Narrative:

As I sat down to relieve sector 42 (bam), I was briefed that several military aircraft were departing the austin 1 MOA to recover at hif and muo. I was further briefed that there were no flight plans filed and stored in the computer on these aircraft. During the briefing approximately 5 aircraft called for recovery. As I sat down to take over the sector I assigned each of these aircraft a computer generated beacon code. One of these aircraft was fgt X and was given a code of 6067. I observed this code 10 mi north of the bam VORTAC. At this time I radar idented the aircraft and issued a clearance to muo via direct bunny (initial approach fix at muo) direct muo at FL210. During the clearance the d-ctlr (manual assistant) instructed me to have the aircraft squawk 3111, as this was the code on a computer flight plan for the aircraft that he now had. I did as the d-ctlr advised. For the next several mins I was busy identing and clearing another 5 pop-up recoveries. As I scanned my radar north of bam I noticed that fgt X was now in coast track. I advised the aircraft of this. The aircraft acknowledged and stated he was recycling. Almost immediately I observed the 3111 code approximately 80 mi north of bam and about 10 mi into sector 33 (boi low) airspace. I instructed fgt X to contact sector 33. Later when darts and other data was collected it was found that the flight plan the d-ctlr held was for fgt Y (note difference in spelling). Therefore, when aircraft changed code the data block on X went into coast track. Further the flight plan on fgt Y was not entered properly. It was entered from ZOA airspace direct bunny direct muo. This meant that salt lake was not eligible for an autoacquire on the 3111 code. Therefore, no data block was associated with the new code. This was not noticed until the aircraft had entered into another sector's airspace west/O the necessary handoff. Although no evasive action or other aircraft were involved the situation was definitely a serious one. There were several factors contributing to the situation. First of all the lack of flight plans on a flush out of the austin MOA increased the workload on controllers tremendously. In the past we have requested our military operations staff to inform the users that flight plans must be filed for return legs from these MOA's. Secondly, the controller failed to recognize the problem in the flight plan when it was eventually obtained. His failure to advise me that the flight would not automatic acquire lead me to assume that there was no need to manually start track. Finally, my preoccupation with giving service to the other military pop-ups caused me to fail to recognize that no data block had acquired on the 3111 code and to lose track of the aircraft for several mins. Situation ultimately could have been avoided by better observation on my part. However, having properly filed flight plans for return legs from MOA would definitely have made situation less likely to occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNCOORDINATED PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE AS MIL FGT WAS ALLOWED TO ENTER ADJACENT SECTOR WITHOUT RADAR HANDOFF OR POINTOUT. OPERATIONAL DEVIATION.

Narrative: AS I SAT DOWN TO RELIEVE SECTOR 42 (BAM), I WAS BRIEFED THAT SEVERAL MIL ACFT WERE DEPARTING THE AUSTIN 1 MOA TO RECOVER AT HIF AND MUO. I WAS FURTHER BRIEFED THAT THERE WERE NO FLT PLANS FILED AND STORED IN THE COMPUTER ON THESE ACFT. DURING THE BRIEFING APPROX 5 ACFT CALLED FOR RECOVERY. AS I SAT DOWN TO TAKE OVER THE SECTOR I ASSIGNED EACH OF THESE ACFT A COMPUTER GENERATED BEACON CODE. ONE OF THESE ACFT WAS FGT X AND WAS GIVEN A CODE OF 6067. I OBSERVED THIS CODE 10 MI N OF THE BAM VORTAC. AT THIS TIME I RADAR IDENTED THE ACFT AND ISSUED A CLRNC TO MUO VIA DIRECT BUNNY (INITIAL APCH FIX AT MUO) DIRECT MUO AT FL210. DURING THE CLRNC THE D-CTLR (MANUAL ASSISTANT) INSTRUCTED ME TO HAVE THE ACFT SQUAWK 3111, AS THIS WAS THE CODE ON A COMPUTER FLT PLAN FOR THE ACFT THAT HE NOW HAD. I DID AS THE D-CTLR ADVISED. FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MINS I WAS BUSY IDENTING AND CLEARING ANOTHER 5 POP-UP RECOVERIES. AS I SCANNED MY RADAR N OF BAM I NOTICED THAT FGT X WAS NOW IN COAST TRACK. I ADVISED THE ACFT OF THIS. THE ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED AND STATED HE WAS RECYCLING. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY I OBSERVED THE 3111 CODE APPROX 80 MI N OF BAM AND ABOUT 10 MI INTO SECTOR 33 (BOI LOW) AIRSPACE. I INSTRUCTED FGT X TO CONTACT SECTOR 33. LATER WHEN DARTS AND OTHER DATA WAS COLLECTED IT WAS FOUND THAT THE FLT PLAN THE D-CTLR HELD WAS FOR FGT Y (NOTE DIFFERENCE IN SPELLING). THEREFORE, WHEN ACFT CHANGED CODE THE DATA BLOCK ON X WENT INTO COAST TRACK. FURTHER THE FLT PLAN ON FGT Y WAS NOT ENTERED PROPERLY. IT WAS ENTERED FROM ZOA AIRSPACE DIRECT BUNNY DIRECT MUO. THIS MEANT THAT SALT LAKE WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR AN AUTOACQUIRE ON THE 3111 CODE. THEREFORE, NO DATA BLOCK WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW CODE. THIS WAS NOT NOTICED UNTIL THE ACFT HAD ENTERED INTO ANOTHER SECTOR'S AIRSPACE W/O THE NECESSARY HDOF. ALTHOUGH NO EVASIVE ACTION OR OTHER ACFT WERE INVOLVED THE SITUATION WAS DEFINITELY A SERIOUS ONE. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SITUATION. FIRST OF ALL THE LACK OF FLT PLANS ON A FLUSH OUT OF THE AUSTIN MOA INCREASED THE WORKLOAD ON CTLRS TREMENDOUSLY. IN THE PAST WE HAVE REQUESTED OUR MIL OPS STAFF TO INFORM THE USERS THAT FLT PLANS MUST BE FILED FOR RETURN LEGS FROM THESE MOA'S. SECONDLY, THE CTLR FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE PROB IN THE FLT PLAN WHEN IT WAS EVENTUALLY OBTAINED. HIS FAILURE TO ADVISE ME THAT THE FLT WOULD NOT AUTO ACQUIRE LEAD ME TO ASSUME THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO MANUALLY START TRACK. FINALLY, MY PREOCCUPATION WITH GIVING SVC TO THE OTHER MIL POP-UPS CAUSED ME TO FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THAT NO DATA BLOCK HAD ACQUIRED ON THE 3111 CODE AND TO LOSE TRACK OF THE ACFT FOR SEVERAL MINS. SITUATION ULTIMATELY COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY BETTER OBSERVATION ON MY PART. HOWEVER, HAVING PROPERLY FILED FLT PLANS FOR RETURN LEGS FROM MOA WOULD DEFINITELY HAVE MADE SITUATION LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.