Narrative:

The aircraft we were assigned came in with a deferred inoperative #2 pack. On taxi out, the #1 pack became inoperative. After contacting maintenance controller, we attempted several resets of various types to correct the problem to no avail. As a result, we returned to the gate for maintenance. Upon return to the gate, the captain phoned the dispatcher and expressed his desire to switch to another aircraft given the nature of the problem and the fact that maintenance had 4 technicians working the problem and unable to formulate a 'fix.' the dispatcher appeared to agree with the captain on this assessment and said he would make the appropriate calls. Approximately 45 mins later in a telephone conversation with the maintenance controller, it was relayed to the captain that he was looking for another airplane, however, maintenance would continue to work the problem. The captain made it clear to the local controller that it would be prudent given the nature of this problem that another aircraft be utilized. The local controller indicated that he was looking. Another 40 mins transpired with no communication from the local controller. The gate agent relayed to the captain that it appeared as if maintenance would have the aircraft fixed soon (information obtained from maintenance). At this point the captain telephoned the flight duty manager to inform him of the situation and 'made it clear' that another aircraft was being requested. The flight duty manager agreed with the captain and said 'I would do the same thing' (the flight duty manager flies the same type aircraft as the captain). The flight duty manager said he would call the operations management manager and relay this information. 10 mins later, the captain received a phone call from the local controller indicating that neither the dispatcher nor the operations management manager would issue a telex on this issue what is what he needs to swap out aircraft. According to the controller, both had stated that maintenance had fixed the aircraft and as far as they were concerned there is no issue. At this point, the captain felt coerced into taking the aircraft due to the lack of support through one word out the chain and also the fact that if he walked off the aircraft for no apparent reason according to the dispatcher and operations management manager he would be penalized monetarily as the new pilot contract only compensates for 'hard time.' knowing that a loss of pressurization would not be a 'life or death' situation, the captain flew the aircraft, uneventfully as it turned out.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CAPT WANTED A PLANE CHANGE AFTER THE #2 PACK WAS DEFERRED INOP PER THE MEL, AND THE #1 PACK BECAME INOP ON TAXI.

Narrative: THE ACFT WE WERE ASSIGNED CAME IN WITH A DEFERRED INOP #2 PACK. ON TAXI OUT, THE #1 PACK BECAME INOP. AFTER CONTACTING MAINT CTLR, WE ATTEMPTED SEVERAL RESETS OF VARIOUS TYPES TO CORRECT THE PROB TO NO AVAIL. AS A RESULT, WE RETURNED TO THE GATE FOR MAINT. UPON RETURN TO THE GATE, THE CAPT PHONED THE DISPATCHER AND EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO SWITCH TO ANOTHER ACFT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE PROB AND THE FACT THAT MAINT HAD 4 TECHNICIANS WORKING THE PROB AND UNABLE TO FORMULATE A 'FIX.' THE DISPATCHER APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THE CAPT ON THIS ASSESSMENT AND SAID HE WOULD MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CALLS. APPROX 45 MINS LATER IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE MAINT CTLR, IT WAS RELAYED TO THE CAPT THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR ANOTHER AIRPLANE, HOWEVER, MAINT WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK THE PROB. THE CAPT MADE IT CLR TO THE LCL CTLR THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THIS PROB THAT ANOTHER ACFT BE UTILIZED. THE LCL CTLR INDICATED THAT HE WAS LOOKING. ANOTHER 40 MINS TRANSPIRED WITH NO COM FROM THE LCL CTLR. THE GATE AGENT RELAYED TO THE CAPT THAT IT APPEARED AS IF MAINT WOULD HAVE THE ACFT FIXED SOON (INFO OBTAINED FROM MAINT). AT THIS POINT THE CAPT TELEPHONED THE FLT DUTY MGR TO INFORM HIM OF THE SIT AND 'MADE IT CLR' THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS BEING REQUESTED. THE FLT DUTY MGR AGREED WITH THE CAPT AND SAID 'I WOULD DO THE SAME THING' (THE FLT DUTY MGR FLIES THE SAME TYPE ACFT AS THE CAPT). THE FLT DUTY MGR SAID HE WOULD CALL THE OPS MGMNT MGR AND RELAY THIS INFO. 10 MINS LATER, THE CAPT RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM THE LCL CTLR INDICATING THAT NEITHER THE DISPATCHER NOR THE OPS MGMNT MGR WOULD ISSUE A TELEX ON THIS ISSUE WHAT IS WHAT HE NEEDS TO SWAP OUT ACFT. ACCORDING TO THE CTLR, BOTH HAD STATED THAT MAINT HAD FIXED THE ACFT AND AS FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THERE IS NO ISSUE. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT FELT COERCED INTO TAKING THE ACFT DUE TO THE LACK OF SUPPORT THROUGH ONE WORD OUT THE CHAIN AND ALSO THE FACT THAT IF HE WALKED OFF THE ACFT FOR NO APPARENT REASON ACCORDING TO THE DISPATCHER AND OPS MGMNT MGR HE WOULD BE PENALIZED MONETARILY AS THE NEW PLT CONTRACT ONLY COMPENSATES FOR 'HARD TIME.' KNOWING THAT A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION WOULD NOT BE A 'LIFE OR DEATH' SIT, THE CAPT FLEW THE ACFT, UNEVENTFULLY AS IT TURNED OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.