Narrative:

Our aircraft was cleared into position and hold on runway 9L at atl. After holding for approximately 30 seconds, we received takeoff clearance. I (captain, pilot flying) illuminated all forward-facing exterior lights, advanced thrust levers, and called for N1 autothrottle engagement. After watching initial power application on engine instruments, I shifted my gaze down along our takeoff runway. I was alarmed to see a dc-9 from another carrier approaching our runway rapidly at what appeared to be taxiway dixie. I said 'is this guy going to cross our runway?' as soon as I said that, the dc-9 did indeed move onto our runway. I said 'yes he is...abort!' I retarded the thrust levers at approximately 65 to 70 KIAS and began braking. Rejected takeoff autobrakes were not activated. As the other aircraft was more than 4000 ft downfield, our braking was not heavy. One second after I initiated the rejected takeoff, atl tower transmitted '(flight #) abort!' we responded 'we are aborting.' during the initial abort sequence, I observed the full length of the dc-9 fuselage within the confines of the runway and still moving right to left. After that I focused on stopping the airplane and making a turnoff at taxiway M6, I never did look at the dc-9 again and do not know if he ever stopped at all. This was a low-energy discontinued takeoff, engine power had only just reached takeoff power setting when retarded and with gentle braking we did not subsequently observe elevated brake temperatures. First officer recalls that as we exited the runway a transmission was made on tower frequency (presumably atl tower, possibly inadvertently) 'that one was on me.' atl tower was utilizing an occasional procedure in which the tower frequency is split--one frequency for the inboard departure runway (9L) and a different frequency for the outboard arrival runway (9R). I have voiced concern over this practice in the past since it was implemented a number of yrs ago. When this procedure is in use it is not possible for an airman to hear all xmissions which affect his runway. If indeed the dc-9 was cleared to cross our runway, I very likely would have recognized the conflict in advance had only one frequency been in use for all aircraft. Regardless of whether the dc-9 was cleared to cross the runway or not, I cannot believe that in this day and age with runway incursions as our greatest threat that any professional airman would cross any runway without looking first to make sure that it was clear. Our aircraft was fully lit up and I'm sure it would be apparent that we were on the takeoff roll. For my part, before crossing any runway I look both ways and then verbalize 'we are cleared to cross this runway, looks good to me.' perhaps something like this needs to be emphasized to the industry. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the B767 after leaving the runway was told to stay on tower instead of returning to ground frequency. They were directed back across the runway to bypass the queue for departure. On return to atlanta later in the day the company duty pilot was contacted. He had conferred with the tower and was told that it was 'no deal' and that 'the dc-9 had not crossed the runway.' the company recommended that the reporter not contact the tower individually. The tower procedure of using separate frequencies for departures on runway 9L and arrivals on runway 9R has been in use for 4 to 5 yrs. It appears to the reporter to be used during heavy traffic times. He estimates it to be 30 to 40 percent of the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A RWY INCURSION AND GND CONFLICT BTWN TWO ACRS AT ATL WHEN THE SOUTH COMPLEX PARALLEL RWYS WERE UNDER THE CTL OF AN ARR AND SEPARATE DEP LOCAL CTLR.

