Narrative:

Assigned ali 1A SID off runway 28 (vidp) by clearance delivery. Flew what we believed to be the notamed SID ali 1A for runway 28. Approximately 3 NM prior to the left turn to ali VOR; departure control called us asking which SID we were flying. We told him the notamed ali 1A SID. He told us we weren't on that SID and to turn left direct ali VOR. We immediately turned direct the VOR. Later in cruise flight we discovered our error. The NOTAM was not effective yet. The non-notamed SID turned left direct ali VOR approximately 15 NM prior to the notamed SID. After approach had us turn left direct the VOR; we ended up approximately 12 NM right of where we should have been. There are several reasons; I believe; we missed the effective date on the specific NOTAM. First; information overload; we had ten single spaced pages of NOTAMS for our departure; destination; and alternate airfields. The vidp NOTAMS were the largest portion of all. While looking at the vidp NOTAMS; many of them had effective dates of years before. I may have become complacent with regard to dates after looking at so many that effective dates back to even 2000. The NOTAM in question was about 2/3 of the way through the vidp NOTAMS. Other contributing factors: the language barrier (clearance delivery had to repeat the clearance 3-4 times for us to understand him); the flight was already 45 minutes late; the APU died causing all power to be lost as we were loading the flight plan; and the captain had been to this airfield only once before and I had never been there. Both the captain and myself had looked quite extensively at the airport charts for vidp and the en route charts for the flight prior to show time. In hindsight; we would have been better served spending more of that time reviewing the NOTAMS. We should have caught the effective date on the NOTAM.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB FLT CREW DEPARTS VIDP NAVIGATING VIA SID BASED ON NOTAMED CHANGES THAT ARE NOT YET EFFECTIVE. CITE VOLUMINOUS NOTAMS; LANGUAGE BARRIER AND STRESS OF SCHEDULE PRESSURE.

Narrative: ASSIGNED ALI 1A SID OFF RWY 28 (VIDP) BY CLEARANCE DELIVERY. FLEW WHAT WE BELIEVED TO BE THE NOTAMED SID ALI 1A FOR RWY 28. APPROX 3 NM PRIOR TO THE LEFT TURN TO ALI VOR; DEP CTL CALLED US ASKING WHICH SID WE WERE FLYING. WE TOLD HIM THE NOTAMED ALI 1A SID. HE TOLD US WE WEREN'T ON THAT SID AND TO TURN LEFT DIRECT ALI VOR. WE IMMEDIATELY TURNED DIRECT THE VOR. LATER IN CRUISE FLT WE DISCOVERED OUR ERROR. THE NOTAM WAS NOT EFFECTIVE YET. THE NON-NOTAMED SID TURNED LEFT DIRECT ALI VOR APPROX 15 NM PRIOR TO THE NOTAMED SID. AFTER APCH HAD US TURN LEFT DIRECT THE VOR; WE ENDED UP APPROX 12 NM RIGHT OF WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS; I BELIEVE; WE MISSED THE EFFECTIVE DATE ON THE SPECIFIC NOTAM. FIRST; INFO OVERLOAD; WE HAD TEN SINGLE SPACED PAGES OF NOTAMS FOR OUR DEP; DEST; AND ALTERNATE AIRFIELDS. THE VIDP NOTAMS WERE THE LARGEST PORTION OF ALL. WHILE LOOKING AT THE VIDP NOTAMS; MANY OF THEM HAD EFFECTIVE DATES OF YEARS BEFORE. I MAY HAVE BECOME COMPLACENT WITH REGARD TO DATES AFTER LOOKING AT SO MANY THAT EFFECTIVE DATES BACK TO EVEN 2000. THE NOTAM IN QUESTION WAS ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY THROUGH THE VIDP NOTAMS. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE LANGUAGE BARRIER (CLEARANCE DELIVERY HAD TO REPEAT THE CLEARANCE 3-4 TIMES FOR US TO UNDERSTAND HIM); THE FLT WAS ALREADY 45 MINUTES LATE; THE APU DIED CAUSING ALL POWER TO BE LOST AS WE WERE LOADING THE FLT PLAN; AND THE CAPT HAD BEEN TO THIS AIRFIELD ONLY ONCE BEFORE AND I HAD NEVER BEEN THERE. BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF HAD LOOKED QUITE EXTENSIVELY AT THE ARPT CHARTS FOR VIDP AND THE ENRTE CHARTS FOR THE FLT PRIOR TO SHOW TIME. IN HINDSIGHT; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER SERVED SPENDING MORE OF THAT TIME REVIEWING THE NOTAMS. WE SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE EFFECTIVE DATE ON THE NOTAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.