Narrative:

Complete loss of left hydraulic system fluid at cruise altitude: FL370 position. The first EICAS message that was initially displayed that got my attention was the left system left hydraulic rsvr press. I saw the warning at the time it was initially displayed. I immediately checked the fluid quantity level. The left hydraulic system was indicating zero quantity. As I was checking the status page the left engine driven and electric hydraulic pumps EICAS messages were now also displayed. I accomplished the (757) hydraulic system pressure (left only) checklist. According to the checklist; 'if power xfr unit status message is not displayed (ptu is available); extend gear and flaps normally.' this message wasn't displayed. However; with the left hydraulic quantity indicating 0; I didn't know if this measurement included the fluid that was reserved for the ptu in the left system. I got in touch with our dispatcher. Dispatch brought maintenance into the conference to discuss our problem. Maintenance said the ptu should work but we might not have nose wheel steering capability after the landing. I asked to also speak to the flight duty manager to discuss our problem and to review options. Even though there was nothing in the QRH or the fom that classified this problem as an emergency where I needed to land as soon as possible and weather at our planned destination wasn't an issue; I wanted to discuss the possibility of landing short. The duty manager gave training a call regarding our situation and to find out about the ptu. The answer the duty manager got was don't count on the ptu. Since the flight was now an hour out from landing and after discussing our options with the first officer I elected to continue to the filed destination I informed ATC about our left hydraulic pump problem and that we were not declaring an emergency. I informed the lead flight attendant; told her about our situation and I was planning on a normal landing but we would have to be towed to the gate. The only question I didn't know was if I would be able to taxi clear of the runway. Dispatch informed me that the airport authority will be having the emergency arff in position. The arff was never in position. In preparation for our landing configuration I wanted to plan on a flap 20 landing even if the ptu was working. My concern was if we had to make a missed approach and the ptu stopped working; I didn't want to have to deal with getting the flap 30 retracted using the alternate system. I placed the ground proximity flap ovrd switch to the ovrd position. After making initial contact with approach and bringing them up-to-date; I informed approach that we can only take either the longest runway (even after consulting the landing distance abnormal or irregular configuration chart I still wanted to have as much runway as possible) and I didn't know if I would be able to clear the runway after landing. We began to configure early since we didn't know about the ptu. The ptu worked. After the flaps indicated position 5 we lowered the gear. Upon gear extension we got the gear disagree message with all of the associated warnings. I had to use the alternate flap and alternate gear extension portion of the (757) hydraulic system pressure (left only) checklist. During the rollout it became apparent that nose wheel steering wasn't available. I was able to exit the runway using a 45 degree taxiway with differential braking and proceeded to the run-up block to wait for a tractor to bring us to the gate. While I was waiting I saw the status message power xfr unit. The CRM with the first officer was excellent. This is the first time I had to use our new QRH. I thought our new QRH is a big improvement over the previous one. It is much more user friendly. Fortunately; I purposely carried the crew briefing bulletin to have a list of the QRH corrections. I recommend this bulletin be required to be carried until the QRH is corrected. Having to look at this briefing bulletin to see if a change did apply to our problem did add additional time to our workload. The non normals that are in the flight manual uses bold type to highlight various portions of the checklist. In the QRH bold type isn't used. Without bold type you waste valuable time finding your place in the QRH when you are in the reading and doing phase of the checklist. In the (757) hydraulic system pressure (left only) checklist; the note that says; 'if power xfr unit status message is not displayed (ptu is available); extend gear and flaps normally;' needs to have a recommendation to only land with flaps 20 due to the possibility of ptu failure during a missed approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 left hydraulic system failed in flight but the flight continued to its filed destination and landed uneventfully without nose wheel steering which required that the aircraft be towed to the gate. An emergency was not declared.

Narrative: Complete Loss Of Left Hydraulic System Fluid at cruise altitude: FL370 Position. The first EICAS message that was initially displayed that got my attention was the left system L HYD RSVR PRESS. I saw the warning at the time it was initially displayed. I immediately checked the fluid quantity level. The left hydraulic system was indicating zero quantity. As I was checking the status page the left engine driven and electric hydraulic pumps EICAS messages were now also displayed. I accomplished the (757) Hydraulic System Pressure (Left Only) checklist. According to the checklist; 'If POWER XFR UNIT status message is not displayed (PTU is available); extend gear and flaps normally.' This message wasn't displayed. However; with the left hydraulic quantity indicating 0; I didn't know if this measurement included the fluid that was reserved for the PTU in the left system. I got in touch with our Dispatcher. Dispatch brought Maintenance into the conference to discuss our problem. Maintenance said the PTU should work but we might not have nose wheel steering capability after the landing. I asked to also speak to the Flight Duty Manager to discuss our problem and to review options. Even though there was nothing in the QRH or the FOM that classified this problem as an emergency where I needed to land as soon as possible and weather at our planned destination wasn't an issue; I wanted to discuss the possibility of landing short. The Duty Manager gave Training a call regarding our situation and to find out about the PTU. The answer the Duty Manager got was don't count on the PTU. Since the flight was now an hour out from landing and after discussing our options with the First Officer I elected to continue to the filed destination I informed ATC about our left hydraulic pump problem and that we were not declaring an emergency. I informed the Lead Flight Attendant; told her about our situation and I was planning on a normal landing but we would have to be towed to the gate. The only question I didn't know was if I would be able to taxi clear of the runway. Dispatch informed me that the airport authority will be having the emergency ARFF in position. The ARFF was never in position. In preparation for our landing configuration I wanted to plan on a flap 20 landing even if the PTU was working. My concern was if we had to make a missed approach and the PTU stopped working; I didn't want to have to deal with getting the flap 30 retracted using the alternate system. I placed the GND PROX FLAP OVRD switch to the OVRD position. After making initial contact with Approach and bringing them up-to-date; I informed Approach that we can only take either the longest runway (even after consulting the Landing Distance Abnormal Or Irregular Configuration chart I still wanted to have as much runway as possible) and I didn't know if I would be able to clear the runway after landing. We began to configure early since we didn't know about the PTU. The PTU worked. After the flaps indicated position 5 we lowered the gear. Upon gear extension we got the GEAR DISAGREE message with all of the associated warnings. I had to use the Alternate Flap and Alternate Gear Extension portion of the (757) Hydraulic System Pressure (Left Only) checklist. During the rollout it became apparent that nose wheel steering wasn't available. I was able to exit the runway using a 45 degree taxiway with differential braking and proceeded to the run-up block to wait for a tractor to bring us to the gate. While I was waiting I saw the status message POWER XFR UNIT. The CRM with the First Officer was excellent. This is the first time I had to use our new QRH. I thought our new QRH is a big improvement over the previous one. It is much more user friendly. Fortunately; I purposely carried the crew briefing bulletin to have a list of the QRH corrections. I recommend this bulletin be required to be carried until the QRH is corrected. Having to look at this briefing bulletin to see if a change did apply to our problem did add additional time to our workload. The Non Normals that are in the Flight Manual uses bold type to highlight various portions of the checklist. In the QRH bold type isn't used. Without bold type you waste valuable time finding your place in the QRH when you are in the reading and doing phase of the checklist. In the (757) Hydraulic System Pressure (Left Only) checklist; the note that says; 'If POWER XFR UNIT status message is not displayed (PTU is available); extend gear and flaps normally;' needs to have a recommendation to only land with flaps 20 due to the possibility of PTU failure during a missed approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.