Narrative:

I was in command of flying flight tokyo-anc. The first officer was flying. Inbound to anc, the first officer started his descent quite a bit late (15-20 mi) and this after our discussion about his descent planning about 15,000', 310 KTS IAS, 30 NM from anc, my attention was concerned about altitude and distance from anc, rate of descent, ground speed and IAS. Next thing I know we are 7000' doing 320 IAS 12 mi from anc. I called for 'gear on!' and 'slow down!' I called 'runway in sight' and we were 'cleared for a visual' runway 6R traffic was 'a widebody transport downwind turning base'. We landed without any reference to our exceeding 250 KTS IAS below 10,000' and there was no conflict with other traffic. This may not have occurred if I would have forgotten our friendship (first officer was a friend and have known each other for over 10 yrs) and had been more assertive. Also I had been up for 21 hours and was quite tired and exhausted. My day started at XA00 local in taipei and the time we arrived at anc it was XI00 local in taipei, a very long day indeed. I should have initiated the descent and brought his descent planning shortcomings to his attention. The entire crew was exhausted (as is the norm for this flight) and I believe int'l duty times should be shortened. The human body can take just so much. To get an idea of the fatigue factor related to int'l flying, someone should spend some time with and monitor our crew's flying sequence (10-12 days). It would be eye opening. It is the crew's professionalism that has saved our system, not the FAA's police tactics.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRSPEED DEVIATION. EXCEEDED 250 KTS UNDER 10,000'.

Narrative: I WAS IN COMMAND OF FLYING FLT TOKYO-ANC. THE F/O WAS FLYING. INBND TO ANC, THE F/O STARTED HIS DSCNT QUITE A BIT LATE (15-20 MI) AND THIS AFTER OUR DISCUSSION ABOUT HIS DSCNT PLANNING ABOUT 15,000', 310 KTS IAS, 30 NM FROM ANC, MY ATTN WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ALT AND DISTANCE FROM ANC, RATE OF DSCNT, GND SPEED AND IAS. NEXT THING I KNOW WE ARE 7000' DOING 320 IAS 12 MI FROM ANC. I CALLED FOR 'GEAR ON!' AND 'SLOW DOWN!' I CALLED 'RWY IN SIGHT' AND WE WERE 'CLRED FOR A VISUAL' RWY 6R TFC WAS 'A WDB DOWNWIND TURNING BASE'. WE LANDED WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO OUR EXCEEDING 250 KTS IAS BELOW 10,000' AND THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC. THIS MAY NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF I WOULD HAVE FORGOTTEN OUR FRIENDSHIP (F/O WAS A FRIEND AND HAVE KNOWN EACH OTHER FOR OVER 10 YRS) AND HAD BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE. ALSO I HAD BEEN UP FOR 21 HRS AND WAS QUITE TIRED AND EXHAUSTED. MY DAY STARTED AT XA00 LCL IN TAIPEI AND THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT ANC IT WAS XI00 LCL IN TAIPEI, A VERY LONG DAY INDEED. I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED THE DSCNT AND BROUGHT HIS DSCNT PLANNING SHORTCOMINGS TO HIS ATTN. THE ENTIRE CREW WAS EXHAUSTED (AS IS THE NORM FOR THIS FLT) AND I BELIEVE INT'L DUTY TIMES SHOULD BE SHORTENED. THE HUMAN BODY CAN TAKE JUST SO MUCH. TO GET AN IDEA OF THE FATIGUE FACTOR RELATED TO INT'L FLYING, SOMEONE SHOULD SPEND SOME TIME WITH AND MONITOR OUR CREW'S FLYING SEQUENCE (10-12 DAYS). IT WOULD BE EYE OPENING. IT IS THE CREW'S PROFESSIONALISM THAT HAS SAVED OUR SYSTEM, NOT THE FAA'S POLICE TACTICS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.