Narrative:

Engines up to application of takeoff power were normal. As power was applied a sensation of nosewheel scrub was felt. Throttles were retarded and taxi back to runway start point accomplished. Captain advised the left engine was not accelerating during application of takeoff power. Returned to runway for takeoff, first officer PF, captain PNF. Stabilized engines prior to takeoff. All engine parameters were normal. Takeoff power applied and a normal takeoff accomplished. During climb, a slight buzzing sound was felt/heard. Climb was continued. Passing FL290, approximately, the left engine vibration was observed to be 1.2, right engine .7. As climb continued the left engine vibration indicated a gradual increase, stabilizing at 2.2. Near top of climb. Low/high vibration parameters were checked and indicated no change between the low or high position. Maximum vibration reached on left engine was 2.5. During the climb the first F/a came forward requesting information as to what had transpired. In addition, she reported that during the first attempt for takeoff, torching had been observed from the left engine. This information was not known prior to this point. No mention was made of torching during the second takeoff attempt. Cruise altitude was reached west/O incident. Left engine vibration in cruise at FL410 indicated 1.8/1.9 and the right engine .5. All other engine instruments were normal. Due to the initial slow acceleration problem and higher than normal vibration indication of the left engine, the captain initiated communications with the company maintenance controller in sfo. Approximately 15 mins into cruise, the left engine parameters changed--EPR lowered, N1 lowered, egt increased, N2 increased and F/F lowered. None of these changes were out of limits and the captain relayed these readings to sfo maintenance. Approximately 10 mins later the engine parameters again changed to respective lower/higher values, still within limits. Five mins later we experienced several short popping sounds and aircraft buffet from the left engine and erratic engine indications of the engine instruments. This we idented as possible engine compressor stalls and slowly retarded the left engine to idle. Shortly after reaching idle, the engine stalled again and was shut down, in accordance with company procedure. Our position at this time was approximately 200 mi east of las. ATC was notified we needed a lower altitude, and a short time later, after checklist completion, ATC was advised we had shut an engine down. The captain returned to company communications to contact sfo maintenance to: provide the in-flight engine shutdown information, to discuss the possibility of a restart attempt on the left engine at a lower altitude, specifically FL270. In training, it is stressed that if this engine stalls/fails at high altitude, a possible restart attempt should be made if crew and maintenance agree it is advisable. Our opinion and that of maintenance was that a restart should not be attempted. After the completion of all company communications, the captain and first officer discussed which airport should be used as a landing point. It was the captain's view that the flight should continue to den for the following reasons: the time necessary to complete proper aircraft procedures, the time required to notify company, sfo maintenance and dispatch of our problem and discussion of a possible in-flight engine start at a lower altitude, a 50 KT average tailwind to den, and a landing time of XA35 indicated in the FMS CDU just prior to engine failure. Therefore in his judgement, den was the airport closest in time with excellent en route and destination WX. I, as first officer, agreed. The drift down from FL410 to FL270 required 30 mins and shortly after reaching FL270, descent clearance was received for den. The landing was accomplished west/O incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter advised this is a fleet problem and not just this aircraft. Seems this engine has a vibration problem from the beginning and the manufacture has not set any limits which would require a precautionary shutdown. Failure was described by maintenance as a 'contained compressor failure.' company is questioning the flight crew decision to continue to den even though the aircraft was about at the half way point, estimated 10 mi difference. Mgt also is questioning the use of clear in that they feeltoo much information was gathered before a decision was made to continue to den. Reporter suggests that the airline communication system, airlink, has deteriorated to the point that it is very difficult to communicate with maintenance or dispatch. Feels this is the result of most air carrier's using ACARS. Engine manufacturer will not certify the engine as airworthy for extended overwater on the 2 engine widebody transport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB ENGINE FAILURE. INFLT SHUTDOWN.

