Narrative:

We were in an light transport operating as air carrier X, cleared to taxi in position and hold on runway 11R in msp. We could see another light transport which had just landed, slowing to exit the runway and were told there was traffic behind us on a 3 mi final. We were given an immediate takeoff clearance with a turn to a heading. My first officer repeated back the clearance and was completing 3 checklist items that are to be completed on the runway prior to takeoff and we conducted a water methanol test (required for the first flight of the day) and then took off. Immediately after takeoff, we heard the traffic behind us air carrier, medium large transport on final going around. Later, approach control asked us to call the tower in msp on our arrival in dbq, and only then found out that msp tower had asked us to exit the runway to accommodate the landing traffic. Neither I nor my first officer heard such a transmission and therefore did not act upon it. Apparently, the air carrier, medium large transport never saw us on the runway holding in position. Awaiting the light transport traffic to clear, noting that our paint scheme blends in with the runway numbers. My first officer and I discussed the possibility of being able to takeoff more quickly and concluded that due to the fact that we must perform several tasks on the runway in preparation for takeoff that we would have saved an insignificant amount of time by 'rushing' through the checklist, which I will not allow for obvious safety reasons. We also discussed the contributing factors which resulted in this go around. The combination of our attention being diverted to completing the checklist, the cockpit noise level for takeoff, and the extremely 'tight' spacing for departures and arrs led us to conclude that unless changes are made on both ATC's behalf and the FAA's allowance of such diversions during such critical phases be minimized, some very disturbing consequences could result in the future.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X FLT CREW NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC. FAILED TO MAKE IMMEDIATE TKOF FAILED TO EXIT RWY AS INSTRUCTED.

Narrative: WE WERE IN AN LTT OPERATING AS ACR X, CLRED TO TAXI IN POS AND HOLD ON RWY 11R IN MSP. WE COULD SEE ANOTHER LTT WHICH HAD JUST LANDED, SLOWING TO EXIT THE RWY AND WERE TOLD THERE WAS TFC BEHIND US ON A 3 MI FINAL. WE WERE GIVEN AN IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC WITH A TURN TO A HDG. MY F/O REPEATED BACK THE CLRNC AND WAS COMPLETING 3 CHKLIST ITEMS THAT ARE TO BE COMPLETED ON THE RWY PRIOR TO TKOF AND WE CONDUCTED A WATER METHANOL TEST (REQUIRED FOR THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY) AND THEN TOOK OFF. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, WE HEARD THE TFC BEHIND US ACR, MLG ON FINAL GOING AROUND. LATER, APCH CTL ASKED US TO CALL THE TWR IN MSP ON OUR ARR IN DBQ, AND ONLY THEN FOUND OUT THAT MSP TWR HAD ASKED US TO EXIT THE RWY TO ACCOMMODATE THE LNDG TFC. NEITHER I NOR MY F/O HEARD SUCH A XMISSION AND THEREFORE DID NOT ACT UPON IT. APPARENTLY, THE ACR, MLG NEVER SAW US ON THE RWY HOLDING IN POS. AWAITING THE LTT TFC TO CLR, NOTING THAT OUR PAINT SCHEME BLENDS IN WITH THE RWY NUMBERS. MY F/O AND I DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING ABLE TO TKOF MORE QUICKLY AND CONCLUDED THAT DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE MUST PERFORM SEVERAL TASKS ON THE RWY IN PREPARATION FOR TKOF THAT WE WOULD HAVE SAVED AN INSIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME BY 'RUSHING' THROUGH THE CHKLIST, WHICH I WILL NOT ALLOW FOR OBVIOUS SAFETY REASONS. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH RESULTED IN THIS GAR. THE COMBINATION OF OUR ATTN BEING DIVERTED TO COMPLETING THE CHKLIST, THE COCKPIT NOISE LEVEL FOR TKOF, AND THE EXTREMELY 'TIGHT' SPACING FOR DEPS AND ARRS LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT UNLESS CHANGES ARE MADE ON BOTH ATC'S BEHALF AND THE FAA'S ALLOWANCE OF SUCH DIVERSIONS DURING SUCH CRITICAL PHASES BE MINIMIZED, SOME VERY DISTURBING CONSEQUENCES COULD RESULT IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.