Narrative:

Due to low visibility, the ILS approach to runway 12R at st. Louis was missed. While on the go around, the outboard trailing edge flaps only retracted to 5 degrees while all the other flaps retracted fully during clean-up. Workload was high at this point. While going through that checklist and being vectored for another approach, I was trying to determine another alternate since our original altitude was below minimums (mci). I chose ind to divert to. I then rechked the fuel remaining and had divert fuel plus reserves, plus approximately 1000 pounds. Since the flaps were still down, we could never have made it to ind so I asked stl approach for our sequence for the next approach, requested vectors for runway 12L since it had a lower decision ht (but same 4000 ft RVR minimums as 12R), and declared minimum fuel. Approach said we were #10 or so for the approach. At that point I declared an emergency for the flaps and fuel state so I could get priority. We were then vectored for the approach in a timely manner, saw the runway right at minimums and landed. Factors leading into this: we held on the ground in iah for over an hour for that fog to lift in stl. After takeoff and en route, we were slowed down as we got closer to stl because holding was in progress. We departed iah with more than enough fuel since we tankered fuel (exact amount I can't recall without the flight plan in front of me). We still did 2 turns in holding. That, in combination with the missed approach and the high fuel flow rate while the flaps were still extended, burned most of our excess fuel. During the ground time in stl, our mechanics fixed the flap problem, and we returned to iah. Our company advised me that an operations inspector at the FAA FSDO of stl wanted to talk to me. We departed before he was able to get there. However, when in range to iah, we were advised that we would be greeted by the houston FAA inspector. I found this to be disruptive and disturbing since I wrote out my written report of the emergency and left a copy in stl for all (including the FAA) to read. The FAA should not be allowed to intervene, or otherwise be confrontational in any way during the operation of an air carrier. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated that he was intimidated by the fact that ATC advised that the FAA inspector would meet the aircraft on arrival at his next destination. However, he was not met and it relieved his crew's anxieties. He believed that all information was given in the company report left behind at the previous station. However, it was pointed out that the FAA inspector probably did not receive a copy since the company wants to look at it first. Therefore, the inspector that tried unsuccessfully to obtain the information at the airport of the emergency low fuel did not have any details on which to pass on for an incident in which the inspector has an obligation to investigate. Therefore, the inspector called ahead to have the information obtained by another FSDO. To further complicate the problem of the inspector getting the information, the inspector arrived at the aircraft just as the cabin door was being closed and then stood on the jetway without having the opportunity to talk with the crew. To further annoy the inspector, the aircraft did not push back for awhile since ATC issued a delay for traffic. All in all, after discussing the matter with the reporting captain, he was less frightened about FAA inspectors and indicated a deeper understanding of their work and how important it is for the flight crew to provide FAA inspectors with their side of the situation and events leading up to the emergency. He also described a low fuel incident a week later in which he was afraid to declare an emergency since he had just done so, even though it was due to unforecast WX where fog has unexpectedly formed and the aircraft had not been dispatched with alternate fuel! However, all went well and declaration of emergency was unnecessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LGT ACR ACFT DECLARES AN EMER LOW FUEL DUE TO A PARTIAL FLAP STUCK PROB.

