Narrative:

On taxi out in dca we proceeded normally to the departure end of runway 36. Upon contact with the tower we were instructed to hold short of runway 36. Which we acknowledged and complied with. At approximately xa:49 we were cleared into position to hold with the instruction to be ready to go as soon as an aircraft crossed our runway downfield on it's rollout from landing on 33. At approximately xa:50 the tower controller informed us, with the crossing traffic just touching down, that he may have to ask us to clear the runway. We acknowledged and understood this statement. At approximately xa:50 the tower controller ask a flight on final to runway 36 (on which we were awaiting departure) to give him a short 'south' turn for spacing. The aircraft had landed on 33 and had crossed runway 36 downfield and there was no instruction for our takeoff clearance. At approximately xa:52 the tower instructed us to taxi clear of runway 36. There was no instruction of an urgent need to clear the runway. We began moving our aircraft in a 90 degree left turn to exit the runway. In the process the tower controller informed us that we could if needed proceed to the next intersection to clear the runway. We informed we would exit the end on runway 36. As we turned left it is then we discovered that the other aircraft was approximately 1/8 mi final at approximately 300' AGL. We cleared the runway with our tail as the other aircraft disappeared from view behind us. My estimate of sep between on tail and the other aircraft left wing was 100' maximum. Supplemental information form acn 139086. I feel the tail of my aircraft may have been breaking the plane of the edge of the runway with the passage of the arriving aircraft. Since the tail of an mcl extends vertically 30' AGL, I can only estimate that the clearance with the left wing-tip of the arriving medium large transport must have been a maximum of 21', and probably less. Conclusion: multiple crossing runway arrival sequencing combined with possible departure void time restrictions appear to be setting the stage for an unacceptable risk situation which will eventually manifest itself in a way the transportation industry can ill afford. In my opinion, in the situation described, a go-around of the arriving aircraft should have been called at some point in the approach when it was obvious that a serious conflict was occurring. The time required to clear an aircraft measuring 148' in length from a 150' wide runway must have been severely underestimated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MLG DEPARTING DCA WAS CLEARED INTO POSITION AND HOLD, THEN LATER TOLD TO CLEAR THE RWY DUE TO AN ARRIVING MLG. FIRST MLG STILL HAD TAIL ON RWY WHEN ARRIVING ACFT FLEW OVER JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT IN DCA WE PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO THE DEP END OF RWY 36. UPON CONTACT WITH THE TWR WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 36. WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED WITH. AT APPROX XA:49 WE WERE CLRED INTO POS TO HOLD WITH THE INSTRUCTION TO BE READY TO GO AS SOON AS AN ACFT CROSSED OUR RWY DOWNFIELD ON IT'S ROLLOUT FROM LNDG ON 33. AT APPROX XA:50 THE TWR CTLR INFORMED US, WITH THE XING TFC JUST TOUCHING DOWN, THAT HE MAY HAVE TO ASK US TO CLR THE RWY. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND UNDERSTOOD THIS STATEMENT. AT APPROX XA:50 THE TWR CTLR ASK A FLT ON FINAL TO RWY 36 (ON WHICH WE WERE AWAITING DEP) TO GIVE HIM A SHORT 'S' TURN FOR SPACING. THE ACFT HAD LANDED ON 33 AND HAD CROSSED RWY 36 DOWNFIELD AND THERE WAS NO INSTRUCTION FOR OUR TKOF CLRNC. AT APPROX XA:52 THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI CLR OF RWY 36. THERE WAS NO INSTRUCTION OF AN URGENT NEED TO CLR THE RWY. WE BEGAN MOVING OUR ACFT IN A 90 DEG L TURN TO EXIT THE RWY. IN THE PROCESS THE TWR CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE COULD IF NEEDED PROCEED TO THE NEXT INTXN TO CLR THE RWY. WE INFORMED WE WOULD EXIT THE END ON RWY 36. AS WE TURNED L IT IS THEN WE DISCOVERED THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS APPROX 1/8 MI FINAL AT APPROX 300' AGL. WE CLRED THE RWY WITH OUR TAIL AS THE OTHER ACFT DISAPPEARED FROM VIEW BEHIND US. MY ESTIMATE OF SEP BTWN ON TAIL AND THE OTHER ACFT L WING WAS 100' MAX. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FORM ACN 139086. I FEEL THE TAIL OF MY ACFT MAY HAVE BEEN BREAKING THE PLANE OF THE EDGE OF THE RWY WITH THE PASSAGE OF THE ARRIVING ACFT. SINCE THE TAIL OF AN MCL EXTENDS VERTICALLY 30' AGL, I CAN ONLY ESTIMATE THAT THE CLRNC WITH THE L WING-TIP OF THE ARRIVING MLG MUST HAVE BEEN A MAX OF 21', AND PROBABLY LESS. CONCLUSION: MULTIPLE XING RWY ARR SEQUENCING COMBINED WITH POSSIBLE DEP VOID TIME RESTRICTIONS APPEAR TO BE SETTING THE STAGE FOR AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK SITUATION WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY MANIFEST ITSELF IN A WAY THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY CAN ILL AFFORD. IN MY OPINION, IN THE SITUATION DESCRIBED, A GO-AROUND OF THE ARRIVING ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED AT SOME POINT IN THE APCH WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT A SERIOUS CONFLICT WAS OCCURRING. THE TIME REQUIRED TO CLR AN ACFT MEASURING 148' IN LENGTH FROM A 150' WIDE RWY MUST HAVE BEEN SEVERELY UNDERESTIMATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.