Narrative:

The problem arose when the aircraft was cleared to taxi to 35L. The captain taxied onto the active runway and began back-taxiing down 35L/17R at lbb. Unfamiliar with the field and busy with taxi checklists and procedures. I (first officer) didn't notice until after the aircraft was on the runway. I told the captain we should not be on the runway because we hadn't been cleared and that we should be on the parallel taxiway to our right. This captain, notorious for being a hothead, lost his patience and forced the completion of the taxi and before-takeoff checklists. His comments about the incident, 'we always do that, and that's what ground control expected us to do.' (this comment was made after safely airborne and en route.) it was also made after I (first officer) brought it up again. My comment to him was to the effect, 'I don't care what they expected or what we normally do, we still should have had clearance to taxi onto the active runway.' the lbb traffic situation at that time of day is nil, ATC instructions minimal, the captain was familiar with the route, the crew was tired from all night flying, and the crew was commanded by an egotistical, impatient captain with a known bad reputation in the company. I determined to watch with vigilance. The next night we got into an argument about an altitude he busted by more than 500'. His general attitude toward ATC (also noted by other situations) is that he knows where ATC wants us and he does what he deems to be better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY TRANSGRESSION. TAXI ONTO ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE WHEN THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO TAXI TO 35L. THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY AND BEGAN BACK-TAXIING DOWN 35L/17R AT LBB. UNFAMILIAR WITH THE FIELD AND BUSY WITH TAXI CHKLISTS AND PROCS. I (F/O) DIDN'T NOTICE UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT WAS ON THE RWY. I TOLD THE CAPT WE SHOULD NOT BE ON THE RWY BECAUSE WE HADN'T BEEN CLRED AND THAT WE SHOULD BE ON THE PARALLEL TXWY TO OUR RIGHT. THIS CAPT, NOTORIOUS FOR BEING A HOTHEAD, LOST HIS PATIENCE AND FORCED THE COMPLETION OF THE TAXI AND BEFORE-TKOF CHKLISTS. HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE INCIDENT, 'WE ALWAYS DO THAT, AND THAT'S WHAT GND CTL EXPECTED US TO DO.' (THIS COMMENT WAS MADE AFTER SAFELY AIRBORNE AND ENRTE.) IT WAS ALSO MADE AFTER I (F/O) BROUGHT IT UP AGAIN. MY COMMENT TO HIM WAS TO THE EFFECT, 'I DON'T CARE WHAT THEY EXPECTED OR WHAT WE NORMALLY DO, WE STILL SHOULD HAVE HAD CLRNC TO TAXI ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY.' THE LBB TFC SITUATION AT THAT TIME OF DAY IS NIL, ATC INSTRUCTIONS MINIMAL, THE CAPT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE RTE, THE CREW WAS TIRED FROM ALL NIGHT FLYING, AND THE CREW WAS COMMANDED BY AN EGOTISTICAL, IMPATIENT CAPT WITH A KNOWN BAD REPUTATION IN THE COMPANY. I DETERMINED TO WATCH WITH VIGILANCE. THE NEXT NIGHT WE GOT INTO AN ARGUMENT ABOUT AN ALT HE BUSTED BY MORE THAN 500'. HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ATC (ALSO NOTED BY OTHER SITUATIONS) IS THAT HE KNOWS WHERE ATC WANTS US AND HE DOES WHAT HE DEEMS TO BE BETTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.