I would ask that NASA encourage that aircraft performance data, including airport runway analysis data be provided and available in the cockpit to the pilots so as to enhance safety...and stop taking away the tools that we need to provide for a safer operation. Callback conversation with reporter revealedthe following information: the company has recently centralized load planning at one point. Captain thinks the current company procedure is just setting a crew up to make an illegal takeoff. It's easy to miss the lack of takeoff numbers when at first glance it appears a legal takeoff, the company has indicated they will fix the sea problem. The pilot has not been back to sea since the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 CREW WAS NOT GIVEN TKOF PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR AN INTXN TKOF AT SEA.

Narrative: SUBJECT: TKOF PERFORMANCE SYS INCONSISTENCIES AT SEA. ON MAY/SAT/02, WE WERE FLYING AN AIRBUS 321 FROM SEA. THE TKOF AND PERFORMANCE DATA (TPS) RECEIVED FROM OUR COMPANY LOAD PLANNERS SPECIFICALLY CONTAINED THE STATEMENT ADVISING US TO 'EXPECT A DEP ON RWY 34R, FROM INTXN Q.' IT ALSO DISPLAYED THE ADVISORY THAT THIS WAS THE NORMAL DEP POINT ON RWY 34R AT SEA. THE INTXN TKOF POINT ON RWY 34R AT TXWY Q WAS DEFINED ON THE TPS AS 'RWY 34RY' WITH A USEABLE DISTANCE OF 9400 FT FROM TXWY RWY 34R (TXWY Q). IT IS CUSTOMARY THAT WHEN AN INTXN TKOF IS DEFINED ON THE TPS, THERE IS ALSO A CORRESPONDING RWY TKOF ANALYSIS, BASED ON THE SPECIFIC INTXN TKOF POINT, COMPUTED AND DESIGNATED ON THE TPS ANALYSIS, INDICATING MAX TKOF WTS FOR THE RWY INTXN TKOF POINT AND THE SECOND SEGMENT CLB WT LIMITS FOR THE PARTICULAR FLAP SETTING, WT AND TEMP. BUT NOT IN THIS CASE! IN THIS CASE, A FULL LENGTH ANALYSIS FOR RWY 34L, WITH A FULL USABLE LENGTH OF 9400 FT WAS LISTED ALONGSIDE RWY 34R WITH A FULL USABLE LENGTH OF 11900 FT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE INTXN DATA FOR RWY 34R, DEFINED ON THE TPS AS RWY 34RY, WAS NOT LISTED ON THE TPS (ONLY THE FULL LENGTH DATA FOR RWY 34R WAS LISTED)! SO, ATC TAXIED US TO RWY 34R AT TXWY Q, AS WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT BY BOTH ATC AND OUR COMPANY PRODUCED TPS. A QUICK CHK OF THE RWY 34R HEADER FOR THE RWY ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT WE WERE LEGAL FOR TKOF. OR WERE WE? UPON CLOSER EXAMINATION, 'RWY 34RY' WAS MISSING! WE HAD ONLY BEEN ISSUED A FULL LENGTH RWY ANALYSIS FOR 'RWY 34R,' EVEN THOUGH WE HAD INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TPS SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTING US TO EXPECT AN INTXN DEP FROM RWY 34R AT TXWY Q, AND FURTHER DEFINED AS RWY 34RY (NOTE THAT THE 'Y' SUFFIX IS THE INTXN DESIGNATOR FOR TXWY Q). SO, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HAVE BEEN LEGAL FOR A FULL LENGTH RWY 34L TKOF WITH AN AVAILABLE FULL LENGTH DISTANCE OF 9400 FT OF FULL LENGTH AVAILABLE, WE DID NOT HAVE AN ANALYSIS FOR AN INTXN TKOF FROM RWY 34R'Y,' WITH AN AVAILABLE DISTANCE OF 9100 FT, BECAUSE IT WAS OMITTED FROM THE TPS ANALYSIS. BUT WHY? WORKING THROUGH DISPATCH, I LEARNED THAT ALTHOUGH ACR USES A CENTRAL LOAD PLANNING SYS (CLP) THE LCL STATIONS HAVE SOME AUTH OVER SELECTED WT AND BAL ENTRIES. IN THIS CASE, THEY COULD CTL WHICH RWYS WERE DESIGNATED FOR ANALYSIS AND THEY ALSO CTLED THE 'NOTES' SECTION, WHICH SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED US (CREWS) TO EXPECT A RWY 34R INTXN DEP AND THE TPS INFO DEFINING THE RWY 34R INTXN TKOF POINT FROM 'Q' INTXN. SIMPLY PUT, THE STATION TOLD US TO EXPECT ONE THING, BUT GAVE US INFO FOR ANOTHER, A POTENTIALLY FATAL ERROR IN THIS CASE. WORKING THROUGH THE DISPATCHER TRAINING INSTRUCTORS TO THE STATION, I HAVE ADVISED THOSE INVOLVED WITH THE TPS SYS OF THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS. I ALSO AM CRITICAL OF ACR X FOR ELIMINATING PLT WT AND BAL DATA MANUALS, WHICH WE ARE USED TO CARRY IN EVERY ACFT AS A MEANS OF PLANNING AND AS A CHK AND A BAL TO THE CENTRAL LOAD PLANNING SYS. THERE ARE OTHER PROB AREAS TOO, WHERE THE TPS WILL NOT ALLOW PLTS TO UTILIZE OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR WX RELATED SAFETY CONCERNS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE RWYS ARE WET WITH STANDING WATER, AND I ASK DISPATCH TO SHOW A CONTAMINATED RWY, THE REPLY I GET IS THAT THEY CANNOT, BECAUSE THE STATION IS NOT RPTING IT! MY 'TOOLS' TO SAFELY CONDUCT THE FLT ARE BEING TAKEN AWAY. SO FAR, MY COPY OF THE ACR X OP SPECS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY THE COMPANY AS WELL AS MY ABILITY TO MANUALLY CONFIRM ARPT ANALYSIS DATA. SUCCESSFUL AIRLINES ACR Y STILL ALLOW THEIR CREWS TO PERFORM THE WT AND BAL RWY ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS IN THE COCKPIT. OTHER AIRLINES STILL ALLOW THEIR MATERIALS TO MANUALLY COMPUTE AND VALIDATE THE TKOF ANALYSIS INFO AND THE OPTIMUM TKOF CONFIGN BASED ON WT, DESIRED FLAP SETTING AND CONDITIONS, BY FLC'S. I WOULD ASK THAT NASA ENCOURAGE THAT ACFT PERFORMANCE DATA, INCLUDING ARPT RWY ANALYSIS DATA BE PROVIDED AND AVAILABLE IN THE COCKPIT TO THE PLTS SO AS TO ENHANCE SAFETY...AND STOP TAKING AWAY THE TOOLS THAT WE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR A SAFER OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALEDTHE FOLLOWING INFO: THE COMPANY HAS RECENTLY CENTRALIZED LOAD PLANNING AT ONE POINT. CAPT THINKS THE CURRENT COMPANY PROC IS JUST SETTING A CREW UP TO MAKE AN ILLEGAL TKOF. IT'S EASY TO MISS THE LACK OF TKOF NUMBERS WHEN AT FIRST GLANCE IT APPEARS A LEGAL TKOF, THE COMPANY HAS INDICATED THEY WILL FIX THE SEA PROB. THE PLT HAS NOT BEEN BACK TO SEA SINCE THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.