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Attributes | |
ACN | 598886 |
Time | |
Date | 200311 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : jax.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi landing : roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 16400 flight time type : 15000 |
ASRS Report | 598886 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 16200 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 599345 |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : taxiway non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other controllerb other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Environmental Factor Airport ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
After landing on runway 7, was instructed to turn off on taxiway F. I mistook taxiway G (with lighted high speed turn off green centerline lights illuminated) for taxiway F. After exiting the runway onto taxiway G I was looking directly into very bright work lights being used by work crew on crossing taxiway a. The lights were so bright as to nearly obscure barricades at taxiway a on taxiway G. There was room on the open portion of the taxiway to clear the runway and barely enough room to reverse course later to return to runway 7 and taxi down runway 7 (with tower clearance) to taxiway F for taxi to gate. There are no NOTAMS listed in chart manual nor on flight release pertaining to the taxiway closure. If the closure was on the audio ATIS, we missed its mention. There is no digital ATIS (for ACARS retrieval) available at jax. I felt some pressure to clear the active runway due to traffic following on approach and had no reason to believe that lighted high speed turn off 'lead-in' lights would be on a 'closed' taxiway. Plus workers high intensity lights pointing toward runway mostly obscured barricades, which would have further clued me to the fact that I could not proceed to the terminal via this taxiway. Supplemental information from acn 599345: after landing on runway 7 at jax, we attempted to turn off the runway on to a taxiway that had lighted lead-off lights. The tower had told us to turn on taxiway F, which we thought this was. However, due to a contractor painting crew working on the parallel taxiway and having a very bright work light shining right at the runway and turnoff, we were not able to see the taxiway identify sign or the cones blocking the taxiway at the juncture with the parallel until we were well into the turn. We stopped the aircraft clear of the runway and short of the blocked taxiway, and then received clearance from the tower to reenter the runway and proceed down to the next taxiway. My observations on this incident are as follows: if the taxiway closure was on the voice ATIS (jax does not have ACARS ATIS) we missed it. All airports serving air carrier aircraft should have digital ATIS for both departure and arrival. It is much easier to miss items on a long voice ATIS. The lead-off lights should never be lit for a closed taxiway. This type of error continues to lead to problems on airports at night, and I am amazed that airport operations will still do this. Contractors should not be permitted to position their work lights so that they are shining directly at a runway or down a taxiway. This work light was positioned directly in line with the turnoff. Unlighted cones or barriers at night are not enough to mark a closed taxiway. If these were lit we were not able to see them because of the bright work light.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 CREW EXITED THE RWY AT THE LIGHTED HIGH SPD TURNOFF, ONTO A CLOSED AND BARRICADED TXWY AT JAX.
Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 7, WAS INSTRUCTED TO TURN OFF ON TXWY F. I MISTOOK TXWY G (WITH LIGHTED HIGH SPD TURN OFF GREEN CTRLINE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED) FOR TXWY F. AFTER EXITING THE RWY ONTO TXWY G I WAS LOOKING DIRECTLY INTO VERY BRIGHT WORK LIGHTS BEING USED BY WORK CREW ON XING TXWY A. THE LIGHTS WERE SO BRIGHT AS TO NEARLY OBSCURE BARRICADES AT TXWY A ON TXWY G. THERE WAS ROOM ON THE OPEN PORTION OF THE TXWY TO CLR THE RWY AND BARELY ENOUGH ROOM TO REVERSE COURSE LATER TO RETURN TO RWY 7 AND TAXI DOWN RWY 7 (WITH TWR CLRNC) TO TXWY F FOR TAXI TO GATE. THERE ARE NO NOTAMS LISTED IN CHART MANUAL NOR ON FLT RELEASE PERTAINING TO THE TXWY CLOSURE. IF THE CLOSURE WAS ON THE AUDIO ATIS, WE MISSED ITS MENTION. THERE IS NO DIGITAL ATIS (FOR ACARS RETRIEVAL) AVAILABLE AT JAX. I FELT SOME PRESSURE TO CLR THE ACTIVE RWY DUE TO TFC FOLLOWING ON APCH AND HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LIGHTED HIGH SPD TURN OFF 'LEAD-IN' LIGHTS WOULD BE ON A 'CLOSED' TXWY. PLUS WORKERS HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS POINTING TOWARD RWY MOSTLY OBSCURED BARRICADES, WHICH WOULD HAVE FURTHER CLUED ME TO THE FACT THAT I COULD NOT PROCEED TO THE TERMINAL VIA THIS TXWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 599345: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 7 AT JAX, WE ATTEMPTED TO TURN OFF THE RWY ON TO A TXWY THAT HAD LIGHTED LEAD-OFF LIGHTS. THE TWR HAD TOLD US TO TURN ON TXWY F, WHICH WE THOUGHT THIS WAS. HOWEVER, DUE TO A CONTRACTOR PAINTING CREW WORKING ON THE PARALLEL TXWY AND HAVING A VERY BRIGHT WORK LIGHT SHINING RIGHT AT THE RWY AND TURNOFF, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SEE THE TXWY IDENT SIGN OR THE CONES BLOCKING THE TXWY AT THE JUNCTURE WITH THE PARALLEL UNTIL WE WERE WELL INTO THE TURN. WE STOPPED THE ACFT CLR OF THE RWY AND SHORT OF THE BLOCKED TXWY, AND THEN RECEIVED CLRNC FROM THE TWR TO REENTER THE RWY AND PROCEED DOWN TO THE NEXT TXWY. MY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: IF THE TXWY CLOSURE WAS ON THE VOICE ATIS (JAX DOES NOT HAVE ACARS ATIS) WE MISSED IT. ALL ARPTS SERVING ACR ACFT SHOULD HAVE DIGITAL ATIS FOR BOTH DEP AND ARR. IT IS MUCH EASIER TO MISS ITEMS ON A LONG VOICE ATIS. THE LEAD-OFF LIGHTS SHOULD NEVER BE LIT FOR A CLOSED TXWY. THIS TYPE OF ERROR CONTINUES TO LEAD TO PROBS ON ARPTS AT NIGHT, AND I AM AMAZED THAT ARPT OPS WILL STILL DO THIS. CONTRACTORS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO POS THEIR WORK LIGHTS SO THAT THEY ARE SHINING DIRECTLY AT A RWY OR DOWN A TXWY. THIS WORK LIGHT WAS POSITIONED DIRECTLY IN LINE WITH THE TURNOFF. UNLIGHTED CONES OR BARRIERS AT NIGHT ARE NOT ENOUGH TO MARK A CLOSED TXWY. IF THESE WERE LIT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SEE THEM BECAUSE OF THE BRIGHT WORK LIGHT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.