Narrative:

While taxiing to runway 30 at iad; I started the #2 engine. N2 rise was slow but within flight manual parameters. When maximum motoring occurred at approximately 20%; I put the start lever to idle. After noticing no egt rise or N2 increase within 10 seconds; I determined we had a hung start. While starting to discuss the hung start with the captain; we were interrupted by a fire vehicle crossing runway 19. He asked if we were doing a cold start because he was seeing a lot of smoke coming from the #2 engine. This was immediately followed by a second call saying we had a fire in the #2 engine. Ground control confirmed the fire. At that point the captain called for the evacuate/evacuation qrc. We completed the evacuate/evacuation qrc down to the final items and stopped short of giving the evacuate/evacuation command because we were told by the fire personnel and by ground control that the fire had gone out. We then verified this information with our flight attendants and our engine indications. The captain elected not to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft based on the information we had. We then RA the tailpipe fire qrc checklist and reference items. Next we talked to the fire personnel and a maintenance supervisor came to the airplane. The fire personnel said we had residual fuel under the engine and on the landing gear. The maintenance supervisor examined the airplane and plugged into our flight interphone. He confirmed with the captain that it would be safe to start the #1 engine and taxi back to the gate. We communicated with dispatch; operations; and maintenance and coordination a return to the gate with the fire trucks following us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 EXPERIENCES TAIL PIPE FIRE DURING START OF R ENG. SITUATION RESOLVED PRIOR TO EVAC.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 30 AT IAD; I STARTED THE #2 ENG. N2 RISE WAS SLOW BUT WITHIN FLT MANUAL PARAMETERS. WHEN MAX MOTORING OCCURRED AT APPROX 20%; I PUT THE START LEVER TO IDLE. AFTER NOTICING NO EGT RISE OR N2 INCREASE WITHIN 10 SECONDS; I DETERMINED WE HAD A HUNG START. WHILE STARTING TO DISCUSS THE HUNG START WITH THE CAPT; WE WERE INTERRUPTED BY A FIRE VEHICLE XING RWY 19. HE ASKED IF WE WERE DOING A COLD START BECAUSE HE WAS SEEING A LOT OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE #2 ENG. THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A SECOND CALL SAYING WE HAD A FIRE IN THE #2 ENG. GND CTL CONFIRMED THE FIRE. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE EVAC QRC. WE COMPLETED THE EVAC QRC DOWN TO THE FINAL ITEMS AND STOPPED SHORT OF GIVING THE EVAC COMMAND BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD BY THE FIRE PERSONNEL AND BY GND CTL THAT THE FIRE HAD GONE OUT. WE THEN VERIFIED THIS INFO WITH OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND OUR ENG INDICATIONS. THE CAPT ELECTED NOT TO EVAC THE ACFT BASED ON THE INFO WE HAD. WE THEN RA THE TAILPIPE FIRE QRC CHKLIST AND REFERENCE ITEMS. NEXT WE TALKED TO THE FIRE PERSONNEL AND A MAINT SUPVR CAME TO THE AIRPLANE. THE FIRE PERSONNEL SAID WE HAD RESIDUAL FUEL UNDER THE ENG AND ON THE LNDG GEAR. THE MAINT SUPVR EXAMINED THE AIRPLANE AND PLUGGED INTO OUR FLT INTERPHONE. HE CONFIRMED WITH THE CAPT THAT IT WOULD BE SAFE TO START THE #1 ENG AND TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. WE COMMUNICATED WITH DISPATCH; OPS; AND MAINT AND COORD A RETURN TO THE GATE WITH THE FIRE TRUCKS FOLLOWING US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.