Narrative:

It was night, the WX was clear and visibility unlimited. We were inbound to sfo on the sfo 095 degree radial, descending through about 7000'. The copilot was flying. The controller said, 'airline 123 heavy, turn left 20 degree, cleared for a visual approach to 28 left.' we turned 20 degree left and intercepted the centerline of 28 left about 14 mi from the runway. About 12 mi out, the controller said, 'airline 123 heavy, do you see traffic at one O'clock 6 mi?' I said, 'I see an aircraft about there.' about 10 mi out the controller said, 'airline 123 heavy, maintain visual sep from the traffic at one O'clock.' (at this time, I saw 2 aircraft at one O'clock. I first saw aircraft a, which I thought was the aircraft the controller was pointing out. Then I saw aircraft B, which appeared closer to me and closer to the airport, therefore, I thought aircraft B must be the aircraft that the controller was pointing out. Then as things progressed, aircraft a appeared closer. At that point, I had serious doubts about which aircraft was actually closer and/or which aircraft the controller was pointing out.) I responded, 'unable to maintain visual sep.' after a pause, the controller (another voice, somewhat harried) said, 'airline 123, do you see traffic at one O'clock?' I said, 'I see 2 aircraft at one O'clock.' the controller said, 'airline 123, maintain visual sep from both those aircraft.' I said, 'unable.' at this time, we were approaching brijj. I asked, 'airline 123 heavy, do you want us on tower?' no answer. I repeated the question. No answer. I switched to the tower and said, 'airline 123 heavy, brijj for the left.' no answer. I repeated the call. The tower responded, 'airline 123 heavy, maintain runway heading and climb to 5000'. As we stopped our descent and started to climb, I noticed we passed what I presume was a commuter airliner. He was off our right, maybe 400 or 500' away (it's hard to say at night), about our heading, and passing through our altitude in a very steep descent. He was in view for about 2 or 3 seconds. We were vectored to a left downwind for a tip toe visual approach to 28L. Discussion. The simultaneous visual approach procedure to sfo 28L and 28R has 2 specific problems that make the procedure hazardous during daylight operation and dangerous during night operations. The procedure, by design, is not just a visual approach but, in addition to executing a visual approach, the pilot is also required to achieve and maintain visual sep from at least 1 other aircraft, sometimes more. During day or night, the procedure leads the controller and the pilot down a box canyon with the airport at the end. If pilot does not see the traffic or is unable to maintain visual sep from the traffic, as in this case, then the controller is on a violation hook, an the pilot, crew and passenger are in danger. During night operations, the requirement for the pilot to achieve and maintain visual sep makes the procedure more than hazardous, even dangerous. Because a procedure which, by design, requires a pilot to maintain visual sep at night fails to take into account depth perception at night is poor to nil. Making visual contact with another aircraft at night is sometimes easier than in daylight, however, since depth perception is poor to nil, maintaining visual sep is a near impossibility. The task of maintaining visual sep with poor to nil depth perception is further compounded by the pilot being on a moving platform that is descending, pitching, rolling, yawing and changing speeds. Plus, from that inconstant platform, the pilot is required to maintain visual sep with a light in a black sky that may or may not be climbing or descending, and may or may not be turning, and may or may not be changing speeds. For a procedure, by design, to require such a task of a pilot is absolutely absurd, and it is absolutely absurd even before considering this task is required of the pilot during the phase of flight with the highest cockpit workload. A 3RD problem, in this particular case, which deserves mentioning, is the controller, perhaps the supervisor, attempted to coerce me into accepting a clearance which in my judgement was unacceptable and unsafe. Conclusion. The simultaneous visual approach procedure to sfo 28L/right is hazardous at any time because of the close proximity of the runways, and it is dangerous at night. There is something seriously wrong with an ATC system which will allow such a procedure to exist. Suggestion. Have the bay TRACON and sfo tower people work with the association, ATC committee for the purpose of developing a safe visual approach procedure for sfo 28L/right.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC OF ACR WDB COMPLAINT ABOUT VISUAL BRIDGE APCHS TO SFO. CLAIMS CLOSE PROX WITH COMMUTER ACFT DURING APCH AT NIGHT.