Narrative: OUR ACFT WAS CLRED INTO POSITION AND HOLD ON RWY 9L AT ATL. AFTER HOLDING FOR APPROX 30 SECS, WE RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC. I (CAPT, PLT FLYING) ILLUMINATED ALL FORWARD-FACING EXTERIOR LIGHTS, ADVANCED THRUST LEVERS, AND CALLED FOR N1 AUTOTHROTTLE ENGAGEMENT. AFTER WATCHING INITIAL POWER APPLICATION ON ENG INSTRUMENTS, I SHIFTED MY GAZE DOWN ALONG OUR TKOF RWY. I WAS ALARMED TO SEE A DC-9 FROM ANOTHER CARRIER APCHING OUR RWY RAPIDLY AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE TXWY DIXIE. I SAID 'IS THIS GUY GOING TO CROSS OUR RWY?' AS SOON AS I SAID THAT, THE DC-9 DID INDEED MOVE ONTO OUR RWY. I SAID 'YES HE IS...ABORT!' I RETARDED THE THRUST LEVERS AT APPROX 65 TO 70 KIAS AND BEGAN BRAKING. RTO AUTOBRAKES WERE NOT ACTIVATED. AS THE OTHER ACFT WAS MORE THAN 4000 FT DOWNFIELD, OUR BRAKING WAS NOT HEAVY. ONE SECOND AFTER I INITIATED THE REJECTED TKOF, ATL TWR TRANSMITTED '(FLT #) ABORT!' WE RESPONDED 'WE ARE ABORTING.' DURING THE INITIAL ABORT SEQUENCE, I OBSERVED THE FULL LENGTH OF THE DC-9 FUSELAGE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RWY AND STILL MOVING R TO L. AFTER THAT I FOCUSED ON STOPPING THE AIRPLANE AND MAKING A TURNOFF AT TXWY M6, I NEVER DID LOOK AT THE DC-9 AGAIN AND DO NOT KNOW IF HE EVER STOPPED AT ALL. THIS WAS A LOW-ENERGY DISCONTINUED TKOF, ENG POWER HAD ONLY JUST REACHED TKOF POWER SETTING WHEN RETARDED AND WITH GENTLE BRAKING WE DID NOT SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVE ELEVATED BRAKE TEMPS. FO RECALLS THAT AS WE EXITED THE RWY A XMISSION WAS MADE ON TWR FREQ (PRESUMABLY ATL TWR, POSSIBLY INADVERTENTLY) 'THAT ONE WAS ON ME.' ATL TWR WAS UTILIZING AN OCCASIONAL PROC IN WHICH THE TWR FREQ IS SPLIT--ONE FREQ FOR THE INBOARD DEP RWY (9L) AND A DIFFERENT FREQ FOR THE OUTBOARD ARR RWY (9R). I HAVE VOICED CONCERN OVER THIS PRACTICE IN THE PAST SINCE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED A NUMBER OF YRS AGO. WHEN THIS PROC IS IN USE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR AN AIRMAN TO HEAR ALL XMISSIONS WHICH AFFECT HIS RWY. IF INDEED THE DC-9 WAS CLRED TO CROSS OUR RWY, I VERY LIKELY WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE CONFLICT IN ADVANCE HAD ONLY ONE FREQ BEEN IN USE FOR ALL ACFT. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE DC-9 WAS CLRED TO CROSS THE RWY OR NOT, I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT IN THIS DAY AND AGE WITH RWY INCURSIONS AS OUR GREATEST THREAT THAT ANY PROFESSIONAL AIRMAN WOULD CROSS ANY RWY WITHOUT LOOKING FIRST TO MAKE SURE THAT IT WAS CLR. OUR ACFT WAS FULLY LIT UP AND I'M SURE IT WOULD BE APPARENT THAT WE WERE ON THE TKOF ROLL. FOR MY PART, BEFORE XING ANY RWY I LOOK BOTH WAYS AND THEN VERBALIZE 'WE ARE CLRED TO CROSS THIS RWY, LOOKS GOOD TO ME.' PERHAPS SOMETHING LIKE THIS NEEDS TO BE EMPHASIZED TO THE INDUSTRY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE B767 AFTER LEAVING THE RWY WAS TOLD TO STAY ON TWR INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO GND FREQ. THEY WERE DIRECTED BACK ACROSS THE RWY TO BYPASS THE QUEUE FOR DEP. ON RETURN TO ATLANTA LATER IN THE DAY THE COMPANY DUTY PLT WAS CONTACTED. HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THE TWR AND WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS 'NO DEAL' AND THAT 'THE DC-9 HAD NOT CROSSED THE RWY.' THE COMPANY RECOMMENDED THAT THE RPTR NOT CONTACT THE TWR INDIVIDUALLY. THE TWR PROC OF USING SEPARATE FREQUENCIES FOR DEPS ON RWY 9L AND ARRIVALS ON RWY 9R HAS BEEN IN USE FOR 4 TO 5 YRS. IT APPEARS TO THE RPTR TO BE USED DURING HEAVY TFC TIMES. HE ESTIMATES IT TO BE 30 TO 40 PERCENT OF THE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.