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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 880909 |
Time | |
Date | 201003 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZDV.ARTCC |
State Reference | CO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was working 33RA position. After receiving a briefing; I started to get settled with all the situations occurring (i.e.; who will need hand offs; is in hand off; point-outs; etc.) I observed a corporate jet being handed off from sector 35. The route the aircraft was flying made it a corner cutter; and would be in our airspace for approximately 4 minutes. He was still in sector 35 for another 3 minutes. I observed the radar controller take the hand off and immediately start a hand off to the next sector; 32. I failed to notice that the aircraft was at an inappropriate altitude of flight for the direction (FL450 westbound). I did monitor the hand off status to sector 32 in addition to numerous other situations still occurring including a change of radar controllers. The new radar controller had some confusion on the south side of the sector he was working thru while on the north side of the sector the corporate jet continued to hand off to the sector 32 controller who seemed not busy since he was laying back in his chair and I had failed to see any tracks on our scope within his airspace. The receiving controller is known to strictly adhere to the 7110.65. When I called him with the hand off his response was that the aircraft was at an unacceptable altitude for direction of flight. I agreed with him and responded that if he would take the hand off; we would descend the aircraft to FL430. His response was '...it doesn't work that way. He has to enter my airspace level at FL430'. I got off the land line and immediately told the r-side to turn the aircraft and descend him to FL430; which the radar controller did. The aircraft was on the boundary of sector 32 by the time this was accomplished. I did fail to get control of the aircraft for descent. Plus since we had failed to complete a hand off by the boundary because the receiving controller refused to cooperate in any manner; I reported to the supervisor that a system deviation had just occurred. The receiving controller could have allowed the descent to FL430; thus avoiding this work and helping to create a more positive work atmosphere; but as he has done on many occasions; he chose the route of conflict. After the supervisor completed a formal investigation; I was told there was no system deviation because the receiving controller had seen the aircraft coming for some time. Based on that philosophy; if I ask a receiving controller if he sees an aircraft and he says yes; I should be able to run him through the receiver's airspace; and that still did not address the fact we descended the aircraft without control. The agency used to be concerned with the teamwork idea. This seems to have gone away. We were supposed to have CRM refresher annually. Other programs have come and gone. We are seeing more and more cases of soloing; watching out for #1; and losing the teamwork approach. I think this will become more pronounced in the future. My recommendations are the incorporation of mandatory teamwork cooperation. Let someone like the receiving controller be held accountable if he refuses to work well with others. People like this individual cause distractions; distrust; and loss of bang for the taxpayers buck because I'm writing this instead of working the boards. There should be an effort to promote teamwork thru team building. We take off 30 minutes every 4th workday so sit around and tell jokes and call it a crew breakout. Let's use this time more advantageously; and that would include spending time with crews from other areas; and mixing up crews sometimes so people from other crews can talk about how they do certain things. Maybe no man is an island; but controllers are becoming peninsulas and the water is going to cut us off.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZDV controller described a deviation event when proper procedures were not followed regarding a hand off; the reporter claiming that controller team work is on a steady decline and increased managerial efforts should be initated to improve same.
Narrative: I was working 33RA position. After receiving a briefing; I started to get settled with all the situations occurring (i.e.; who will need hand offs; is in hand off; point-outs; etc.) I observed a corporate jet being handed off from Sector 35. The route the aircraft was flying made it a corner cutter; and would be in our airspace for approximately 4 minutes. He was still in Sector 35 for another 3 minutes. I observed the RADAR Controller take the hand off and immediately start a hand off to the next sector; 32. I failed to notice that the aircraft was at an inappropriate altitude of flight for the direction (FL450 westbound). I did monitor the hand off status to Sector 32 in addition to numerous other situations still occurring including a change of RADAR Controllers. The new RADAR Controller had some confusion on the south side of the sector he was working thru while on the north side of the sector the corporate jet continued to hand off to the Sector 32 Controller who seemed not busy since he was laying back in his chair and I had failed to see any tracks on our scope within his airspace. The Receiving Controller is known to strictly adhere to the 7110.65. When I called him with the hand off his response was that the aircraft was at an unacceptable altitude for direction of flight. I agreed with him and responded that if he would take the hand off; we would descend the aircraft to FL430. His response was '...it doesn't work that way. He has to enter my airspace level at FL430'. I got off the land line and immediately told the R-side to turn the aircraft and descend him to FL430; which the RADAR Controller did. The aircraft was on the boundary of Sector 32 by the time this was accomplished. I did fail to get control of the aircraft for descent. Plus since we had failed to complete a hand off by the boundary because the Receiving Controller refused to cooperate in any manner; I reported to the Supervisor that a system deviation had just occurred. The Receiving Controller could have allowed the descent to FL430; thus avoiding this work and helping to create a more positive work atmosphere; but as he has done on many occasions; he chose the route of conflict. After the Supervisor completed a formal investigation; I was told there was no system deviation because the Receiving Controller had seen the aircraft coming for some time. Based on that philosophy; if I ask a Receiving Controller if he sees an aircraft and he says yes; I should be able to run him through the receiver's airspace; and that still did not address the fact we descended the aircraft without control. The agency used to be concerned with the teamwork idea. This seems to have gone away. We were supposed to have CRM refresher annually. Other programs have come and gone. We are seeing more and more cases of soloing; watching out for #1; and losing the teamwork approach. I think this will become more pronounced in the future. My recommendations are the incorporation of mandatory teamwork cooperation. Let someone like the Receiving Controller be held accountable if he refuses to work well with others. People like this individual cause distractions; distrust; and loss of bang for the taxpayers buck because I'm writing this instead of working the boards. There should be an effort to promote teamwork thru team building. We take off 30 minutes every 4th workday so sit around and tell jokes and call it a crew breakout. Let's use this time more advantageously; and that would include spending time with crews from other areas; and mixing up crews sometimes so people from other crews can talk about how they do certain things. Maybe no man is an island; but controllers are becoming peninsulas and the water is going to cut us off.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.