Narrative:

Operating from eug to pdx with 37 passenger aboard. During the preflight, I noticed that the reserve fuel on the dispatch release was abnormally low (approximately 787 pounds versus the normal 1200 pounds for the filed altitude). I brought the issue to the attention of the captain. The captain contacted the dispatcher to verify the validity of the fuel load provided. The dispatcher told the captain that the computer had generated the fuel quantity and that it was correct. The captain decided that the fuel quantity specified for the flight had to be correct because the computer had determined it. Our company has removed from the airplane all afm's and performance information with the exception of takeoff and landing data for served airport. We are totally dependent on the dispatcher to get the performance information to us. Without any performance information to hang my hat on, I had no way of convincing the captain that the release was wrong. I advised the captain that I was not comfortable with the specified fuel load. The captain compromised and added an additional 200 pounds of fuel above the specified fuel load contrary to company fueling policy. Hard evidence that the fuel load was in error was found during the flight. The fuel flows at filed altitude and planned 'normal' cruise setting totaled 1681 pounds (473 pounds less than planned and 273 pounds less than actually aboard the airplane). Additional evidence was found by visiting dispatch and reviewing the dispatcher standards manual (not available in the airplane). On page xx-X, the chart for standard reserve quantities shows that the flight should have had 1184 pounds of reserve fuel for the filed altitude. Additionally, the quantity computed was found to be less than the standard reserve fuel quantity for the aircraft at service ceilings. To prevent recurrence of this problem, crews must be provided with hard performance information to determine aircraft performance while in the airplane. Additionally, all people involved in the operation of airplanes need to learn a simple rule that computer programmers use: garbage in = garbage out. Simply stated, the computer is not always right! I lay the cause of this error directly at the feet of the dispatcher. Of the people involved, he was the only one with the ability to go 'outside the box' and verify the fuel quantity was wrong.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DH-8B CREW WAS NOT GIVEN A LEGAL FUEL LOAD BY COMPANY DISPATCH. THE CAPT WAS UNWILLING TO ADD A LEGAL FUEL LOAD.

Narrative: OPERATING FROM EUG TO PDX WITH 37 PAX ABOARD. DURING THE PREFLT, I NOTICED THAT THE RESERVE FUEL ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE WAS ABNORMALLY LOW (APPROX 787 LBS VERSUS THE NORMAL 1200 LBS FOR THE FILED ALT). I BROUGHT THE ISSUE TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT. THE CAPT CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THE FUEL LOAD PROVIDED. THE DISPATCHER TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE COMPUTER HAD GENERATED THE FUEL QUANTITY AND THAT IT WAS CORRECT. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT THE FUEL QUANTITY SPECIFIED FOR THE FLT HAD TO BE CORRECT BECAUSE THE COMPUTER HAD DETERMINED IT. OUR COMPANY HAS REMOVED FROM THE AIRPLANE ALL AFM'S AND PERFORMANCE INFO WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TKOF AND LNDG DATA FOR SERVED ARPT. WE ARE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE DISPATCHER TO GET THE PERFORMANCE INFO TO US. WITHOUT ANY PERFORMANCE INFO TO HANG MY HAT ON, I HAD NO WAY OF CONVINCING THE CAPT THAT THE RELEASE WAS WRONG. I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE SPECIFIED FUEL LOAD. THE CAPT COMPROMISED AND ADDED AN ADDITIONAL 200 LBS OF FUEL ABOVE THE SPECIFIED FUEL LOAD CONTRARY TO COMPANY FUELING POLICY. HARD EVIDENCE THAT THE FUEL LOAD WAS IN ERROR WAS FOUND DURING THE FLT. THE FUEL FLOWS AT FILED ALT AND PLANNED 'NORMAL' CRUISE SETTING TOTALED 1681 LBS (473 LBS LESS THAN PLANNED AND 273 LBS LESS THAN ACTUALLY ABOARD THE AIRPLANE). ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE WAS FOUND BY VISITING DISPATCH AND REVIEWING THE DISPATCHER STANDARDS MANUAL (NOT AVAILABLE IN THE AIRPLANE). ON PAGE XX-X, THE CHART FOR STANDARD RESERVE QUANTITIES SHOWS THAT THE FLT SHOULD HAVE HAD 1184 LBS OF RESERVE FUEL FOR THE FILED ALT. ADDITIONALLY, THE QUANTITY COMPUTED WAS FOUND TO BE LESS THAN THE STANDARD RESERVE FUEL QUANTITY FOR THE ACFT AT SVC CEILINGS. TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS PROB, CREWS MUST BE PROVIDED WITH HARD PERFORMANCE INFO TO DETERMINE ACFT PERFORMANCE WHILE IN THE AIRPLANE. ADDITIONALLY, ALL PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE OP OF AIRPLANES NEED TO LEARN A SIMPLE RULE THAT COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS USE: GARBAGE IN = GARBAGE OUT. SIMPLY STATED, THE COMPUTER IS NOT ALWAYS RIGHT! I LAY THE CAUSE OF THIS ERROR DIRECTLY AT THE FEET OF THE DISPATCHER. OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WITH THE ABILITY TO GO 'OUTSIDE THE BOX' AND VERIFY THE FUEL QUANTITY WAS WRONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.