Narrative:

Unforecast WX moved into the orlando, fl, area while I was flying VFR. Reported WX in orlando was 400 ft overcast and 1 mi visibility. Upon contact with orlando approach, I requested an IFR clearance to the orlando executive airport. I was cleared direct and told to expect the localizer back course runway 25 approach. WX deteriorated to 200 ft overcast. A last min runway change was made and I was told to expect runway 7. I set up for the ILS runway 7 orl and was given vectors to the final approach course. I was cleared for the ILS runway 7 and proceeded inbound as planned. I began my descent at GS intercept and tracked the localizer and GS inbound. The runway environment was in sight 50 ft above decision altitude. However, upon acquiring the VASI, I discovered I was well below glide path and made a correction to intercept. Upon landing, I discovered the GS was reported OTS. With the GS inoperative, the MDA for the localizer approach should have been 660 ft. The chain of events leading to the flight began with the unforecast IFR conditions in the orlando area. I failed to thoroughly listen to ATIS and overlooked an important piece of flight information. The change from the localizer back course runway 25 to the ILS runway 7 made me complacent in thinking the choice for an approach to lower minimums was the reason the runway change was made. I could not think of any other reason for switching to runway 7 operations since all other approach minima were above the localizer back course runway 25 minimums. The wind was southerly at about 8 KTS. My mind was set on shooting the ILS approach. In addition, the orlando approach controller did clear me for the ILS runway 7 approach, not the localizer runway 7 approach. My report to executive tower was for the ILS runway 7, and no comment or correction was made. Unfortunately, I discovered the error after I landed. Corrective actions include thoroughly listening to all ATIS and NOTAMS regardless of airport familiarity. The localizer was tuned and idented, however the GS contains no separate identify. The GS was seemingly functioning properly prior to GS intercept, however, I did not notice if I received a navigation flag after passing the OM. Lack of controller specificity regarding the approach I was to fly was also a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 PLT DSNDS BELOW LOC MDA WHILE FLYING AN ILS APCH WITH THE GLIDE PATH OTS AT ORL.

Narrative: UNFORECAST WX MOVED INTO THE ORLANDO, FL, AREA WHILE I WAS FLYING VFR. RPTED WX IN ORLANDO WAS 400 FT OVCST AND 1 MI VISIBILITY. UPON CONTACT WITH ORLANDO APCH, I REQUESTED AN IFR CLRNC TO THE ORLANDO EXECUTIVE ARPT. I WAS CLRED DIRECT AND TOLD TO EXPECT THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 25 APCH. WX DETERIORATED TO 200 FT OVCST. A LAST MIN RWY CHANGE WAS MADE AND I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 7. I SET UP FOR THE ILS RWY 7 ORL AND WAS GIVEN VECTORS TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I WAS CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 7 AND PROCEEDED INBOUND AS PLANNED. I BEGAN MY DSCNT AT GS INTERCEPT AND TRACKED THE LOC AND GS INBOUND. THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS IN SIGHT 50 FT ABOVE DECISION ALT. HOWEVER, UPON ACQUIRING THE VASI, I DISCOVERED I WAS WELL BELOW GLIDE PATH AND MADE A CORRECTION TO INTERCEPT. UPON LNDG, I DISCOVERED THE GS WAS RPTED OTS. WITH THE GS INOP, THE MDA FOR THE LOC APCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN 660 FT. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE FLT BEGAN WITH THE UNFORECAST IFR CONDITIONS IN THE ORLANDO AREA. I FAILED TO THOROUGHLY LISTEN TO ATIS AND OVERLOOKED AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF FLT INFO. THE CHANGE FROM THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 25 TO THE ILS RWY 7 MADE ME COMPLACENT IN THINKING THE CHOICE FOR AN APCH TO LOWER MINIMUMS WAS THE REASON THE RWY CHANGE WAS MADE. I COULD NOT THINK OF ANY OTHER REASON FOR SWITCHING TO RWY 7 OPS SINCE ALL OTHER APCH MINIMA WERE ABOVE THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 25 MINIMUMS. THE WIND WAS SOUTHERLY AT ABOUT 8 KTS. MY MIND WAS SET ON SHOOTING THE ILS APCH. IN ADDITION, THE ORLANDO APCH CTLR DID CLR ME FOR THE ILS RWY 7 APCH, NOT THE LOC RWY 7 APCH. MY RPT TO EXECUTIVE TWR WAS FOR THE ILS RWY 7, AND NO COMMENT OR CORRECTION WAS MADE. UNFORTUNATELY, I DISCOVERED THE ERROR AFTER I LANDED. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE THOROUGHLY LISTENING TO ALL ATIS AND NOTAMS REGARDLESS OF ARPT FAMILIARITY. THE LOC WAS TUNED AND IDENTED, HOWEVER THE GS CONTAINS NO SEPARATE IDENT. THE GS WAS SEEMINGLY FUNCTIONING PROPERLY PRIOR TO GS INTERCEPT, HOWEVER, I DID NOT NOTICE IF I RECEIVED A NAV FLAG AFTER PASSING THE OM. LACK OF CTLR SPECIFICITY REGARDING THE APCH I WAS TO FLY WAS ALSO A FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.