Narrative:

The WX around morgantown was low ceiling (800-1000 ft AGL) and rain. I had been waiting for 2.5 hours for the WX to improve. I concluded that there would be no significant improvement for the next 2-3 hours; so decided to depart. The WX would clearly improve 50-70 mi west of mgw; where conditions were VFR for the remainder of the flight to cincinnati; blue ash (isz). When I read back my clearance to mgw tower; I initially copied the incorrect departure frequency. After correcting my readback and completing my before takeoff checklist I was cleared for takeoff and departed on runway 18. Just as I was entering the clouds I was handed off to departure. I toggled the radio and attempted to contact departure while climbing on runway heading. After the second attempt; I switched back to tower to alert them that I could not raise departure and to confirm the frequency. Tower told me that I might need more altitude before I could communicate with departure. I switched back to departure; and noticed that I was way off my heading. I thought I was still climbing on runway heading; but now saw that I was on a 090 degree heading; which was toward terrain; and contrary to the departure procedure. I immediately began a turn to the right to 270 degrees. At this point I contacted departure; and was asked 'what are you doing?' I informed the controller that my turn to the east was inadvertent. He asked what my instructions from the tower were. I informed him that I had not been cleared on course; nor given a vector; but simply handed off shortly after takeoff. The events that led to my mistake were: 1) I was not properly prepared to execute the departure procedure. I knew that the procedure was a climb and turn to the west; but I expected to be given a vector by tower before being handed off. I expected to hear 'right turn on-course and contact departure.' instead; when I heard 'contact departure;' I was surprised. Then when I couldn't reach departure. I became worried; and focused too heavily on the radio to the exclusion of my scan. I had not effectively committed the departure procedure to memory; and was not prepared to carry out the procedure because I anticipated a vector. I will not make this mistake again. 2) improper scan. While I am satisfied that I continued to climb; kept the wings level; and turned on the carburetor heat during heavy rain in the climb; I clearly lost track of my heading and turned off course. I am satisfied that I took immediate corrective action when I discovered the heading error and executed a fairly steep turn to the right while keeping control of the airplane. However; this would not have been necessary had I scanned effectively and executed the proper obstacle departure procedure. I have become accustomed to getting an initial vector from the tower before handoff; even when there is a departure procedure. Because of this expectation; I did not properly prepare for this flight. This mistake was the result of complacency. My primary corrective action is going to be to strengthen my use of checklists during flight planning. Had I focused on the departure procedure more effectively during planning; then again just before takeoff; I would probably not have made this mistake because I would have been more confident in my obstacle clearance; and not so concerned with communication. I will ensure that this item is in both checklists; planning and before takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 INST PLT DEPARTING MGW IN IMC FAILS TO FOLLOW OBSTACLE DEP PROC.

Narrative: THE WX AROUND MORGANTOWN WAS LOW CEILING (800-1000 FT AGL) AND RAIN. I HAD BEEN WAITING FOR 2.5 HRS FOR THE WX TO IMPROVE. I CONCLUDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT FOR THE NEXT 2-3 HRS; SO DECIDED TO DEPART. THE WX WOULD CLRLY IMPROVE 50-70 MI W OF MGW; WHERE CONDITIONS WERE VFR FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT TO CINCINNATI; BLUE ASH (ISZ). WHEN I READ BACK MY CLRNC TO MGW TWR; I INITIALLY COPIED THE INCORRECT DEP FREQ. AFTER CORRECTING MY READBACK AND COMPLETING MY BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND DEPARTED ON RWY 18. JUST AS I WAS ENTERING THE CLOUDS I WAS HANDED OFF TO DEP. I TOGGLED THE RADIO AND ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DEP WHILE CLBING ON RWY HDG. AFTER THE SECOND ATTEMPT; I SWITCHED BACK TO TWR TO ALERT THEM THAT I COULD NOT RAISE DEP AND TO CONFIRM THE FREQ. TWR TOLD ME THAT I MIGHT NEED MORE ALT BEFORE I COULD COMMUNICATE WITH DEP. I SWITCHED BACK TO DEP; AND NOTICED THAT I WAS WAY OFF MY HDG. I THOUGHT I WAS STILL CLBING ON RWY HDG; BUT NOW SAW THAT I WAS ON A 090 DEG HDG; WHICH WAS TOWARD TERRAIN; AND CONTRARY TO THE DEP PROC. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN A TURN TO THE R TO 270 DEGS. AT THIS POINT I CONTACTED DEP; AND WAS ASKED 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT MY TURN TO THE E WAS INADVERTENT. HE ASKED WHAT MY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR WERE. I INFORMED HIM THAT I HAD NOT BEEN CLRED ON COURSE; NOR GIVEN A VECTOR; BUT SIMPLY HANDED OFF SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. THE EVENTS THAT LED TO MY MISTAKE WERE: 1) I WAS NOT PROPERLY PREPARED TO EXECUTE THE DEP PROC. I KNEW THAT THE PROC WAS A CLB AND TURN TO THE W; BUT I EXPECTED TO BE GIVEN A VECTOR BY TWR BEFORE BEING HANDED OFF. I EXPECTED TO HEAR 'R TURN ON-COURSE AND CONTACT DEP.' INSTEAD; WHEN I HEARD 'CONTACT DEP;' I WAS SURPRISED. THEN WHEN I COULDN'T REACH DEP. I BECAME WORRIED; AND FOCUSED TOO HEAVILY ON THE RADIO TO THE EXCLUSION OF MY SCAN. I HAD NOT EFFECTIVELY COMMITTED THE DEP PROC TO MEMORY; AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO CARRY OUT THE PROC BECAUSE I ANTICIPATED A VECTOR. I WILL NOT MAKE THIS MISTAKE AGAIN. 2) IMPROPER SCAN. WHILE I AM SATISFIED THAT I CONTINUED TO CLB; KEPT THE WINGS LEVEL; AND TURNED ON THE CARB HEAT DURING HVY RAIN IN THE CLB; I CLRLY LOST TRACK OF MY HDG AND TURNED OFF COURSE. I AM SATISFIED THAT I TOOK IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHEN I DISCOVERED THE HDG ERROR AND EXECUTED A FAIRLY STEEP TURN TO THE R WHILE KEEPING CTL OF THE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER; THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY HAD I SCANNED EFFECTIVELY AND EXECUTED THE PROPER OBSTACLE DEP PROC. I HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO GETTING AN INITIAL VECTOR FROM THE TWR BEFORE HDOF; EVEN WHEN THERE IS A DEP PROC. BECAUSE OF THIS EXPECTATION; I DID NOT PROPERLY PREPARE FOR THIS FLT. THIS MISTAKE WAS THE RESULT OF COMPLACENCY. MY PRIMARY CORRECTIVE ACTION IS GOING TO BE TO STRENGTHEN MY USE OF CHKLISTS DURING FLT PLANNING. HAD I FOCUSED ON THE DEP PROC MORE EFFECTIVELY DURING PLANNING; THEN AGAIN JUST BEFORE TKOF; I WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE MADE THIS MISTAKE BECAUSE I WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CONFIDENT IN MY OBSTACLE CLRNC; AND NOT SO CONCERNED WITH COM. I WILL ENSURE THAT THIS ITEM IS IN BOTH CHKLISTS; PLANNING AND BEFORE TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.