Narrative: IT WAS NIGHT, THE WX WAS CLR AND VIS UNLIMITED. WE WERE INBND TO SFO ON THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL, DSNDING THROUGH ABOUT 7000'. THE COPLT WAS FLYING. THE CTLR SAID, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, TURN LEFT 20 DEG, CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO 28 LEFT.' WE TURNED 20 DEG LEFT AND INTERCEPTED THE CENTERLINE OF 28 LEFT ABOUT 14 MI FROM THE RWY. ABOUT 12 MI OUT, THE CTLR SAID, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, DO YOU SEE TFC AT ONE O'CLOCK 6 MI?' I SAID, 'I SEE AN ACFT ABOUT THERE.' ABOUT 10 MI OUT THE CTLR SAID, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM THE TFC AT ONE O'CLOCK.' (AT THIS TIME, I SAW 2 ACFT AT ONE O'CLOCK. I FIRST SAW ACFT A, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS THE ACFT THE CTLR WAS POINTING OUT. THEN I SAW ACFT B, WHICH APPEARED CLOSER TO ME AND CLOSER TO THE ARPT, THEREFORE, I THOUGHT ACFT B MUST BE THE ACFT THAT THE CTLR WAS POINTING OUT. THEN AS THINGS PROGRESSED, ACFT A APPEARED CLOSER. AT THAT POINT, I HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT WHICH ACFT WAS ACTUALLY CLOSER AND/OR WHICH ACFT THE CTLR WAS POINTING OUT.) I RESPONDED, 'UNABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP.' AFTER A PAUSE, THE CTLR (ANOTHER VOICE, SOMEWHAT HARRIED) SAID, 'AIRLINE 123, DO YOU SEE TFC AT ONE O'CLOCK?' I SAID, 'I SEE 2 ACFT AT ONE O'CLOCK.' THE CTLR SAID, 'AIRLINE 123, MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM BOTH THOSE ACFT.' I SAID, 'UNABLE.' AT THIS TIME, WE WERE APCHING BRIJJ. I ASKED, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, DO YOU WANT US ON TWR?' NO ANSWER. I REPEATED THE QUESTION. NO ANSWER. I SWITCHED TO THE TWR AND SAID, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, BRIJJ FOR THE LEFT.' NO ANSWER. I REPEATED THE CALL. THE TWR RESPONDED, 'AIRLINE 123 HEAVY, MAINTAIN RWY HDG AND CLB TO 5000'. AS WE STOPPED OUR DSCNT AND STARTED TO CLB, I NOTICED WE PASSED WHAT I PRESUME WAS A COMMUTER AIRLINER. HE WAS OFF OUR RIGHT, MAYBE 400 OR 500' AWAY (IT'S HARD TO SAY AT NIGHT), ABOUT OUR HDG, AND PASSING THROUGH OUR ALT IN A VERY STEEP DSCNT. HE WAS IN VIEW FOR ABOUT 2 OR 3 SECS. WE WERE VECTORED TO A LEFT DOWNWIND FOR A TIP TOE VISUAL APCH TO 28L. DISCUSSION. THE SIMULTANEOUS VISUAL APCH PROC TO SFO 28L AND 28R HAS 2 SPECIFIC PROBS THAT MAKE THE PROC HAZARDOUS DURING DAYLIGHT OP AND DANGEROUS DURING NIGHT OPS. THE PROC, BY DESIGN, IS NOT JUST A VISUAL APCH BUT, IN ADDITION TO EXECUTING A VISUAL APCH, THE PLT IS ALSO REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM AT LEAST 1 OTHER ACFT, SOMETIMES MORE. DURING DAY OR NIGHT, THE PROC LEADS THE CTLR AND THE PLT DOWN A BOX CANYON WITH THE ARPT AT THE END. IF PLT DOES NOT SEE THE TFC OR IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM THE TFC, AS IN THIS CASE, THEN THE CTLR IS ON A VIOLATION HOOK, AN THE PLT, CREW AND PAX ARE IN DANGER. DURING NIGHT OPS, THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE PLT TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP MAKES THE PROC MORE THAN HAZARDOUS, EVEN DANGEROUS. BECAUSE A PROC WHICH, BY DESIGN, REQUIRES A PLT TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP AT NIGHT FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DEPTH PERCEPTION AT NIGHT IS POOR TO NIL. MAKING VISUAL CONTACT WITH ANOTHER ACFT AT NIGHT IS SOMETIMES EASIER THAN IN DAYLIGHT, HOWEVER, SINCE DEPTH PERCEPTION IS POOR TO NIL, MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP IS A NEAR IMPOSSIBILITY. THE TASK OF MAINTAINING VISUAL SEP WITH POOR TO NIL DEPTH PERCEPTION IS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE PLT BEING ON A MOVING PLATFORM THAT IS DSNDING, PITCHING, ROLLING, YAWING AND CHANGING SPDS. PLUS, FROM THAT INCONSTANT PLATFORM, THE PLT IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP WITH A LIGHT IN A BLACK SKY THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE CLBING OR DSNDING, AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE TURNING, AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE CHANGING SPDS. FOR A PROC, BY DESIGN, TO REQUIRE SUCH A TASK OF A PLT IS ABSOLUTELY ABSURD, AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY ABSURD EVEN BEFORE CONSIDERING THIS TASK IS REQUIRED OF THE PLT DURING THE PHASE OF FLT WITH THE HIGHEST COCKPIT WORKLOAD. A 3RD PROB, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, WHICH DESERVES MENTIONING, IS THE CTLR, PERHAPS THE SUPVR, ATTEMPTED TO COERCE ME INTO ACCEPTING A CLRNC WHICH IN MY JUDGEMENT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND UNSAFE. CONCLUSION. THE SIMULTANEOUS VISUAL APCH PROC TO SFO 28L/R IS HAZARDOUS AT ANY TIME BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE PROX OF THE RWYS, AND IT IS DANGEROUS AT NIGHT. THERE IS SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG WITH AN ATC SYS WHICH WILL ALLOW SUCH A PROC TO EXIST. SUGGESTION. HAVE THE BAY TRACON AND SFO TWR PEOPLE WORK WITH THE ASSOCIATION, ATC COMMITTEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING A SAFE VISUAL APCH PROC FOR SFO 28L/R.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.