Narrative:

I was working local control position. There was a position briefing taking place. There was a heavy in the IFR practice pattern on final cleared for the option on runway xxr. A G150 called ready back at the ILS critical area line. I taxied him up to runway yy with instructions to hold short. Approach control called with 2 point outs; a cessna going into a satellite airport on a practice approach and a BE35 about 11 miles east going west bound to another satellite airport. Point out phraseology was non-standard and both point outs ran together. I clarified what the cessna was doing and approved the BE35 crossing the departure corridor at 5;000 ft. The radar controller called back again to clarify the point out on the BE35 being allowed to descend west of the runway yy departure corridor. I cleared the G150 for takeoff on a 180 heading. He was very slow to roll and I issued without delay for traffic on 3 mile final to runway xxr. I noted both point outs to the relieving controller; but still did not stop the G150 at a lower altitude. My attention was focused on getting him to roll ahead of the heavy on final. In the middle of the G150 rolling; the TRACON called with a request to give the heavy a noise turn; which is a left turn to 040. They initiated the noise turn and when I questioned it TRACON said; 'if you can; get him in front of the cessna.' I denied this because I did not think I could get the heavy in front of the traffic. I did not think we would have separation if I turned the heavy. The relieving controller and I were watching separation at the runway intersection and discussing the possibility of a left turn for the heavy and I forgot to stop the G150. I think the non-standard phraseology for point outs and turn requests were a distraction. Apreqing a turn when you are the one working traffic for the turning aircraft seems like poor planning. Approach vectored the point out directly through the widest portion of our departure corridor; working harder to avoid taking aircraft through there or leaving them at a higher altitude would reduce the chance of errors. My recommendation would be working harder to avoid the departure corridor. Ultimately; I am the one who was distracted and did not stop my departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Local Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination with the TRACON was confused and appropriate phraseology was not utilized.

Narrative: I was working Local Control position. There was a position briefing taking place. There was a Heavy in the IFR practice pattern on final cleared for the option on Runway XXR. A G150 called ready back at the ILS critical area line. I taxied him up to Runway YY with instructions to hold short. Approach Control called with 2 point outs; a Cessna going into a satellite airport on a practice approach and a BE35 about 11 miles east going west bound to another satellite airport. Point out phraseology was non-standard and both point outs ran together. I clarified what the Cessna was doing and approved the BE35 crossing the departure corridor at 5;000 FT. The RADAR Controller called back again to clarify the point out on the BE35 being allowed to descend west of the Runway YY departure corridor. I cleared the G150 for takeoff on a 180 heading. He was very slow to roll and I issued without delay for traffic on 3 mile final to Runway XXR. I noted both point outs to the relieving Controller; but still did not stop the G150 at a lower altitude. My attention was focused on getting him to roll ahead of the Heavy on final. In the middle of the G150 rolling; the TRACON called with a request to give the Heavy a noise turn; which is a left turn to 040. They initiated the noise turn and when I questioned it TRACON said; 'If you can; get him in front of the Cessna.' I denied this because I did not think I could get the Heavy in front of the traffic. I did not think we would have separation if I turned the Heavy. The relieving Controller and I were watching separation at the runway intersection and discussing the possibility of a left turn for the Heavy and I forgot to stop the G150. I think the non-standard phraseology for point outs and turn requests were a distraction. APREQING a turn when you are the one working traffic for the turning aircraft seems like poor planning. Approach vectored the point out directly through the widest portion of our departure corridor; working harder to avoid taking aircraft through there or leaving them at a higher altitude would reduce the chance of errors. My recommendation would be working harder to avoid the departure corridor. Ultimately; I am the one who was distracted and did not stop my departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.