Narrative:

During a marginal WX CAT ii approach into atl, we had configured the aircraft for an autoland approach. Although wind at the field was approximately 140/06, winds aloft were approximately 220/30 or more according to the FMS. Passing 500 ft AGL, the autoplt kicked off and the captain took over manually but never got lined up on the localizer again. We executed a missed approach at approximately 400 ft AGL. On the next approach, the captain decided to fly a manual approach due to the suspect autoplt system. We flew the aircraft on autoplt to the FAF, then took over manually. At 1000 ft AGL, we were tracking on glide path and localizer with about 14 degrees of crab. As the wind shifted, accompanied by moderate turbulence, the captain was unable to maintain track. He continued the approach varying between 1/2 DOT to 1 DOT off. At 200 ft above mins I called, 'too far right, go around.' at that time the approach lights came into sight 30-45 degrees off to the left (150 yards). The captain made a sharp turn for the centerline and overshot as we broke out at 100 ft AGL parallel to the left side of the runway 1000 ft past the threshold. He made another sharp turn, this time to the right, to establish a line up. I had called 'go around.' 3 times by this point and had been tuned out. He managed to get wings level and nose aligned with the runway as we touched down. The events following my initial go around call endangered the aircraft and passenger to the extreme. The capts unwillingness to go around was unbelievable. Our crew had become a crew of 1. At the time he saw the lights, he committed himself to land. Despite the extreme offset. Our airline training doesn't permit this type of 'play' for the runway though. Hard maneuvering below maneuvering speed is never warranted. I also was completely surprised that the captain did not acknowledge or execute my 'go around' calls. I was so surprised that I couldn't have even attempted to take the aircraft and do it myself. Cockpit resource management training is good, but this type of situation seems to indicate that a pilot can become so absorbed that he can block out the other crew. On the ground, the captain later acknowledged that he was outside the safe parameters for landing and should have gone around. My question is why he didn't recognize it in flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG CREW HAND FLEW AN ILS VERY POORLY AND LANDED SAFELY. THE FO CALLED OUT 'GAR' MORE THAN ONCE.

Narrative: DURING A MARGINAL WX CAT II APCH INTO ATL, WE HAD CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR AN AUTOLAND APCH. ALTHOUGH WIND AT THE FIELD WAS APPROX 140/06, WINDS ALOFT WERE APPROX 220/30 OR MORE ACCORDING TO THE FMS. PASSING 500 FT AGL, THE AUTOPLT KICKED OFF AND THE CAPT TOOK OVER MANUALLY BUT NEVER GOT LINED UP ON THE LOC AGAIN. WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AT APPROX 400 FT AGL. ON THE NEXT APCH, THE CAPT DECIDED TO FLY A MANUAL APCH DUE TO THE SUSPECT AUTOPLT SYS. WE FLEW THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT TO THE FAF, THEN TOOK OVER MANUALLY. AT 1000 FT AGL, WE WERE TRACKING ON GLIDE PATH AND LOC WITH ABOUT 14 DEGS OF CRAB. AS THE WIND SHIFTED, ACCOMPANIED BY MODERATE TURB, THE CAPT WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN TRACK. HE CONTINUED THE APCH VARYING BTWN 1/2 DOT TO 1 DOT OFF. AT 200 FT ABOVE MINS I CALLED, 'TOO FAR R, GAR.' AT THAT TIME THE APCH LIGHTS CAME INTO SIGHT 30-45 DEGS OFF TO THE L (150 YARDS). THE CAPT MADE A SHARP TURN FOR THE CTRLINE AND OVERSHOT AS WE BROKE OUT AT 100 FT AGL PARALLEL TO THE L SIDE OF THE RWY 1000 FT PAST THE THRESHOLD. HE MADE ANOTHER SHARP TURN, THIS TIME TO THE R, TO ESTABLISH A LINE UP. I HAD CALLED 'GAR.' 3 TIMES BY THIS POINT AND HAD BEEN TUNED OUT. HE MANAGED TO GET WINGS LEVEL AND NOSE ALIGNED WITH THE RWY AS WE TOUCHED DOWN. THE EVENTS FOLLOWING MY INITIAL GAR CALL ENDANGERED THE ACFT AND PAX TO THE EXTREME. THE CAPTS UNWILLINGNESS TO GAR WAS UNBELIEVABLE. OUR CREW HAD BECOME A CREW OF 1. AT THE TIME HE SAW THE LIGHTS, HE COMMITTED HIMSELF TO LAND. DESPITE THE EXTREME OFFSET. OUR AIRLINE TRAINING DOESN'T PERMIT THIS TYPE OF 'PLAY' FOR THE RWY THOUGH. HARD MANEUVERING BELOW MANEUVERING SPD IS NEVER WARRANTED. I ALSO WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED THAT THE CAPT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE OR EXECUTE MY 'GAR' CALLS. I WAS SO SURPRISED THAT I COULDN'T HAVE EVEN ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THE ACFT AND DO IT MYSELF. COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING IS GOOD, BUT THIS TYPE OF SITUATION SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT A PLT CAN BECOME SO ABSORBED THAT HE CAN BLOCK OUT THE OTHER CREW. ON THE GND, THE CAPT LATER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS OUTSIDE THE SAFE PARAMETERS FOR LNDG AND SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. MY QUESTION IS WHY HE DIDN'T RECOGNIZE IT IN FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.