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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 192826 |
Time | |
Date | 199110 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : fak |
State Reference | VA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 21000 msl bound upper : 23000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zdc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | descent other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 14500 flight time type : 3400 |
ASRS Report | 192826 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : undershoot non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Approximately 100 NM west of fak VORTAC washington center controller issued clearance to cross 20 west of fak at FL210. Aircraft was in cruise at FL330 with first officer manipulating the controls. First officer started descent 63 DME west of fak to comply with crossing restriction. At about the same time, 1 of the flight attendants came up to the cockpit and requested some information for a passenger. He then began discussing the beautiful fall WX and how pretty the lights of richmond were. I had allowed this distraction to divert my attention from xchking the first officer who was flying the aircraft without saying a word. At approximately 0 DME west of fak washington center asked if we were going to cross 20 west of fak at FL210. First officer had the aircraft on autoplt descending out of FL260 at 300 KTS and 2000 FPM rate of descent. I asked him if he was going to make the crossing. After a long pause, he said that he didn't think so. This was my first indication that the man had absolutely no idea of the performance capability of the aircraft. I told ATC 'the man flying says no, but we will make the crossing restriction.' I was going to take control of the aircraft and make the restriction. Controller became very angry, said that he had traffic at FL220 and assigned us a clearance to cross 20 west of fak at FL230. He continued to severely chastise us for what seemed like several mins and then handed us off to the next controller who cleared us to FL200. This was the first time that I had flown with this particular individual and knew only that he had been with the airline since 1970. Once on the ground, I asked him to enlighten me on his flying career. He related that the majority of his career was either on furlough or flying flight engineer on wide body aircraft out of a west coast domicile. He had about 1600 hours in type, the vast majority of which was in the new generation model with an autoflt system which has the capability to make xings for you. Our company has created an atmosphere of pressures and concerns that have to have adverse affects on the quality of our human performance. We used to have 7 domiciles, now there are 2, making many of us, me included, commute to work. The day of the described incident I got up at XX00 CDT to commute to an 11 hour plus duty cay. The day of the incident, I had been up for 19 1/2 hours with only a short nap, and the first officer had been up for 15 1/2 hours. This was our fifth flight leg of the day. Fatigue, had to be a major factor affecting both our performance and thought processes. Our owner has mismanaged the airline in fulfilling his personal greed to the point that morale of all employees is at rock bottom. Watching your career systematically destroyed by a billionaire to put a few more bucks in his pocket creates a lot of stress and distraction that is with all of us 24 hours a day. Company practice of making us fly all models of this particular type aircraft, is in my opinion a definite compromise of flight safety, but the FAA lets them do it. The models X, Y and have nothing in common with the model a, but company contends it is the same aircraft and indiscriminately dumps the extra workload and stress on our backs almost daily. The afore mentioned are at least some of the factors that I feel in my case was a significant impact on human performance. Unfortunately, I cannot offer any simple solution to eliminate the problems.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ALT XING RESTRICTION NOT MADE AS ACR MLG HAS ALTDEV ALT UNDERSHOT DURING A LOWER SINK RATE THAN REQUIRED.
Narrative: APPROX 100 NM W OF FAK VORTAC WASHINGTON CENTER CTLR ISSUED CLRNC TO CROSS 20 W OF FAK AT FL210. ACFT WAS IN CRUISE AT FL330 WITH FO MANIPULATING THE CTLS. FO STARTED DSCNT 63 DME W OF FAK TO COMPLY WITH XING RESTRICTION. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, 1 OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT AND REQUESTED SOME INFO FOR A PAX. HE THEN BEGAN DISCUSSING THE BEAUTIFUL FALL WX AND HOW PRETTY THE LIGHTS OF RICHMOND WERE. I HAD ALLOWED THIS DISTR TO DIVERT MY ATTN FROM XCHKING THE FO WHO WAS FLYING THE ACFT WITHOUT SAYING A WORD. AT APPROX 0 DME W OF FAK WASHINGTON CENTER ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO CROSS 20 W OF FAK AT FL210. FO HAD THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT DSNDING OUT OF FL260 AT 300 KTS AND 2000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE THE XING. AFTER A LONG PAUSE, HE SAID THAT HE DIDN'T THINK SO. THIS WAS MY FIRST INDICATION THAT THE MAN HAD ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA OF THE PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY OF THE ACFT. I TOLD ATC 'THE MAN FLYING SAYS NO, BUT WE WILL MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION.' I WAS GOING TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT AND MAKE THE RESTRICTION. CTLR BECAME VERY ANGRY, SAID THAT HE HAD TFC AT FL220 AND ASSIGNED US A CLRNC TO CROSS 20 W OF FAK AT FL230. HE CONTINUED TO SEVERELY CHASTISE US FOR WHAT SEEMED LIKE SEVERAL MINS AND THEN HANDED US OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR WHO CLRED US TO FL200. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL AND KNEW ONLY THAT HE HAD BEEN WITH THE AIRLINE SINCE 1970. ONCE ON THE GND, I ASKED HIM TO ENLIGHTEN ME ON HIS FLYING CAREER. HE RELATED THAT THE MAJORITY OF HIS CAREER WAS EITHER ON FURLOUGH OR FLYING FLT ENGINEER ON WIDE BODY ACFT OUT OF A W COAST DOMICILE. HE HAD ABOUT 1600 HRS IN TYPE, THE VAST MAJORITY OF WHICH WAS IN THE NEW GENERATION MODEL WITH AN AUTOFLT SYS WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE XINGS FOR YOU. OUR COMPANY HAS CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF PRESSURES AND CONCERNS THAT HAVE TO HAVE ADVERSE AFFECTS ON THE QUALITY OF OUR HUMAN PERFORMANCE. WE USED TO HAVE 7 DOMICILES, NOW THERE ARE 2, MAKING MANY OF US, ME INCLUDED, COMMUTE TO WORK. THE DAY OF THE DESCRIBED INCIDENT I GOT UP AT XX00 CDT TO COMMUTE TO AN 11 HR PLUS DUTY CAY. THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, I HAD BEEN UP FOR 19 1/2 HRS WITH ONLY A SHORT NAP, AND THE FO HAD BEEN UP FOR 15 1/2 HRS. THIS WAS OUR FIFTH FLT LEG OF THE DAY. FATIGUE, HAD TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR AFFECTING BOTH OUR PERFORMANCE AND THOUGHT PROCESSES. OUR OWNER HAS MISMANAGED THE AIRLINE IN FULFILLING HIS PERSONAL GREED TO THE POINT THAT MORALE OF ALL EMPLOYEES IS AT ROCK BOTTOM. WATCHING YOUR CAREER SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED BY A BILLIONAIRE TO PUT A FEW MORE BUCKS IN HIS POCKET CREATES A LOT OF STRESS AND DISTR THAT IS WITH ALL OF US 24 HRS A DAY. COMPANY PRACTICE OF MAKING US FLY ALL MODELS OF THIS PARTICULAR TYPE ACFT, IS IN MY OPINION A DEFINITE COMPROMISE OF FLT SAFETY, BUT THE FAA LETS THEM DO IT. THE MODELS X, Y AND HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON WITH THE MODEL A, BUT COMPANY CONTENDS IT IS THE SAME ACFT AND INDISCRIMINATELY DUMPS THE EXTRA WORKLOAD AND STRESS ON OUR BACKS ALMOST DAILY. THE AFORE MENTIONED ARE AT LEAST SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT I FEEL IN MY CASE WAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON HUMAN PERFORMANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, I CANNOT OFFER ANY SIMPLE SOLUTION TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEMS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.