Narrative:

First officer was the PF. Autoplt on and level at FL230. ZHU cleared us to climb from FL230 to FL280 just south of diffa. As the first officer began the climb, we received a TCASII TA at our 1 or 2 O'clock position. I selected the 10 mi range on the TCASII to get a more accurate picture of the traffic and almost immediately the TCASII issued an RA to descend. The first officer disconnected the autoplt and autothrottles while pushing the nose of the aircraft over and simultaneously reducing power. By this time, I had visual contact with the air carrier regional jet and could see it growing larger in the windscreen. The regional jet passed directly over us as the first officer managed to stop the climb and begin descending. Our highest altitude in the climb was approximately FL235. The TCASII showed 500 ft vertical separation. At that moment, ZHU instructed us to turn left 30 degrees. I told the controller that we were responding to a TA alert (should have used the term 'RA') and had seen the other aircraft pass over us. Later, I called ZHU on the telephone and talked with quality assurance and was told this was an operational error. He was familiar with the details of the incident and related that an investigation had already begun. Apparently, the controller had confused the track on our conflicting traffic with traffic that had already passed. The clearance to climb was given when there was less than 1 min separation between our flight and the air carrier rj at FL240. He also confirmed that center radar showed our vertical separation as 500 ft after the targets merged. The other aircraft also received a TCASII RA and began to climb after passing us, eventually climbing 1000 ft. After responding to the RA and hearing the 'clear of conflict' announcement from the TCASII, we resumed the previously assigned flight path. The second climb apparently caused another alert on the center radar because of our proximity to the other aircraft, but did not result in a TCASII RA. Lesson learned. The first officer responded calmly and promptly in applying the procedures for a TCASII RA. Because of the closure rate, a delay in responding to the RA would have, I am certain, resulted in a midair collision. I am even more convinced of the value in following the TCASII RA as per company procedures. Supplemental information from acn 561343: the sun was shining into the cockpit and casting a glare over the TCASII display. I could not see the display so I held out my hand to block the glare. 1) the TCASII proved invaluable to avoiding a collision, but due to the glare from the sun, I could not see the display during any of the maneuvering. 2) although TCASII training emphasizes smooth control response to an RA -- in this situation I feel that I should have been more aggressive in the descent and that would have increased the separation. 3) it was alarming that ARTCC had no indication of a conflict until it had passed. The total elapsed time from the first TA until resuming the climb was less than 2 mins giving little time to analyze the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CREW CLBING IN CLASS A AIRSPACE RECEIVE A TCASII RA TO DSND AND OBSERVE A CRJ PASS OVERHEAD.

Narrative: FO WAS THE PF. AUTOPLT ON AND LEVEL AT FL230. ZHU CLRED US TO CLB FROM FL230 TO FL280 JUST S OF DIFFA. AS THE FO BEGAN THE CLB, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA AT OUR 1 OR 2 O'CLOCK POS. I SELECTED THE 10 MI RANGE ON THE TCASII TO GET A MORE ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE TFC AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE TCASII ISSUED AN RA TO DSND. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES WHILE PUSHING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT OVER AND SIMULTANEOUSLY REDUCING PWR. BY THIS TIME, I HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ACR REGIONAL JET AND COULD SEE IT GROWING LARGER IN THE WINDSCREEN. THE REGIONAL JET PASSED DIRECTLY OVER US AS THE FO MANAGED TO STOP THE CLB AND BEGIN DSNDING. OUR HIGHEST ALT IN THE CLB WAS APPROX FL235. THE TCASII SHOWED 500 FT VERT SEPARATION. AT THAT MOMENT, ZHU INSTRUCTED US TO TURN L 30 DEGS. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO A TA ALERT (SHOULD HAVE USED THE TERM 'RA') AND HAD SEEN THE OTHER ACFT PASS OVER US. LATER, I CALLED ZHU ON THE TELEPHONE AND TALKED WITH QUALITY ASSURANCE AND WAS TOLD THIS WAS AN OPERROR. HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AND RELATED THAT AN INVESTIGATION HAD ALREADY BEGUN. APPARENTLY, THE CTLR HAD CONFUSED THE TRACK ON OUR CONFLICTING TFC WITH TFC THAT HAD ALREADY PASSED. THE CLRNC TO CLB WAS GIVEN WHEN THERE WAS LESS THAN 1 MIN SEPARATION BTWN OUR FLT AND THE ACR RJ AT FL240. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT CTR RADAR SHOWED OUR VERT SEPARATION AS 500 FT AFTER THE TARGETS MERGED. THE OTHER ACFT ALSO RECEIVED A TCASII RA AND BEGAN TO CLB AFTER PASSING US, EVENTUALLY CLBING 1000 FT. AFTER RESPONDING TO THE RA AND HEARING THE 'CLR OF CONFLICT' ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE TCASII, WE RESUMED THE PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED FLT PATH. THE SECOND CLB APPARENTLY CAUSED ANOTHER ALERT ON THE CTR RADAR BECAUSE OF OUR PROX TO THE OTHER ACFT, BUT DID NOT RESULT IN A TCASII RA. LESSON LEARNED. THE FO RESPONDED CALMLY AND PROMPTLY IN APPLYING THE PROCS FOR A TCASII RA. BECAUSE OF THE CLOSURE RATE, A DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE RA WOULD HAVE, I AM CERTAIN, RESULTED IN A MIDAIR COLLISION. I AM EVEN MORE CONVINCED OF THE VALUE IN FOLLOWING THE TCASII RA AS PER COMPANY PROCS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 561343: THE SUN WAS SHINING INTO THE COCKPIT AND CASTING A GLARE OVER THE TCASII DISPLAY. I COULD NOT SEE THE DISPLAY SO I HELD OUT MY HAND TO BLOCK THE GLARE. 1) THE TCASII PROVED INVALUABLE TO AVOIDING A COLLISION, BUT DUE TO THE GLARE FROM THE SUN, I COULD NOT SEE THE DISPLAY DURING ANY OF THE MANEUVERING. 2) ALTHOUGH TCASII TRAINING EMPHASIZES SMOOTH CTL RESPONSE TO AN RA -- IN THIS SIT I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN THE DSCNT AND THAT WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE SEPARATION. 3) IT WAS ALARMING THAT ARTCC HAD NO INDICATION OF A CONFLICT UNTIL IT HAD PASSED. THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME FROM THE FIRST TA UNTIL RESUMING THE CLB WAS LESS THAN 2 MINS GIVING LITTLE TIME TO ANALYZE THE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.