Narrative:

Flight #xx was taxiing at sfo from gate to runway 1R. Instructions were to taxi from the gate via the inner taxiway, hold short at runway 1L. As we were approaching taxiway microphone we were then told by ground to cross the left runway and hold short of runway 1R. Shortly thereafter we were told to takeoff and to expedite as there was traffic landing on runway 28 (approximately 2 mi final). I, the first officer, then proceeded to finish the before takeoff checklist and I was busy flipping switches and looking inside the cockpit. The captain continued to taxi us into position. As I started to apply takeoff thrust I was still busy looking inside at the cockpit gauges. Shortly after rolling the throttles forward I looked up and something appeared to be very wrong. I said to the captain, 'something is really wrong here, I don't see the threshold lights.' at that time he responded by pulling back the throttle levers saying: 'abort takeoff.' then the tower called and said 'cancel takeoff clearance.' we maybe only rolled about 200'. The tower controller then said, 'can you make the next turn off?' I proceeded to tell her that we could. We were then told to turn left, continue to runway 1R, and then left turn into position and hold. We did that and then we were cleared for takeoff again. We then continued on to sac west/O further incident that evening in sacramento we tried to call sfo tower to clarify the situation but had no luck with reaching them. The next day the captain was able to reach them by phone to find that they had filed an incident report. Several factors contributed to this incident occurring. First of all, the captain was just put on line. It was his third day as captain and he was new to the northern ca routes and airports. He had only been into sfo once before, during the day. I was just put on line as a new first officer 2 months ago with little experience into sfo as well. Secondly, runway 1L was closed and there were several construction signs brightly lit as we taxied by them. We feel it might have impaired our night vision. Also, there were several blue taxiway lights inoperative. Thirdly, the captain's commercial chart airport diagram was not currently in effect. He had the 4/22/88 and the 7/88 chart was in effect. He was not aware that this had happened as he thought he was current. His chart showed that taxiway microphone terminates on runway 1R. On the new plate, it continued past runway 1R where we ended up. First officer's are not required to carry commercial charts according to company policy--and we are not provided with them. So, this becomes a financial problem for us. Fourthly, it was a clear night and with only one other aircraft inbound, there was little congestion in the whole area. The tower never mentioned to us our location, being on the taxiway, when they cleared us for takeoff. Also, runway 1R has a displaced threshold lending us to believe that we were on that portion of the runway. The green taxiway lights appeared white--again we think that our night vision was impaired. The confusion came when we did not see the threshold lights, thus causing the aborted takeoff. In conclusion, I feel that we made a mistake that could have been prevented if maybe one or all of the above circumstances were different. I do feel though that we did not endanger or cause conflict with other aircraft or property (I believe safety is a very important issue here) and that this incident is a lesson for us all. The fact that we did notice the problem quickly and reacted to it should say something. Lastly, we learned that communication is a must, not only within the cockpit, but also additional questioning to the ground/tower control, I believe, might have prevented this from recurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ABORTED TXWY TKOF.

