Narrative:

At XA59Z, I cleared atx Y for takeoff on runway 10R with an initial heading of 100 degrees. The aircraft proceeded onto the runway and commenced takeoff roll. At XB00Z the south radar controller called with an arrival sequence including an approval request into the departure fan for an arriving small transport X. The aircraft was 13 mi ese of the airport wbound on V218, descending to 3000'. I approved the request. As atx Y crossed the departure end of the runway I issued, 'when leaving 2000', turn right heading 140. Contact departure.' at XB02Z, after recognizing and resolving the confliction, the south radar controller advised me of the problem 6 mi southeast of the airport. I failed to recognize the developing situation believing that south radar had sufficient time and room to turn the departure on course inside of the arrival. Leaving the departure on the initial 100 degree heading would have prevented this traffic confliction. The atx Y acknowledged the change to departure frequency, but failed to call departure. The south radar controller initiated communications with the aircraft 3-4 mi southeast with avoidance vectors. This may or may not have been a contributing factor. Supplemental information from acn 110656: I requested approval for the arriving small transport X to penetrate the edge of the departure fan. I was aware that atx Y would be departing shortly. We were departing eastbound and atx Y only flies to mdw from lan. I was working between 7 and 9 aircraft at the time. I heard the departure strip come down the tube, picked it up knowing that it was atx Y. I did not specifically look at the assigned heading, assuming that the aircraft would be on runway heading and not in conflict with the arrival. Several aircraft required instructions making the primary frequency congested. Atx Y did not check in on departure, but that may not have been possible. Both aircraft at 3000' MSL. Latitude sep 1 1/2 NM. Had we been automated attention would have not been diverted making manual handoffs. The safest procedure would have been to assign runway heading to atx Y. In defense of local, he did not recognize my workload and assumed that atx Y would/could contact departure timely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEPARTING ACFT CONFLICTED WITH AN ARRIVING ACFT. LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION OCCURRED.

Narrative: AT XA59Z, I CLRED ATX Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 10R WITH AN INITIAL HDG OF 100 DEGS. THE ACFT PROCEEDED ONTO THE RWY AND COMMENCED TKOF ROLL. AT XB00Z THE S RADAR CTLR CALLED WITH AN ARR SEQUENCE INCLUDING AN APPROVAL REQUEST INTO THE DEP FAN FOR AN ARRIVING SMT X. THE ACFT WAS 13 MI ESE OF THE ARPT WBOUND ON V218, DSNDING TO 3000'. I APPROVED THE REQUEST. AS ATX Y CROSSED THE DEP END OF THE RWY I ISSUED, 'WHEN LEAVING 2000', TURN RIGHT HDG 140. CONTACT DEP.' AT XB02Z, AFTER RECOGNIZING AND RESOLVING THE CONFLICTION, THE SOUTH RADAR CTLR ADVISED ME OF THE PROB 6 MI SE OF THE ARPT. I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE DEVELOPING SITUATION BELIEVING THAT S RADAR HAD SUFFICIENT TIME AND ROOM TO TURN THE DEP ON COURSE INSIDE OF THE ARR. LEAVING THE DEP ON THE INITIAL 100 DEG HDG WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS TFC CONFLICTION. THE ATX Y ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHANGE TO DEP FREQ, BUT FAILED TO CALL DEP. THE S RADAR CTLR INITIATED COMS WITH THE ACFT 3-4 MI SE WITH AVOIDANCE VECTORS. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 110656: I REQUESTED APPROVAL FOR THE ARRIVING SMT X TO PENETRATE THE EDGE OF THE DEP FAN. I WAS AWARE THAT ATX Y WOULD BE DEPARTING SHORTLY. WE WERE DEPARTING EBND AND ATX Y ONLY FLIES TO MDW FROM LAN. I WAS WORKING BTWN 7 AND 9 ACFT AT THE TIME. I HEARD THE DEP STRIP COME DOWN THE TUBE, PICKED IT UP KNOWING THAT IT WAS ATX Y. I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY LOOK AT THE ASSIGNED HDG, ASSUMING THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE ON RWY HDG AND NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE ARR. SEVERAL ACFT REQUIRED INSTRUCTIONS MAKING THE PRIMARY FREQ CONGESTED. ATX Y DID NOT CHK IN ON DEP, BUT THAT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. BOTH ACFT AT 3000' MSL. LAT SEP 1 1/2 NM. HAD WE BEEN AUTOMATED ATTN WOULD HAVE NOT BEEN DIVERTED MAKING MANUAL HDOFS. THE SAFEST PROC WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ASSIGN RWY HDG TO ATX Y. IN DEFENSE OF LCL, HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE MY WORKLOAD AND ASSUMED THAT ATX Y WOULD/COULD CONTACT DEP TIMELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.