Narrative:

I was the inspector on aircraft in jun/05 during a sheet metal repair to the forward left fuselage at body station 259.5. The aircraft had sustained damage by a jetway in the area of the pitot probes and butt splice. The work was performed in accordance with authority/authorized X. The repair was classified as a major and the engineering authority/authorized reflected that the instructions were FAA approved. I was informed on oct/thu/05 that there had been an FAA inquiry into the 'appearance' of the repair. On aug/thu/05 in ZZZ; a repair correction was generated to investigate whether the repair was in accordance with air carrier X engineering authority/authorized. At that time it was determined to be in accordance. On aug/fri/05 in ZZZ; another repair correction was generated to replace 6 rivets on the repair which was accomplished. To the best of my knowledge; the repair was in accordance with the B737-300 srm and any deviations were addressed by the FAA approved engineering document. I know of no reason why 6 rivets would need to be replaced on the repair 2 months after installation and 8 days after the repair was reviewed and found to be in accordance with the engineering authority/authorized. After I signed off the installation of the repair; my shift ended and it is possible that the aircraft was flown prior to the paint and sealant fully drying. Other than the sealant; I know of no issues that would affect the airworthiness or non compliance in regards to the approved documentation used for the repair.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 WAS DAMAGED BY A JETWAY. REPAIR WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER THE SRM AND ENGINEERING AUTH. LATER; FAA REQUIRED ADDITIONAL 6 RIVETS REPLACED.

Narrative: I WAS THE INSPECTOR ON ACFT IN JUN/05 DURING A SHEET METAL REPAIR TO THE FORWARD L FUSELAGE AT BODY STATION 259.5. THE ACFT HAD SUSTAINED DAMAGE BY A JETWAY IN THE AREA OF THE PITOT PROBES AND BUTT SPLICE. THE WORK WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTH X. THE REPAIR WAS CLASSIFIED AS A MAJOR AND THE ENGINEERING AUTH REFLECTED THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE FAA APPROVED. I WAS INFORMED ON OCT/THU/05 THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN FAA INQUIRY INTO THE 'APPEARANCE' OF THE REPAIR. ON AUG/THU/05 IN ZZZ; A REPAIR CORRECTION WAS GENERATED TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THE REPAIR WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACR X ENGINEERING AUTH. AT THAT TIME IT WAS DETERMINED TO BE IN ACCORDANCE. ON AUG/FRI/05 IN ZZZ; ANOTHER REPAIR CORRECTION WAS GENERATED TO REPLACE 6 RIVETS ON THE REPAIR WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE; THE REPAIR WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE B737-300 SRM AND ANY DEVS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE FAA APPROVED ENGINEERING DOCUMENT. I KNOW OF NO REASON WHY 6 RIVETS WOULD NEED TO BE REPLACED ON THE REPAIR 2 MONTHS AFTER INSTALLATION AND 8 DAYS AFTER THE REPAIR WAS REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ENGINEERING AUTH. AFTER I SIGNED OFF THE INSTALLATION OF THE REPAIR; MY SHIFT ENDED AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ACFT WAS FLOWN PRIOR TO THE PAINT AND SEALANT FULLY DRYING. OTHER THAN THE SEALANT; I KNOW OF NO ISSUES THAT WOULD AFFECT THE AIRWORTHINESS OR NON COMPLIANCE IN REGARDS TO THE APPROVED DOCUMENTATION USED FOR THE REPAIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.