Narrative:

I advised the tower on initial call up that I was eastbound and was clrd for takeoff from runway 15L. No restrictions on my left turn were advised (for runway 25 traffic, left turn is sometimes delayed until 1000-1500' MSL is reached). Standard departure procedure is 'left turn at shoreline,' which I then initiated. I then proceeded to crs climb at about 95 mph and about a 500 FPM roc. Even though no traffic was advised for runway 25 (VOR or visual approach), I still make a point to be above 2000' MSL by the time I would cross the VOR approach east of sba. This also helps to clear traffic on left base runway 25. (Runway 25 is used primarily for commuter/airline traffic.) at the same time that I saw an large transport starting a left turn from left downwind (for runway 25), tower advised me of that traffic and requested my altitude. I reported traffic in sight and that I was climbing 'out of 2.3 for 3.5.' he (the tower) then acknowledged and advised that my traffic was descending for the airport. From the time he (the large transport) turned base, the aircraft was on an apparent collision course, horizontal. When the large transport was coming up on my 3 O'clock position, at about a 40 degree visual angle down, I noticed a slight pitch down of the aircraft. The large transport then passed either directly below or slightly behind me. Tower then called the air carrier large transport twice before an acknowledge was received. No comment was made by either large transport or tower in regards to the 'conflict.' later that evening I received additional information about the conflict. An instrument/charter pilot, who was on approach behind the large transport, passed along some of the conversation which transpired on approach while I was on tower frequency. Apparently, approach had called me out as traffic for the large transport 'altitude unknown.' the large transport did not have me in sight and approach requested him to stop his des on base. (I think this was just about the time he started his downwind to base turn.) he still did not have me in sight, and then continued his descent on base. I think he must have seen me about the time he was at the position described above. He commented 'traffic in sight,' and, 'boy, that was close,' or words to that effect (I hadn't heard the tower tape). I called the tower the next day to find out what (or if) the large transport flight had reported anything, and spoke with the acting manager. He told me that the large transport captain had filed a report with his company, which they required (possibly because some of the passenger saw me). He did not or intend to file an FAA near miss report. The tower was not intending to file one either. Went over the incident with the tower manager, explaining my feelings as to their procedures which led up to the conflict. Sba approach has the habit of handing traffic off to the tower from approach late (which they deny, but I and many friends are repeatedly handed off within 2-3 mi of the airport, instead of the normal 5 mi). Since large transport was on the visual and within the air traffic area he should have definitely been on tower frequency, not approach. There was no time for my altitude/intentions to be relayed to approach from tower. Had large transport been on tower frequency, he would have heard my report and I would have been aware of his presence on downwind. I am thoroughly convinced that had this been an uncontrolled airport or operating on the CTAF after tower hours, that the conflict would not have occurred. I have flown after hours many times with large transport's and other large airliner's arrs and departures and have found no problems communicating our positions. In this instance, I would have heard large transport's intentions when he was still many miles from the airport. As a result of this conflict, the tower manager informed me that they intended to require traffic departing 15L eastbound to always climb straight out, not to the previous 1000-1500' MSL, but to an incredible 2000', and to require this all the time. This action is even more unsafe than the 1500' request. Most trainers aircraft are outside of gliding distance of the shoreline if they climb to even 1500' straight out, let alone 2000', which is a violation of the far's. Also, 2000' will put them in conflict with downwind traffic for 25! Another bandaid, just like the lax TCA emergency measures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX ACR-LGT GA-SMA AT SHORELINE SOUTH OF SBA.

