Narrative:

While enroute to clt; we were slowed to 250 KIAS for the entire flight. While on the adena 2 arrival; atlanta center advised us to expect holding instructions. When issued the controller stated; 'cleared to the unarm intersection; hold at unarm southwest as published; 15 mile legs; efc XA20Z. ' It was read back as such by the pilot monitoring. When asked for the reason for holding into clt; the controller stated that due to time based metering; we needed to lose 9 minutes. Well; after the pilot monitoring and I built the hold; he also selected direct unarm. I questioned the pilot monitoring because it didn't make sense to shortcut and hold. He said; the clearance was cleared to the unarm intersection. A few minutes later while enroute direct unarm; ATC queried our course. The pilot monitoring explained and the controller said that he cleared us to a clearance limit; which did not imply a direct to. We asked for a heading to get back on course and the controller stated unable; but direct grd. We resumed own navigation. The pilot monitoring had commuted earlier in the day to start this trip and by this 4th leg of flying for work he was a bit tired. He misunderstood his direction. Although I questioned the action; I didn't pursue it further since the captain seemed to be confident in what was occurring. While the language of the controller was fairly typical; it was misleading all the same. Had we been told to just hold at the unarm intersection without the preface of being cleared to the unarm intersection this incident may not have occurred. The controller also was not helpful with an initial vector to get us back on course while we reprogrammed the grd intersection. In fact; his reaction created a flustered flight crew and potentially a more dangerous incident. A simple vector to get us turned in the right direction would've helped and would have represented a cooperative action to rectify the situation.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ700 crew was given holding instructions at an intersection on the arrival for metering and the crew proceeded direct to the fix. This was not what the Controller intended and the crew was made aware of this fact. The reporter suggested scheduling; delays and fatigue contributed to the error.

Narrative: While enroute to CLT; we were slowed to 250 KIAS for the entire flight. While on the ADENA 2 arrival; Atlanta center advised us to expect holding instructions. When issued the controller stated; 'Cleared to the UNARM intersection; hold at UNARM SW as published; 15 mile legs; EFC XA20Z. ' It was read back as such by the pilot monitoring. When asked for the reason for holding into CLT; the Controller stated that due to time based metering; we needed to lose 9 minutes. Well; after the pilot monitoring and I built the hold; he also selected direct UNARM. I questioned the pilot monitoring because it didn't make sense to shortcut and hold. He said; the clearance was cleared to the UNARM intersection. A few minutes later while enroute direct UNARM; ATC queried our course. The pilot monitoring explained and the Controller said that he cleared us to a clearance limit; which did not imply a direct to. We asked for a heading to get back on course and the Controller stated unable; but direct GRD. We resumed own navigation. The pilot monitoring had commuted earlier in the day to start this trip and by this 4th leg of flying for work he was a bit tired. He misunderstood his direction. Although I questioned the action; I didn't pursue it further since the Captain seemed to be confident in what was occurring. While the language of the Controller was fairly typical; it was misleading all the same. Had we been told to just hold at the UNARM intersection without the preface of being cleared to the UNARM intersection this incident may not have occurred. The Controller also was not helpful with an initial vector to get us back on course while we reprogrammed the GRD intersection. In fact; his reaction created a flustered flight crew and potentially a more dangerous incident. A simple vector to get us turned in the right direction would've helped and would have represented a cooperative action to rectify the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.