Narrative:

Shortly after leveling at a cruise altitude of 35;000 ft; the EICAS displayed a right engine hydraulic pump light. Crew coordination resulted in referring to the QRH which gave guidance to turn off the right engine hydraulic pump switch. The pressure light at the hydraulic switch illuminated; hydraulic quantities were normal; and the EICAS warning remained on the screen. With the problem isolated and the checklist complete; we decided to contact dispatch and maintenance control for any further guidance or recommendations with regards to final destination or return to base. During a discussion with dispatch and maintenance control detailing our situation; the actions taken; and resulting indications; a question arose from maintenance control. Maintenance control wanted to know if the pressure light was on at the right engine hydraulic switch before the switch was deselected. Because I could not positively confirm the light's status prior to deselecting the switch; I asked maintenance control if there would be any problem with reselecting the switch to correctly answer their question. Maintenance control confirmed that a reselection of the switch presented no problem. When the switch was reselected; all warning lights extinguished and the right hydraulic system returned to what appeared to be normal operations. Maintenance control suggested that the right engine hydraulic pump had experienced cavitations and suggested continuing with normal operations. Approximately 10 minutes further into the flight; the right engine hydraulic pump EICAS light re-illuminated; the right engine hydraulic pump switch was again deselected; and coordination with ATC and dispatch was accomplished to safely execute the return to base as previously requested by dispatch. I believe that although I initially accomplished aom procedures properly with regard to this situation; a discussion with maintenance control resulted in troubleshooting a problem while in flight. I think it is important to note that it is very easy to loose sight of what the original system indications or lights were while focused on an EICAS message and a checklist procedure. Once the checklist has been completed; I shall be very careful before considering a reversal of any item directed by the checklist; because at that point; I will be indirect violation of the aom/QRH procedure; and taking matters into my own hands. Certainly at very least I should be an emergency aircraft at that point.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 EICAS displayed RIGHT ENGINE DRIVE HYDRAULIC PUMP while at cruise. The crew complied with the QRH and turned the pump off. Later Maintenance asked them to turn the pump back on only to have the PUMP alert failure again. The crew returned to the departure airport.

Narrative: Shortly after leveling at a cruise altitude of 35;000 FT; the EICAS displayed a Right Engine Hydraulic Pump Light. Crew coordination resulted in referring to the QRH which gave guidance to turn off the Right Engine Hydraulic Pump Switch. The pressure light at the hydraulic switch illuminated; hydraulic quantities were normal; and the EICAS warning remained on the screen. With the problem isolated and the checklist complete; we decided to contact Dispatch and Maintenance Control for any further guidance or recommendations with regards to final destination or return to base. During a discussion with Dispatch and Maintenance Control detailing our situation; the actions taken; and resulting indications; a question arose from Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control wanted to know if the pressure light was on at the right engine hydraulic switch before the switch was deselected. Because I could not positively confirm the light's status prior to deselecting the switch; I asked Maintenance Control if there would be any problem with reselecting the switch to correctly answer their question. Maintenance Control confirmed that a reselection of the switch presented no problem. When the switch was reselected; all warning lights extinguished and the right hydraulic system returned to what appeared to be normal operations. Maintenance Control suggested that the Right Engine Hydraulic Pump had experienced cavitations and suggested continuing with normal operations. Approximately 10 minutes further into the flight; the Right Engine Hydraulic Pump EICAS light re-illuminated; the Right Engine Hydraulic Pump switch was again deselected; and coordination with ATC and Dispatch was accomplished to safely execute the return to base as previously requested by Dispatch. I believe that although I initially accomplished AOM procedures properly with regard to this situation; a discussion with Maintenance Control resulted in troubleshooting a problem while in flight. I think it is important to note that it is very easy to loose sight of what the original system indications or lights were while focused on an EICAS message and a checklist procedure. Once the checklist has been completed; I shall be very careful before considering a reversal of any item directed by the checklist; because at that point; I will be indirect violation of the AOM/QRH procedure; and taking matters into my own hands. Certainly at very least I should be an emergency aircraft at that point.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.