Narrative:

Near midair collision was brought about by my aircraft departing and climbing out from runway 30 while another aircraft was practicing an IFR approach procedure localizer/DME for runway 12 approximately 3 NM wnw of the airport directly in-line with the runway at bcb. Conditions at the time were 20 mi visibility with some haze; but otherwise no clouds and unrestr visibility with light winds from 270 degrees at 4 KTS. Prior to departing from runway 30 at bcb; I noted an aircraft calling for a practice localizer approach to runway 12 at 10 mi to the northwest. Upon departing and climb out from runway 30; I continued monitoring unicom 123.05; the other pilot was then reporting 5 mi northwest and so I began searching for this aircraft slightly to my left at about an 11:30 O'clock position. A few mins later after failing to locate the other aircraft; I initiated a shallow right bank. At that moment the second aircraft was directly ahead descending toward me and close aboard so I rapidly increased right bank to 60+ degrees to avoid any possibility of a collision. My flight continued on to the north without incident. The other pilot apparently did not see my aircraft at any time as there was no change in his reporting communications (voice timbre). I felt that I should not take up the frequency with a report (after near midair) to the second pilot as he was still making position reports and there may have been other aircraft departing or waiting to depart runway 30. Negative contributing factors include: 1) a high gross weight of my aircraft with 2 passenger and full fuel slowing the climb out. 2) the terrain north of the airport delaying my turn due north as planned. 3) lack of appreciation for head on closing speeds above 160 KTS and unknown second aircraft type/capability. 4) no communications with second pilot after calling out a departure from runway 30 with an expected departure from the pattern to the north. 5) high amount of radio communications traffic on frequency due to large number of pilots enjoying excellent flying conditions. 6) IFR practice flts in direct opposition to frequent VFR departures. Positive contributing factors include: 1) proper position reporting by second pilot. 2) excellent WX. 3) intensive visual search for second aircraft due to expected position and turn away to remove any visual obstructions from locating the other aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC OCCURS NW OF BCB BETWEEN C177 DEPARTING RWY 30 AND C172 MAKING PRACTICE IAP TO RWY 12.

Narrative: NMAC WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY MY ACFT DEPARTING AND CLBING OUT FROM RWY 30 WHILE ANOTHER ACFT WAS PRACTICING AN IFR APCH PROC LOC/DME FOR RWY 12 APPROX 3 NM WNW OF THE ARPT DIRECTLY IN-LINE WITH THE RWY AT BCB. CONDITIONS AT THE TIME WERE 20 MI VISIBILITY WITH SOME HAZE; BUT OTHERWISE NO CLOUDS AND UNRESTR VISIBILITY WITH LIGHT WINDS FROM 270 DEGS AT 4 KTS. PRIOR TO DEPARTING FROM RWY 30 AT BCB; I NOTED AN ACFT CALLING FOR A PRACTICE LOC APCH TO RWY 12 AT 10 MI TO THE NW. UPON DEPARTING AND CLBOUT FROM RWY 30; I CONTINUED MONITORING UNICOM 123.05; THE OTHER PLT WAS THEN RPTING 5 MI NW AND SO I BEGAN SEARCHING FOR THIS ACFT SLIGHTLY TO MY L AT ABOUT AN 11:30 O'CLOCK POS. A FEW MINS LATER AFTER FAILING TO LOCATE THE OTHER ACFT; I INITIATED A SHALLOW R BANK. AT THAT MOMENT THE SECOND ACFT WAS DIRECTLY AHEAD DSNDING TOWARD ME AND CLOSE ABOARD SO I RAPIDLY INCREASED R BANK TO 60+ DEGS TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF A COLLISION. MY FLT CONTINUED ON TO THE N WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE OTHER PLT APPARENTLY DID NOT SEE MY ACFT AT ANY TIME AS THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN HIS RPTING COMS (VOICE TIMBRE). I FELT THAT I SHOULD NOT TAKE UP THE FREQ WITH A RPT (AFTER NEAR MIDAIR) TO THE SECOND PLT AS HE WAS STILL MAKING POS RPTS AND THERE MAY HAVE BEEN OTHER ACFT DEPARTING OR WAITING TO DEPART RWY 30. NEGATIVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: 1) A HIGH GROSS WT OF MY ACFT WITH 2 PAX AND FULL FUEL SLOWING THE CLBOUT. 2) THE TERRAIN N OF THE ARPT DELAYING MY TURN DUE N AS PLANNED. 3) LACK OF APPRECIATION FOR HEAD ON CLOSING SPDS ABOVE 160 KTS AND UNKNOWN SECOND ACFT TYPE/CAPABILITY. 4) NO COMS WITH SECOND PLT AFTER CALLING OUT A DEP FROM RWY 30 WITH AN EXPECTED DEP FROM THE PATTERN TO THE N. 5) HIGH AMOUNT OF RADIO COMS TFC ON FREQ DUE TO LARGE NUMBER OF PLTS ENJOYING EXCELLENT FLYING CONDITIONS. 6) IFR PRACTICE FLTS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO FREQUENT VFR DEPS. POSITIVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: 1) PROPER POS RPTING BY SECOND PLT. 2) EXCELLENT WX. 3) INTENSIVE VISUAL SEARCH FOR SECOND ACFT DUE TO EXPECTED POS AND TURN AWAY TO REMOVE ANY VISUAL OBSTRUCTIONS FROM LOCATING THE OTHER ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.