Narrative:

I was part of a crew which may have missed an assigned crossing restr while descending into jfk. The adventure started back in ord where I was assigned to act as sic for a junior captain for 4 legs and a deadhead. I was tired as I had less than the sleep I was used to due in part to being given an early show and my internal clock was still on PDT time. I felt ok with the assignment because the aircraft was a -700 series nicer than the -200 I had just been flying; and after all; I was only acting as first officer! 2 things I didn't know: first; the other captain had been off line for 3 weeks for an investigation into a harrowing near miss/runway incursion in ZZZ in the previous month. He was returned to the line after it was preliminarily determined that he; as PIC; had acted appropriately in the incident; but he was still a bit shook up! Second; the FMS was MEL'ed. Before departing ord we did brief the MEL and how we would be navigating by green needles but he was not overly concerned and nor was I because we reviewed the route and it was fairly simple airway navigation. The first sign of trouble was when we passed the first VOR and he missed the turn as the aircraft was in heading mode and he failed to select the correct outbound heading. I was ok with using heading mode because the VOR needles were jumping around a lot and the plane was constantly turning back and forth when we tried navigation mode. When I told him we needed to turn to intercept the outbound radial he reviewed the map for a moment and finally agreed. As he was turning to rejoin the airway; ATC asked us about our course! We explained that we were turning to rejoin the airway. The controller was nice about it and gave us a heading for mdt. That leg concluded without further event; but I noticed that the other captain seemed just a bit behind the curve. We had a bit of difficulty getting a clearance that was consistent with our equipment suffix; in fact; all day controllers and clearance delivery kept giving us RNAV departures and arrs despite how we were filed. Once the route was cleared up we briefed it and how we were going to establish our navigation. I flew this leg and it went fairly smoothly; the detailed pre-brief and keeping speed back a bit (under 300 KTS in cruise) helped out. The third leg up to jfk where the possible missed restr crossing occurred also took a bit of back and forth with clearance to get a navigable route. The flight went much better than the first leg; and we were given direct acy on course. When we were nearing panze; ZNY said something like; 'I show you off the airway; are you direct camrn now?' I replied that we were on V229 just about to turn toward camrn. New york then cleared us to cross camrn at 11000 ft and 250 KTS. I quickly calculated 17000 ft to 11000 ft would require approximately 18 NM to descend and added it to the DME of camrn and calculated that we should start down at 71 NM off dpk which was coming up quick as we were doing 330 KTS. I cautioned the other captain that we needed to start down soon. He was negotiating the turn over karrs turning toward camrn; again I stated we needed to descend. I may have said it for a 3RD time when he got the picture and he immediately initiated a swift descent; went to flight idle; and deployed the flight spoilers. Based on my VOR we may have missed the altitude by about 700 ft and did not slow to 250 KTS until we leveled off on the dpk side of camrn. From this point the flight continued without further event to jfk. Summarizing the main reason we may have issued the crossing restr; the PIC was preoccupied with navigating using green needles and lost the big picture on the crossing restr. Contributing factors were airspeed and the confusion associated with concern about the earlier call about not being on the airway. Additionally being out of the aircraft for 3 weeks and any associated stress from the runway incursion may have increased his apprehension. Personally it was demanding duty flying that aircraft in that airspace in green needles as well as being tired from previous duty. At the time I was a little angry that I had been ignored after figuring out a suitable descent point. In hindsight I should have been more assertive when he did not initiate the descent. Additionally I could have asked approach for relief on the altitude or for a turn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL60 FLT CREW FAILS TO COMPLY WITH CROSSING RESTRICTION ON DESCENT.