Narrative: ENGS UP TO APPLICATION OF TKOF PWR WERE NORMAL. AS PWR WAS APPLIED A SENSATION OF NOSEWHEEL SCRUB WAS FELT. THROTTLES WERE RETARDED AND TAXI BACK TO RWY START POINT ACCOMPLISHED. CAPT ADVISED THE LEFT ENG WAS NOT ACCELERATING DURING APPLICATION OF TKOF PWR. RETURNED TO RWY FOR TKOF, F/O PF, CAPT PNF. STABILIZED ENGS PRIOR TO TKOF. ALL ENG PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL. TKOF PWR APPLIED AND A NORMAL TKOF ACCOMPLISHED. DURING CLB, A SLIGHT BUZZING SOUND WAS FELT/HEARD. CLB WAS CONTINUED. PASSING FL290, APPROX, THE LEFT ENG VIBRATION WAS OBSERVED TO BE 1.2, RIGHT ENG .7. AS CLB CONTINUED THE LEFT ENG VIBRATION INDICATED A GRADUAL INCREASE, STABILIZING AT 2.2. NEAR TOP OF CLB. LOW/HIGH VIBRATION PARAMETERS WERE CHKED AND INDICATED NO CHANGE BTWN THE LOW OR HIGH POS. MAX VIBRATION REACHED ON LEFT ENG WAS 2.5. DURING THE CLB THE FIRST F/A CAME FORWARD REQUESTING INFO AS TO WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. IN ADDITION, SHE RPTED THAT DURING THE FIRST ATTEMPT FOR TKOF, TORCHING HAD BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE LEFT ENG. THIS INFO WAS NOT KNOWN PRIOR TO THIS POINT. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF TORCHING DURING THE SECOND TKOF ATTEMPT. CRUISE ALT WAS REACHED W/O INCIDENT. LEFT ENG VIBRATION IN CRUISE AT FL410 INDICATED 1.8/1.9 AND THE RIGHT ENG .5. ALL OTHER ENG INSTRUMENTS WERE NORMAL. DUE TO THE INITIAL SLOW ACCELERATION PROBLEM AND HIGHER THAN NORMAL VIBRATION INDICATION OF THE LEFT ENG, THE CAPT INITIATED COMS WITH THE COMPANY MAINT CTLR IN SFO. APPROX 15 MINS INTO CRUISE, THE LEFT ENG PARAMETERS CHANGED--EPR LOWERED, N1 LOWERED, EGT INCREASED, N2 INCREASED AND F/F LOWERED. NONE OF THESE CHANGES WERE OUT OF LIMITS AND THE CAPT RELAYED THESE READINGS TO SFO MAINT. APPROX 10 MINS LATER THE ENG PARAMETERS AGAIN CHANGED TO RESPECTIVE LOWER/HIGHER VALUES, STILL WITHIN LIMITS. FIVE MINS LATER WE EXPERIENCED SEVERAL SHORT POPPING SOUNDS AND ACFT BUFFET FROM THE LEFT ENG AND ERRATIC ENG INDICATIONS OF THE ENG INSTRUMENTS. THIS WE IDENTED AS POSSIBLE ENG COMPRESSOR STALLS AND SLOWLY RETARDED THE LEFT ENG TO IDLE. SHORTLY AFTER REACHING IDLE, THE ENG STALLED AGAIN AND WAS SHUT DOWN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY PROC. OUR POS AT THIS TIME WAS APPROX 200 MI E OF LAS. ATC WAS NOTIFIED WE NEEDED A LOWER ALT, AND A SHORT TIME LATER, AFTER CHKLIST COMPLETION, ATC WAS ADVISED WE HAD SHUT AN ENG DOWN. THE CAPT RETURNED TO COMPANY COMS TO CONTACT SFO MAINT TO: PROVIDE THE INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN INFO, TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESTART ATTEMPT ON THE LEFT ENG AT A LOWER ALT, SPECIFICALLY FL270. IN TRNING, IT IS STRESSED THAT IF THIS ENG STALLS/FAILS AT HIGH ALT, A POSSIBLE RESTART ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE IF CREW AND MAINT AGREE IT IS ADVISABLE. OUR OPINION AND THAT OF MAINT WAS THAT A RESTART SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED. AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ALL COMPANY COMS, THE CAPT AND F/O DISCUSSED WHICH ARPT SHOULD BE USED AS A LNDG POINT. IT WAS THE CAPT'S VIEW THAT THE FLT SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE TIME NECESSARY TO COMPLETE PROPER ACFT PROCS, THE TIME REQUIRED TO NOTIFY COMPANY, SFO MAINT AND DISPATCH OF OUR PROB AND DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE INFLT ENG START AT A LOWER ALT, A 50 KT AVERAGE TAILWIND TO DEN, AND A LNDG TIME OF XA35 INDICATED IN THE FMS CDU JUST PRIOR TO ENG FAILURE. THEREFORE IN HIS JUDGEMENT, DEN WAS THE ARPT CLOSEST IN TIME WITH EXCELLENT ENRTE AND DEST WX. I, AS F/O, AGREED. THE DRIFT DOWN FROM FL410 TO FL270 REQUIRED 30 MINS AND SHORTLY AFTER REACHING FL270, DSCNT CLRNC WAS RECEIVED FOR DEN. THE LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED W/O INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR ADVISED THIS IS A FLEET PROB AND NOT JUST THIS ACFT. SEEMS THIS ENG HAS A VIBRATION PROB FROM THE BEGINNING AND THE MANUFACTURE HAS NOT SET ANY LIMITS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN. FAILURE WAS DESCRIBED BY MAINT AS A 'CONTAINED COMPRESSOR FAILURE.' COMPANY IS QUESTIONING THE FLT CREW DECISION TO CONTINUE TO DEN EVEN THOUGH THE ACFT WAS ABOUT AT THE HALF WAY POINT, ESTIMATED 10 MI DIFFERENCE. MGT ALSO IS QUESTIONING THE USE OF CLR IN THAT THEY FEELTOO MUCH INFO WAS GATHERED BEFORE A DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE TO DEN. RPTR SUGGESTS THAT THE AIRLINE COM SYS, AIRLINK, HAS DETERIORATED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE WITH MAINT OR DISPATCH. FEELS THIS IS THE RESULT OF MOST ACR'S USING ACARS. ENG MANUFACTURER WILL NOT CERTIFY THE ENG AS AIRWORTHY FOR EXTENDED OVERWATER ON THE 2 ENG WDB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.