Narrative: DUE TO LOW VISIBILITY, THE ILS APCH TO RWY 12R AT ST. LOUIS WAS MISSED. WHILE ON THE GAR, THE OUTBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAPS ONLY RETRACTED TO 5 DEGS WHILE ALL THE OTHER FLAPS RETRACTED FULLY DURING CLEAN-UP. WORKLOAD WAS HIGH AT THIS POINT. WHILE GOING THROUGH THAT CHKLIST AND BEING VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH, I WAS TRYING TO DETERMINE ANOTHER ALTERNATE SINCE OUR ORIGINAL ALT WAS BELOW MINIMUMS (MCI). I CHOSE IND TO DIVERT TO. I THEN RECHKED THE FUEL REMAINING AND HAD DIVERT FUEL PLUS RESERVES, PLUS APPROX 1000 LBS. SINCE THE FLAPS WERE STILL DOWN, WE COULD NEVER HAVE MADE IT TO IND SO I ASKED STL APCH FOR OUR SEQUENCE FOR THE NEXT APCH, REQUESTED VECTORS FOR RWY 12L SINCE IT HAD A LOWER DECISION HT (BUT SAME 4000 FT RVR MINIMUMS AS 12R), AND DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL. APCH SAID WE WERE #10 OR SO FOR THE APCH. AT THAT POINT I DECLARED AN EMER FOR THE FLAPS AND FUEL STATE SO I COULD GET PRIORITY. WE WERE THEN VECTORED FOR THE APCH IN A TIMELY MANNER, SAW THE RWY RIGHT AT MINIMUMS AND LANDED. FACTORS LEADING INTO THIS: WE HELD ON THE GND IN IAH FOR OVER AN HR FOR THAT FOG TO LIFT IN STL. AFTER TKOF AND ENRTE, WE WERE SLOWED DOWN AS WE GOT CLOSER TO STL BECAUSE HOLDING WAS IN PROGRESS. WE DEPARTED IAH WITH MORE THAN ENOUGH FUEL SINCE WE TANKERED FUEL (EXACT AMOUNT I CAN'T RECALL WITHOUT THE FLT PLAN IN FRONT OF ME). WE STILL DID 2 TURNS IN HOLDING. THAT, IN COMBINATION WITH THE MISSED APCH AND THE HIGH FUEL FLOW RATE WHILE THE FLAPS WERE STILL EXTENDED, BURNED MOST OF OUR EXCESS FUEL. DURING THE GND TIME IN STL, OUR MECHS FIXED THE FLAP PROB, AND WE RETURNED TO IAH. OUR COMPANY ADVISED ME THAT AN OPS INSPECTOR AT THE FAA FSDO OF STL WANTED TO TALK TO ME. WE DEPARTED BEFORE HE WAS ABLE TO GET THERE. HOWEVER, WHEN IN RANGE TO IAH, WE WERE ADVISED THAT WE WOULD BE GREETED BY THE HOUSTON FAA INSPECTOR. I FOUND THIS TO BE DISRUPTIVE AND DISTURBING SINCE I WROTE OUT MY WRITTEN RPT OF THE EMER AND LEFT A COPY IN STL FOR ALL (INCLUDING THE FAA) TO READ. THE FAA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE, OR OTHERWISE BE CONFRONTATIONAL IN ANY WAY DURING THE OP OF AN ACR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS INTIMIDATED BY THE FACT THAT ATC ADVISED THAT THE FAA INSPECTOR WOULD MEET THE ACFT ON ARR AT HIS NEXT DEST. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT MET AND IT RELIEVED HIS CREW'S ANXIETIES. HE BELIEVED THAT ALL INFO WAS GIVEN IN THE COMPANY RPT LEFT BEHIND AT THE PREVIOUS STATION. HOWEVER, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE FAA INSPECTOR PROBABLY DID NOT RECEIVE A COPY SINCE THE COMPANY WANTS TO LOOK AT IT FIRST. THEREFORE, THE INSPECTOR THAT TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO OBTAIN THE INFO AT THE ARPT OF THE EMER LOW FUEL DID NOT HAVE ANY DETAILS ON WHICH TO PASS ON FOR AN INCIDENT IN WHICH THE INSPECTOR HAS AN OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE. THEREFORE, THE INSPECTOR CALLED AHEAD TO HAVE THE INFO OBTAINED BY ANOTHER FSDO. TO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE PROB OF THE INSPECTOR GETTING THE INFO, THE INSPECTOR ARRIVED AT THE ACFT JUST AS THE CABIN DOOR WAS BEING CLOSED AND THEN STOOD ON THE JETWAY WITHOUT HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH THE CREW. TO FURTHER ANNOY THE INSPECTOR, THE ACFT DID NOT PUSH BACK FOR AWHILE SINCE ATC ISSUED A DELAY FOR TFC. ALL IN ALL, AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH THE RPTING CAPT, HE WAS LESS FRIGHTENED ABOUT FAA INSPECTORS AND INDICATED A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR WORK AND HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR THE FLC TO PROVIDE FAA INSPECTORS WITH THEIR SIDE OF THE SIT AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE EMER. HE ALSO DESCRIBED A LOW FUEL INCIDENT A WK LATER IN WHICH HE WAS AFRAID TO DECLARE AN EMER SINCE HE HAD JUST DONE SO, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS DUE TO UNFORECAST WX WHERE FOG HAS UNEXPECTEDLY FORMED AND THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN DISPATCHED WITH ALTERNATE FUEL! HOWEVER, ALL WENT WELL AND DECLARATION OF EMER WAS UNNECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.