Narrative:

I was the only aircraft in the gca 'box' pattern practicing PAR/ASR approachs. I executed climb out terminating my approach with 3800 pounds of fuel, enough for 1 more practice approach to a full stop. During climb out, I heard 5 other aircraft check in with approach. I knew getting caught on the end of this line would put me in a near emergency fuel situation. I requested the short hook to final from the controller. They told me 'unable' because of traffic spacing approaching my 1 O'clock position at 5 mi. I was vectored 20 NM south of the field. To conserve fuel, I stayed clean through most of the approach. I lowered my landing gear at 3 mi. I scanned the runway and noticed a taxi light at the departure end of the runway. I flew the approach to published minimums, took over visually, and flew the ball. Moments before touchdown, I was informed by approach that tower instructed me to wave off. I anticipated a situation like this, and with 2200 pounds of gas, waving off would have put me in an emergency fuel situation, with a good possibility of flaming out on downwind or final. I knew with my fuel situation, and knowing there were 3 other aircraft in the pattern, waving off was not a good option for me. I saw the activity at the approach end of an 8000 ft runway, and told control, 'unable fuel.' if they would have instructed me again to wave off, I would have declared an emergency because I did not have enough fuel to execute a go around. The decision to land potentially avoided an emergency situation of flameout due to fuel starvation resulting in loss of aircraft and possible loss of life. On the roll-out I aggressively applied brakes to minimize distance traveled during landing rollout. I stopped within 3000 ft, switched to tower frequency, and asked for clearance to taxi. They gave me clearance to taxi, telling me, 'if you see wave-off lights in the future, you should wave off and enter tower downwind.' they also told me the reason for the wave-off was due to another flight taxiing back from the overrun area. I replied to tower with a 'roger,' thinking to myself the wave-off lights never came on. My only indication of a wave-off was from my final PAR controller. Contributing factors to this potential mishap was my decision to maximize training by shooting another approach. ATC's inability to work a short hook. Poor communications between tower and approach, resulting in a late wave-off. But the largest contributing factor was the aircraft in front of me ended up in the overrun area, then attempted to back-taxi from the overrun area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F18 PLT LANDS ON OCCUPIED RWY DUE TO CRITICAL FUEL STATE.

Narrative: I WAS THE ONLY ACFT IN THE GCA 'BOX' PATTERN PRACTICING PAR/ASR APCHS. I EXECUTED CLBOUT TERMINATING MY APCH WITH 3800 LBS OF FUEL, ENOUGH FOR 1 MORE PRACTICE APCH TO A FULL STOP. DURING CLBOUT, I HEARD 5 OTHER ACFT CHK IN WITH APCH. I KNEW GETTING CAUGHT ON THE END OF THIS LINE WOULD PUT ME IN A NEAR EMER FUEL SIT. I REQUESTED THE SHORT HOOK TO FINAL FROM THE CTLR. THEY TOLD ME 'UNABLE' BECAUSE OF TFC SPACING APCHING MY 1 O'CLOCK POS AT 5 MI. I WAS VECTORED 20 NM S OF THE FIELD. TO CONSERVE FUEL, I STAYED CLEAN THROUGH MOST OF THE APCH. I LOWERED MY LNDG GEAR AT 3 MI. I SCANNED THE RWY AND NOTICED A TAXI LIGHT AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY. I FLEW THE APCH TO PUBLISHED MINIMUMS, TOOK OVER VISUALLY, AND FLEW THE BALL. MOMENTS BEFORE TOUCHDOWN, I WAS INFORMED BY APCH THAT TWR INSTRUCTED ME TO WAVE OFF. I ANTICIPATED A SIT LIKE THIS, AND WITH 2200 LBS OF GAS, WAVING OFF WOULD HAVE PUT ME IN AN EMER FUEL SIT, WITH A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF FLAMING OUT ON DOWNWIND OR FINAL. I KNEW WITH MY FUEL SIT, AND KNOWING THERE WERE 3 OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN, WAVING OFF WAS NOT A GOOD OPTION FOR ME. I SAW THE ACTIVITY AT THE APCH END OF AN 8000 FT RWY, AND TOLD CTL, 'UNABLE FUEL.' IF THEY WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED ME AGAIN TO WAVE OFF, I WOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER BECAUSE I DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO EXECUTE A GAR. THE DECISION TO LAND POTENTIALLY AVOIDED AN EMER SIT OF FLAMEOUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION RESULTING IN LOSS OF ACFT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE. ON THE ROLL-OUT I AGGRESSIVELY APPLIED BRAKES TO MINIMIZE DISTANCE TRAVELED DURING LNDG ROLLOUT. I STOPPED WITHIN 3000 FT, SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ, AND ASKED FOR CLRNC TO TAXI. THEY GAVE ME CLRNC TO TAXI, TELLING ME, 'IF YOU SEE WAVE-OFF LIGHTS IN THE FUTURE, YOU SHOULD WAVE OFF AND ENTER TWR DOWNWIND.' THEY ALSO TOLD ME THE REASON FOR THE WAVE-OFF WAS DUE TO ANOTHER FLT TAXIING BACK FROM THE OVERRUN AREA. I REPLIED TO TWR WITH A 'ROGER,' THINKING TO MYSELF THE WAVE-OFF LIGHTS NEVER CAME ON. MY ONLY INDICATION OF A WAVE-OFF WAS FROM MY FINAL PAR CTLR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS POTENTIAL MISHAP WAS MY DECISION TO MAXIMIZE TRAINING BY SHOOTING ANOTHER APCH. ATC'S INABILITY TO WORK A SHORT HOOK. POOR COMS BTWN TWR AND APCH, RESULTING IN A LATE WAVE-OFF. BUT THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE ACFT IN FRONT OF ME ENDED UP IN THE OVERRUN AREA, THEN ATTEMPTED TO BACK-TAXI FROM THE OVERRUN AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.