Narrative:

During takeoff roll; received ECAM engine thrust levers not set. Positioned thrust to toga thrust. Near 80 KTS; received ECAM engine #1 EPR mode fault and automatic flight a/thrust off. The ECAM engine and warning display engine #1 EPR indication was absent; and the ECAM showed several faults in a row. Because of numerous ECAM alerts and inability to determine engine thrust and engine thrust limit; I initiated a rejected takeoff at 100-110 KTS. The rejected takeoff resulted in a normal turnoff off runway 23L. The route back to the gate involved a back taxi on runway 23L and crossing runway 23R. During taxi back to the gate we noticed the brake temperature rise; especially on #1 brake. We asked the tower if they had had a hot brake area; and it directed us to a spot near the airport crash fire rescue equipment. As we neared the assigned area; the #1 tire fuse plug melted and the tire deflated. We stopped and called for crash fire rescue equipment to inspect the tire and brakes. They arrived very quickly and advised us to hold our position; and that #1 tire had indeed deflated. We then received ECAM green system hydraulic quantity underfilled; followed by green hydraulic pressure loss. Passenger were deplaned in an orderly manner via airstairs from door 1R. Once the event was idented; published procedures were followed to provide for a safe conclusion. The event began because #1 EPR indication failure during takeoff roll. This then led to the tire; brake; and green system hydraulic failures due to equipment failure during the rejected takeoff. This situation can happen at any time and procedures to deal with it should continue to be reinforced during qualification and continuing qualification training. Supplemental information from acn 788754: logbook entry incomplete. Due to crew task loading; crew coordination; taking care of aircraft and passenger plus requirement to leave the aircraft by local auths; flight crew simply forgot several maintenance log write-ups. 'Brake 5 released' ECAM as well as deflated tire #1 and green hydraulic qty loss. These items were clearly visible and known by engineers tending to the aircraft; however we forgot to enter into the maintenance log. Additional information: suggest 'engine EPR mode fault' ECAM on takeoff be introduced into initial and recurrent A330 training scenarios. Additional emphasis on EPR mode versus N1 mode system and associated dynamics would also be helpful as well. My sense is we have put these 2 items on the back burner the last several yrs in the A330 training arena. Supplemental information from acn 788752: during takeoff roll received ECAM engine thrust levers not set. Placed thrust levers from flex to toga. Then received ECAM engine #1 EPR mode fault and automatic flight a/thrust off. The #1 EPR indication disappeared from EFIS. Unable to readily determine engine thrust status; therefore rejected takeoff at 100-110 KTS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A330 TKOF WAS REJECTED FOLLOWING ECAM MSGS: ENG TFR LEVERS NOT SET; #1 EPR MODE FAULT; AUTO FLT A/TFR OFF. DURING TAXI BACK A TIRE DEFLATED AND THE GREEN HYD SYSTEM LOST FLUID. THE ACFT WAS DEPLANED USING STAIRS.

Narrative: DURING TKOF ROLL; RECEIVED ECAM ENG THRUST LEVERS NOT SET. POSITIONED THRUST TO TOGA THRUST. NEAR 80 KTS; RECEIVED ECAM ENG #1 EPR MODE FAULT AND AUTO FLT A/THRUST OFF. THE ECAM ENG AND WARNING DISPLAY ENG #1 EPR INDICATION WAS ABSENT; AND THE ECAM SHOWED SEVERAL FAULTS IN A ROW. BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS ECAM ALERTS AND INABILITY TO DETERMINE ENG THRUST AND ENG THRUST LIMIT; I INITIATED A REJECTED TKOF AT 100-110 KTS. THE REJECTED TKOF RESULTED IN A NORMAL TURNOFF OFF RWY 23L. THE RTE BACK TO THE GATE INVOLVED A BACK TAXI ON RWY 23L AND XING RWY 23R. DURING TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WE NOTICED THE BRAKE TEMP RISE; ESPECIALLY ON #1 BRAKE. WE ASKED THE TWR IF THEY HAD HAD A HOT BRAKE AREA; AND IT DIRECTED US TO A SPOT NEAR THE ARPT CFR. AS WE NEARED THE ASSIGNED AREA; THE #1 TIRE FUSE PLUG MELTED AND THE TIRE DEFLATED. WE STOPPED AND CALLED FOR CFR TO INSPECT THE TIRE AND BRAKES. THEY ARRIVED VERY QUICKLY AND ADVISED US TO HOLD OUR POS; AND THAT #1 TIRE HAD INDEED DEFLATED. WE THEN RECEIVED ECAM GREEN SYS HYD QUANTITY UNDERFILLED; FOLLOWED BY GREEN HYD PRESSURE LOSS. PAX WERE DEPLANED IN AN ORDERLY MANNER VIA AIRSTAIRS FROM DOOR 1R. ONCE THE EVENT WAS IDENTED; PUBLISHED PROCS WERE FOLLOWED TO PROVIDE FOR A SAFE CONCLUSION. THE EVENT BEGAN BECAUSE #1 EPR INDICATION FAILURE DURING TKOF ROLL. THIS THEN LED TO THE TIRE; BRAKE; AND GREEN SYS HYD FAILURES DUE TO EQUIP FAILURE DURING THE REJECTED TKOF. THIS SITUATION CAN HAPPEN AT ANY TIME AND PROCS TO DEAL WITH IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE REINFORCED DURING QUALIFICATION AND CONTINUING QUALIFICATION TRAINING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 788754: LOGBOOK ENTRY INCOMPLETE. DUE TO CREW TASK LOADING; CREW COORD; TAKING CARE OF ACFT AND PAX PLUS REQUIREMENT TO LEAVE THE ACFT BY LCL AUTHS; FLT CREW SIMPLY FORGOT SEVERAL MAINT LOG WRITE-UPS. 'BRAKE 5 RELEASED' ECAM AS WELL AS DEFLATED TIRE #1 AND GREEN HYD QTY LOSS. THESE ITEMS WERE CLEARLY VISIBLE AND KNOWN BY ENGINEERS TENDING TO THE ACFT; HOWEVER WE FORGOT TO ENTER INTO THE MAINT LOG. ADDITIONAL INFO: SUGGEST 'ENG EPR MODE FAULT' ECAM ON TKOF BE INTRODUCED INTO INITIAL AND RECURRENT A330 TRAINING SCENARIOS. ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON EPR MODE VERSUS N1 MODE SYS AND ASSOCIATED DYNAMICS WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL AS WELL. MY SENSE IS WE HAVE PUT THESE 2 ITEMS ON THE BACK BURNER THE LAST SEVERAL YRS IN THE A330 TRAINING ARENA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 788752: DURING TKOF ROLL RECEIVED ECAM ENG THRUST LEVERS NOT SET. PLACED THRUST LEVERS FROM FLEX TO TOGA. THEN RECEIVED ECAM ENG #1 EPR MODE FAULT AND AUTO FLT A/THRUST OFF. THE #1 EPR INDICATION DISAPPEARED FROM EFIS. UNABLE TO READILY DETERMINE ENG THRUST STATUS; THEREFORE REJECTED TKOF AT 100-110 KTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.