Narrative: FLT #XX WAS TAXIING AT SFO FROM GATE TO RWY 1R. INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TAXI FROM THE GATE VIA THE INNER TXWY, HOLD SHORT AT RWY 1L. AS WE WERE APCHING TXWY MIKE WE WERE THEN TOLD BY GND TO CROSS THE LEFT RWY AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1R. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE TOLD TO TKOF AND TO EXPEDITE AS THERE WAS TFC LNDG ON RWY 28 (APPROX 2 MI FINAL). I, THE F/O, THEN PROCEEDED TO FINISH THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND I WAS BUSY FLIPPING SWITCHES AND LOOKING INSIDE THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT CONTINUED TO TAXI US INTO POS. AS I STARTED TO APPLY TKOF THRUST I WAS STILL BUSY LOOKING INSIDE AT THE COCKPIT GAUGES. SHORTLY AFTER ROLLING THE THROTTLES FORWARD I LOOKED UP AND SOMETHING APPEARED TO BE VERY WRONG. I SAID TO THE CAPT, 'SOMETHING IS REALLY WRONG HERE, I DON'T SEE THE THRESHOLD LIGHTS.' AT THAT TIME HE RESPONDED BY PULLING BACK THE THROTTLE LEVERS SAYING: 'ABORT TKOF.' THEN THE TWR CALLED AND SAID 'CANCEL TKOF CLRNC.' WE MAYBE ONLY ROLLED ABOUT 200'. THE TWR CTLR THEN SAID, 'CAN YOU MAKE THE NEXT TURN OFF?' I PROCEEDED TO TELL HER THAT WE COULD. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO TURN LEFT, CONTINUE TO RWY 1R, AND THEN LEFT TURN INTO POS AND HOLD. WE DID THAT AND THEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AGAIN. WE THEN CONTINUED ON TO SAC W/O FURTHER INCIDENT THAT EVENING IN SACRAMENTO WE TRIED TO CALL SFO TWR TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION BUT HAD NO LUCK WITH REACHING THEM. THE NEXT DAY THE CAPT WAS ABLE TO REACH THEM BY PHONE TO FIND THAT THEY HAD FILED AN INCIDENT RPT. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT OCCURRING. FIRST OF ALL, THE CAPT WAS JUST PUT ON LINE. IT WAS HIS THIRD DAY AS CAPT AND HE WAS NEW TO THE NORTHERN CA ROUTES AND ARPTS. HE HAD ONLY BEEN INTO SFO ONCE BEFORE, DURING THE DAY. I WAS JUST PUT ON LINE AS A NEW F/O 2 MONTHS AGO WITH LITTLE EXPERIENCE INTO SFO AS WELL. SECONDLY, RWY 1L WAS CLOSED AND THERE WERE SEVERAL CONSTRUCTION SIGNS BRIGHTLY LIT AS WE TAXIED BY THEM. WE FEEL IT MIGHT HAVE IMPAIRED OUR NIGHT VISION. ALSO, THERE WERE SEVERAL BLUE TXWY LIGHTS INOP. THIRDLY, THE CAPT'S COMMERCIAL CHART ARPT DIAGRAM WAS NOT CURRENTLY IN EFFECT. HE HAD THE 4/22/88 AND THE 7/88 CHART WAS IN EFFECT. HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THIS HAD HAPPENED AS HE THOUGHT HE WAS CURRENT. HIS CHART SHOWED THAT TXWY MIKE TERMINATES ON RWY 1R. ON THE NEW PLATE, IT CONTINUED PAST RWY 1R WHERE WE ENDED UP. F/O'S ARE NOT REQUIRED TO CARRY COMMERCIAL CHARTS ACCORDING TO COMPANY POLICY--AND WE ARE NOT PROVIDED WITH THEM. SO, THIS BECOMES A FINANCIAL PROB FOR US. FOURTHLY, IT WAS A CLEAR NIGHT AND WITH ONLY ONE OTHER ACFT INBND, THERE WAS LITTLE CONGESTION IN THE WHOLE AREA. THE TWR NEVER MENTIONED TO US OUR LOCATION, BEING ON THE TXWY, WHEN THEY CLRED US FOR TKOF. ALSO, RWY 1R HAS A DISPLACED THRESHOLD LENDING US TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE ON THAT PORTION OF THE RWY. THE GREEN TXWY LIGHTS APPEARED WHITE--AGAIN WE THINK THAT OUR NIGHT VISION WAS IMPAIRED. THE CONFUSION CAME WHEN WE DID NOT SEE THE THRESHOLD LIGHTS, THUS CAUSING THE ABORTED TKOF. IN CONCLUSION, I FEEL THAT WE MADE A MISTAKE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF MAYBE ONE OR ALL OF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DIFFERENT. I DO FEEL THOUGH THAT WE DID NOT ENDANGER OR CAUSE CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT OR PROPERTY (I BELIEVE SAFETY IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE HERE) AND THAT THIS INCIDENT IS A LESSON FOR US ALL. THE FACT THAT WE DID NOTICE THE PROB QUICKLY AND REACTED TO IT SHOULD SAY SOMETHING. LASTLY, WE LEARNED THAT COM IS A MUST, NOT ONLY WITHIN THE COCKPIT, BUT ALSO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONING TO THE GND/TWR CTL, I BELIEVE, MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM RECURRING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.