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Attributes | |
ACN | 574616 |
Time | |
Date | 200302 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : czqm.artcc |
State Reference | NB |
Altitude | msl single value : 33000 |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : czqm.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Route In Use | enroute : direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 574616 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : lavatory sys indicators other other : 7 |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : landed as precaution flight crew : diverted to another airport |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Air abort and overweight landing. This report addresses the air abort of a flight scheduled to zrh. Operations were normal until en route approximately north of halifax, nova scotia. I was notified by the cabin crew that we had in -- fairly rapid succession -- lost the functioning of 4 lavatories out of a total of 8. They would not flush and had become quite full. I contacted the relief pilot on break at the time and asked him to assess the problem. First officer and I consulted our onboard resources and initiated contact with air carrier maintenance controller through dispatch in order to get additional information relevant to the system malfunction. The air carrier maintenance controller representative indicated that the 4 lavatories are all associated with a single system and the other 4 are associated with a separate system. Maintenance suggested the time honored technique of attempting 1 reset of the malfunctioning system coupled with flushing some ice through an aft lavatory. We attempted this procedure without success. I requested information from maintenance representative as to whether the remaining lavatory system had adequate capacity for the trans-atlantic crossing, given the full passenger load of 161 passenger plus crew. I was informed that capacity should be adequate assuming that the lavatory tanks had been fully emptied prior to departure and barring further failure of the lavatory system. Shortly thereafter, I was informed that we had experienced an additional failure of 1 lavatory associated with the remaining system. Naturally, this seemed somewhat more than coincidence and strongly suggested that the lavatories had not been properly svced or perhaps that we were experiencing some significant progressive system failure. After consultation with the crew and dispatch, I elected to make an intermediate stop in order to rectify the system problem. The course change was made prior to entering the north atlantic route structure so as to avoid the additional hazards associated with a course reversal once in the track structure. Dispatch elected not to attempt a servicing at halifax, but instead to return us to jfk where an aircraft change would be planned. The return to jfk was uneventful and, after additional consultation with maintenance, an overweight landing was accomplished. All overweight landing considerations were addressed and the touchdown was smooth at 300 FPM and 319400 pounds. In my judgement, landing this small amount overweight was as safe as the alternative of holding to burn fuel. Also, an expeditious landing could reduce exposure to these lavatory failures of unknown nature or additional problems. After landing, initial maintenance investigation indicated that lavatory servicing had not been successfully accomplished due to a system component failure. Additionally, there was evidence that the lavatory system was leaking. The aircraft was taken OTS.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767-300 CREW HAD 4 OF 8 ACFT TOILETS BECOME INOP WITH A FULL PAX LOAD, PRIOR TO ENTERING ATLANTIC OCEANIC AIRSPACE FOR A FLT FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE.
Narrative: AIR ABORT AND OVERWT LNDG. THIS RPT ADDRESSES THE AIR ABORT OF A FLT SCHEDULED TO ZRH. OPS WERE NORMAL UNTIL ENRTE APPROX N OF HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA. I WAS NOTIFIED BY THE CABIN CREW THAT WE HAD IN -- FAIRLY RAPID SUCCESSION -- LOST THE FUNCTIONING OF 4 LAVATORIES OUT OF A TOTAL OF 8. THEY WOULD NOT FLUSH AND HAD BECOME QUITE FULL. I CONTACTED THE RELIEF PLT ON BREAK AT THE TIME AND ASKED HIM TO ASSESS THE PROB. FO AND I CONSULTED OUR ONBOARD RESOURCES AND INITIATED CONTACT WITH ACR MAINT CTLR THROUGH DISPATCH IN ORDER TO GET ADDITIONAL INFO RELEVANT TO THE SYS MALFUNCTION. THE ACR MAINT CTLR REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT THE 4 LAVATORIES ARE ALL ASSOCIATED WITH A SINGLE SYS AND THE OTHER 4 ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A SEPARATE SYS. MAINT SUGGESTED THE TIME HONORED TECHNIQUE OF ATTEMPTING 1 RESET OF THE MALFUNCTIONING SYS COUPLED WITH FLUSHING SOME ICE THROUGH AN AFT LAVATORY. WE ATTEMPTED THIS PROC WITHOUT SUCCESS. I REQUESTED INFO FROM MAINT REPRESENTATIVE AS TO WHETHER THE REMAINING LAVATORY SYS HAD ADEQUATE CAPACITY FOR THE TRANS-ATLANTIC XING, GIVEN THE FULL PAX LOAD OF 161 PAX PLUS CREW. I WAS INFORMED THAT CAPACITY SHOULD BE ADEQUATE ASSUMING THAT THE LAVATORY TANKS HAD BEEN FULLY EMPTIED PRIOR TO DEP AND BARRING FURTHER FAILURE OF THE LAVATORY SYS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I WAS INFORMED THAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF 1 LAVATORY ASSOCIATED WITH THE REMAINING SYS. NATURALLY, THIS SEEMED SOMEWHAT MORE THAN COINCIDENCE AND STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT THE LAVATORIES HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SVCED OR PERHAPS THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING SOME SIGNIFICANT PROGRESSIVE SYS FAILURE. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE CREW AND DISPATCH, I ELECTED TO MAKE AN INTERMEDIATE STOP IN ORDER TO RECTIFY THE SYS PROB. THE COURSE CHANGE WAS MADE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE NORTH ATLANTIC RTE STRUCTURE SO AS TO AVOID THE ADDITIONAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH A COURSE REVERSAL ONCE IN THE TRACK STRUCTURE. DISPATCH ELECTED NOT TO ATTEMPT A SVCING AT HALIFAX, BUT INSTEAD TO RETURN US TO JFK WHERE AN ACFT CHANGE WOULD BE PLANNED. THE RETURN TO JFK WAS UNEVENTFUL AND, AFTER ADDITIONAL CONSULTATION WITH MAINT, AN OVERWT LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. ALL OVERWT LNDG CONSIDERATIONS WERE ADDRESSED AND THE TOUCHDOWN WAS SMOOTH AT 300 FPM AND 319400 LBS. IN MY JUDGEMENT, LNDG THIS SMALL AMOUNT OVERWT WAS AS SAFE AS THE ALTERNATIVE OF HOLDING TO BURN FUEL. ALSO, AN EXPEDITIOUS LNDG COULD REDUCE EXPOSURE TO THESE LAVATORY FAILURES OF UNKNOWN NATURE OR ADDITIONAL PROBS. AFTER LNDG, INITIAL MAINT INVESTIGATION INDICATED THAT LAVATORY SVCING HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO A SYS COMPONENT FAILURE. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE LAVATORY SYS WAS LEAKING. THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.