Narrative:

On initial climb out 'speed low' (10 percent less than alpha speed) annunciated at V2 plus 20 KTS. After clean up 'alpha speed' was annunciated a '0 ret/min man.' I had to set the speed bug at 248 KTS or seven KTS above our paper plan to get it to extinguish. We had corresponding six or eight KTS higher than planned alpha annunciation at each flap speed when using our paper speeds on landing. At cruise FL330 the throttles stayed at cruise limit 1.96 EPR, only giving us .74 mach with a TAS of 439 KTS. Sat was minus 41 degrees C. It wasn't until we burned our weight down the throttles came off the pegs. This aircraft was in excess of the planned weight by thousands of pounds. If air carrier company and the FAA continue to use false and misleading weights as 'averages' there will be a future loss of airframe and life on a misloaded maximum gross weight takeoff with a subsequent system failure. The FAA in AC 120-27C and order N8300.112, and N8400.40 have found in their own tests, using real time empirical data that the former averages that were used were more than 30 pounds below normal. What did they do about it? The FAA and the airlines increased effective averages using only half of their own findings! If people are fatter and luggage is larger then it behooves us all in the name of safety to use the real numbers. I propose that the flight department send a written message to all MD82 capts and fos to document every 'speed low' and 'alpha' warning with details such as not extending slats early for example: (ie 250 KTS as is seen on the line) until the speed bug/alpha is determined by the aoa and DFGS computers. Techniques on using the speed bug to prompt an alpha annunciation should be illustrated. The wing knows how much lift is required through aoa, we as pilots deserve the same data. Only then should the remaining bugs and V speeds be set using interpolation from the speed reference cards. With summer here and airplanes full of overweight passenger with heavy luggage it is my bet that there will be a significant number of reports. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: there was no baggage count on arrival so loading error could not be determined. Feedback from the company indicated that they were concerned, but the procedures were approved and in compliance with the latest FAA directives so no changes were being contemplated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LOW SPD WARNING DURING INITIAL CLB LEADS AN MD82 PLT TO BELIEVE HIS ACFT IS HEAVIER THAN WT DOCUMENTS BASED ON APPROVED AVERAGES FOR THE FLT INDICATE.

Narrative: ON INITIAL CLBOUT 'SPD LOW' (10 PERCENT LESS THAN ALPHA SPD) ANNUNCIATED AT V2 PLUS 20 KTS. AFTER CLEAN UP 'ALPHA SPD' WAS ANNUNCIATED A '0 RET/MIN MAN.' I HAD TO SET THE SPD BUG AT 248 KTS OR SEVEN KTS ABOVE OUR PAPER PLAN TO GET IT TO EXTINGUISH. WE HAD CORRESPONDING SIX OR EIGHT KTS HIGHER THAN PLANNED ALPHA ANNUNCIATION AT EACH FLAP SPD WHEN USING OUR PAPER SPDS ON LNDG. AT CRUISE FL330 THE THROTTLES STAYED AT CRUISE LIMIT 1.96 EPR, ONLY GIVING US .74 MACH WITH A TAS OF 439 KTS. SAT WAS MINUS 41 DEGS C. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE BURNED OUR WT DOWN THE THROTTLES CAME OFF THE PEGS. THIS ACFT WAS IN EXCESS OF THE PLANNED WT BY THOUSANDS OF POUNDS. IF ACR COMPANY AND THE FAA CONTINUE TO USE FALSE AND MISLEADING WTS AS 'AVERAGES' THERE WILL BE A FUTURE LOSS OF AIRFRAME AND LIFE ON A MISLOADED MAXIMUM GROSS WT TKOF WITH A SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM FAILURE. THE FAA IN AC 120-27C AND ORDER N8300.112, AND N8400.40 HAVE FOUND IN THEIR OWN TESTS, USING REAL TIME EMPIRICAL DATA THAT THE FORMER AVERAGES THAT WERE USED WERE MORE THAN 30 POUNDS BELOW NORMAL. WHAT DID THEY DO ABOUT IT? THE FAA AND THE AIRLINES INCREASED EFFECTIVE AVERAGES USING ONLY HALF OF THEIR OWN FINDINGS! IF PEOPLE ARE FATTER AND LUGGAGE IS LARGER THEN IT BEHOOVES US ALL IN THE NAME OF SAFETY TO USE THE REAL NUMBERS. I PROPOSE THAT THE FLT DEPARTMENT SEND A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO ALL MD82 CAPTS AND FOS TO DOCUMENT EVERY 'SPD LOW' AND 'ALPHA' WARNING WITH DETAILS SUCH AS NOT EXTENDING SLATS EARLY FOR EXAMPLE: (IE 250 KTS AS IS SEEN ON THE LINE) UNTIL THE SPD BUG/ALPHA IS DETERMINED BY THE AOA AND DFGS COMPUTERS. TECHNIQUES ON USING THE SPD BUG TO PROMPT AN ALPHA ANNUNCIATION SHOULD BE ILLUSTRATED. THE WING KNOWS HOW MUCH LIFT IS REQUIRED THROUGH AOA, WE AS PLTS DESERVE THE SAME DATA. ONLY THEN SHOULD THE REMAINING BUGS AND V SPDS BE SET USING INTERPOLATION FROM THE SPD REFERENCE CARDS. WITH SUMMER HERE AND AIRPLANES FULL OF OVERWEIGHT PAX WITH HEAVY LUGGAGE IT IS MY BET THAT THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF RPTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THERE WAS NO BAGGAGE COUNT ON ARR SO LOADING ERROR COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. FEEDBACK FROM THE COMPANY INDICATED THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED, BUT THE PROCS WERE APPROVED AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LATEST FAA DIRECTIVES SO NO CHANGES WERE BEING CONTEMPLATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.