Narrative: I ADVISED THE TWR ON INITIAL CALL UP THAT I WAS EBND AND WAS CLRD FOR TKOF FROM RWY 15L. NO RESTRICTIONS ON MY LEFT TURN WERE ADVISED (FOR RWY 25 TFC, LEFT TURN IS SOMETIMES DELAYED UNTIL 1000-1500' MSL IS REACHED). STANDARD DEP PROC IS 'LEFT TURN AT SHORELINE,' WHICH I THEN INITIATED. I THEN PROCEEDED TO CRS CLB AT ABOUT 95 MPH AND ABOUT A 500 FPM ROC. EVEN THOUGH NO TFC WAS ADVISED FOR RWY 25 (VOR OR VISUAL APCH), I STILL MAKE A POINT TO BE ABOVE 2000' MSL BY THE TIME I WOULD CROSS THE VOR APCH E OF SBA. THIS ALSO HELPS TO CLR TFC ON LEFT BASE RWY 25. (RWY 25 IS USED PRIMARILY FOR COMMUTER/AIRLINE TFC.) AT THE SAME TIME THAT I SAW AN LGT STARTING A LEFT TURN FROM LEFT DOWNWIND (FOR RWY 25), TWR ADVISED ME OF THAT TFC AND REQUESTED MY ALT. I RPTED TFC IN SIGHT AND THAT I WAS CLBING 'OUT OF 2.3 FOR 3.5.' HE (THE TWR) THEN ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADVISED THAT MY TFC WAS DSNDING FOR THE ARPT. FROM THE TIME HE (THE LGT) TURNED BASE, THE ACFT WAS ON AN APPARENT COLLISION COURSE, HORIZ. WHEN THE LGT WAS COMING UP ON MY 3 O'CLOCK POS, AT ABOUT A 40 DEG VISUAL ANGLE DOWN, I NOTICED A SLIGHT PITCH DOWN OF THE ACFT. THE LGT THEN PASSED EITHER DIRECTLY BELOW OR SLIGHTLY BEHIND ME. TWR THEN CALLED THE ACR LGT TWICE BEFORE AN ACKNOWLEDGE WAS RECEIVED. NO COMMENT WAS MADE BY EITHER LGT OR TWR IN REGARDS TO THE 'CONFLICT.' LATER THAT EVENING I RECEIVED ADDITIONAL INFO ABOUT THE CONFLICT. AN INSTR/CHARTER PLT, WHO WAS ON APCH BEHIND THE LGT, PASSED ALONG SOME OF THE CONVERSATION WHICH TRANSPIRED ON APCH WHILE I WAS ON TWR FREQ. APPARENTLY, APCH HAD CALLED ME OUT AS TFC FOR THE LGT 'ALT UNKNOWN.' THE LGT DID NOT HAVE ME IN SIGHT AND APCH REQUESTED HIM TO STOP HIS DES ON BASE. (I THINK THIS WAS JUST ABOUT THE TIME HE STARTED HIS DOWNWIND TO BASE TURN.) HE STILL DID NOT HAVE ME IN SIGHT, AND THEN CONTINUED HIS DSCNT ON BASE. I THINK HE MUST HAVE SEEN ME ABOUT THE TIME HE WAS AT THE POS DESCRIBED ABOVE. HE COMMENTED 'TFC IN SIGHT,' AND, 'BOY, THAT WAS CLOSE,' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT (I HADN'T HEARD THE TWR TAPE). I CALLED THE TWR THE NEXT DAY TO FIND OUT WHAT (OR IF) THE LGT FLT HAD RPTED ANYTHING, AND SPOKE WITH THE ACTING MGR. HE TOLD ME THAT THE LGT CAPT HAD FILED A RPT WITH HIS COMPANY, WHICH THEY REQUIRED (POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOME OF THE PAX SAW ME). HE DID NOT OR INTEND TO FILE AN FAA NEAR MISS RPT. THE TWR WAS NOT INTENDING TO FILE ONE EITHER. WENT OVER THE INCIDENT WITH THE TWR MGR, EXPLAINING MY FEELINGS AS TO THEIR PROCS WHICH LED UP TO THE CONFLICT. SBA APCH HAS THE HABIT OF HANDING TFC OFF TO THE TWR FROM APCH LATE (WHICH THEY DENY, BUT I AND MANY FRIENDS ARE REPEATEDLY HANDED OFF WITHIN 2-3 MI OF THE ARPT, INSTEAD OF THE NORMAL 5 MI). SINCE LGT WAS ON THE VISUAL AND WITHIN THE ATA HE SHOULD HAVE DEFINITELY BEEN ON TWR FREQ, NOT APCH. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR MY ALT/INTENTIONS TO BE RELAYED TO APCH FROM TWR. HAD LGT BEEN ON TWR FREQ, HE WOULD HAVE HEARD MY RPT AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF HIS PRESENCE ON DOWNWIND. I AM THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT HAD THIS BEEN AN UNCONTROLLED ARPT OR OPERATING ON THE CTAF AFTER TWR HRS, THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. I HAVE FLOWN AFTER HRS MANY TIMES WITH LGT'S AND OTHER LARGE AIRLINER'S ARRS AND DEPS AND HAVE FOUND NO PROBS COMMUNICATING OUR POSITIONS. IN THIS INSTANCE, I WOULD HAVE HEARD LGT'S INTENTIONS WHEN HE WAS STILL MANY MILES FROM THE ARPT. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONFLICT, THE TWR MGR INFORMED ME THAT THEY INTENDED TO REQUIRE TFC DEPARTING 15L EBND TO ALWAYS CLB STRAIGHT OUT, NOT TO THE PREVIOUS 1000-1500' MSL, BUT TO AN INCREDIBLE 2000', AND TO REQUIRE THIS ALL THE TIME. THIS ACTION IS EVEN MORE UNSAFE THAN THE 1500' REQUEST. MOST TRAINERS ACFT ARE OUTSIDE OF GLIDING DISTANCE OF THE SHORELINE IF THEY CLB TO EVEN 1500' STRAIGHT OUT, LET ALONE 2000', WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF THE FAR'S. ALSO, 2000' WILL PUT THEM IN CONFLICT WITH DOWNWIND TFC FOR 25! ANOTHER BANDAID, JUST LIKE THE LAX TCA EMER MEASURES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.