Narrative: I WAS PART OF A CREW WHICH MAY HAVE MISSED AN ASSIGNED XING RESTR WHILE DSNDING INTO JFK. THE ADVENTURE STARTED BACK IN ORD WHERE I WAS ASSIGNED TO ACT AS SIC FOR A JUNIOR CAPT FOR 4 LEGS AND A DEADHEAD. I WAS TIRED AS I HAD LESS THAN THE SLEEP I WAS USED TO DUE IN PART TO BEING GIVEN AN EARLY SHOW AND MY INTERNAL CLOCK WAS STILL ON PDT TIME. I FELT OK WITH THE ASSIGNMENT BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS A -700 SERIES NICER THAN THE -200 I HAD JUST BEEN FLYING; AND AFTER ALL; I WAS ONLY ACTING AS FO! 2 THINGS I DIDN'T KNOW: FIRST; THE OTHER CAPT HAD BEEN OFF LINE FOR 3 WKS FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO A HARROWING NEAR MISS/RWY INCURSION IN ZZZ IN THE PREVIOUS MONTH. HE WAS RETURNED TO THE LINE AFTER IT WAS PRELIMINARILY DETERMINED THAT HE; AS PIC; HAD ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN THE INCIDENT; BUT HE WAS STILL A BIT SHOOK UP! SECOND; THE FMS WAS MEL'ED. BEFORE DEPARTING ORD WE DID BRIEF THE MEL AND HOW WE WOULD BE NAVIGATING BY GREEN NEEDLES BUT HE WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED AND NOR WAS I BECAUSE WE REVIEWED THE RTE AND IT WAS FAIRLY SIMPLE AIRWAY NAV. THE FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE WAS WHEN WE PASSED THE FIRST VOR AND HE MISSED THE TURN AS THE ACFT WAS IN HDG MODE AND HE FAILED TO SELECT THE CORRECT OUTBOUND HDG. I WAS OK WITH USING HDG MODE BECAUSE THE VOR NEEDLES WERE JUMPING AROUND A LOT AND THE PLANE WAS CONSTANTLY TURNING BACK AND FORTH WHEN WE TRIED NAV MODE. WHEN I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO TURN TO INTERCEPT THE OUTBOUND RADIAL HE REVIEWED THE MAP FOR A MOMENT AND FINALLY AGREED. AS HE WAS TURNING TO REJOIN THE AIRWAY; ATC ASKED US ABOUT OUR COURSE! WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE TURNING TO REJOIN THE AIRWAY. THE CTLR WAS NICE ABOUT IT AND GAVE US A HDG FOR MDT. THAT LEG CONCLUDED WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT; BUT I NOTICED THAT THE OTHER CAPT SEEMED JUST A BIT BEHIND THE CURVE. WE HAD A BIT OF DIFFICULTY GETTING A CLRNC THAT WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR EQUIP SUFFIX; IN FACT; ALL DAY CTLRS AND CLRNC DELIVERY KEPT GIVING US RNAV DEPS AND ARRS DESPITE HOW WE WERE FILED. ONCE THE RTE WAS CLRED UP WE BRIEFED IT AND HOW WE WERE GOING TO ESTABLISH OUR NAV. I FLEW THIS LEG AND IT WENT FAIRLY SMOOTHLY; THE DETAILED PRE-BRIEF AND KEEPING SPD BACK A BIT (UNDER 300 KTS IN CRUISE) HELPED OUT. THE THIRD LEG UP TO JFK WHERE THE POSSIBLE MISSED RESTR XING OCCURRED ALSO TOOK A BIT OF BACK AND FORTH WITH CLRNC TO GET A NAVIGABLE RTE. THE FLT WENT MUCH BETTER THAN THE FIRST LEG; AND WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT ACY ON COURSE. WHEN WE WERE NEARING PANZE; ZNY SAID SOMETHING LIKE; 'I SHOW YOU OFF THE AIRWAY; ARE YOU DIRECT CAMRN NOW?' I REPLIED THAT WE WERE ON V229 JUST ABOUT TO TURN TOWARD CAMRN. NEW YORK THEN CLRED US TO CROSS CAMRN AT 11000 FT AND 250 KTS. I QUICKLY CALCULATED 17000 FT TO 11000 FT WOULD REQUIRE APPROX 18 NM TO DSND AND ADDED IT TO THE DME OF CAMRN AND CALCULATED THAT WE SHOULD START DOWN AT 71 NM OFF DPK WHICH WAS COMING UP QUICK AS WE WERE DOING 330 KTS. I CAUTIONED THE OTHER CAPT THAT WE NEEDED TO START DOWN SOON. HE WAS NEGOTIATING THE TURN OVER KARRS TURNING TOWARD CAMRN; AGAIN I STATED WE NEEDED TO DSND. I MAY HAVE SAID IT FOR A 3RD TIME WHEN HE GOT THE PICTURE AND HE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A SWIFT DSCNT; WENT TO FLT IDLE; AND DEPLOYED THE FLT SPOILERS. BASED ON MY VOR WE MAY HAVE MISSED THE ALT BY ABOUT 700 FT AND DID NOT SLOW TO 250 KTS UNTIL WE LEVELED OFF ON THE DPK SIDE OF CAMRN. FROM THIS POINT THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT TO JFK. SUMMARIZING THE MAIN REASON WE MAY HAVE ISSUED THE XING RESTR; THE PIC WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH NAVIGATING USING GREEN NEEDLES AND LOST THE BIG PICTURE ON THE XING RESTR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AIRSPEED AND THE CONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH CONCERN ABOUT THE EARLIER CALL ABOUT NOT BEING ON THE AIRWAY. ADDITIONALLY BEING OUT OF THE ACFT FOR 3 WKS AND ANY ASSOCIATED STRESS FROM THE RWY INCURSION MAY HAVE INCREASED HIS APPREHENSION. PERSONALLY IT WAS DEMANDING DUTY FLYING THAT ACFT IN THAT AIRSPACE IN GREEN NEEDLES AS WELL AS BEING TIRED FROM PREVIOUS DUTY. AT THE TIME I WAS A LITTLE ANGRY THAT I HAD BEEN IGNORED AFTER FIGURING OUT A SUITABLE DSCNT POINT. IN HINDSIGHT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE WHEN HE DID NOT INITIATE THE DSCNT. ADDITIONALLY I COULD HAVE ASKED APCH FOR RELIEF ON THE ALT OR FOR A TURN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.