Narrative:

ZOB had given us a crossing restr when we were cruising at FL230 from pit to syr to cross 30 mi southwest of syr at 11000 ft. We were approximately 85 mi from syr at time. Winds aloft were out of the west at about 150 KTS. At about 65 DME, I asked the captain if he was aware that we were to cross 30 DME at 11000 ft. He said 'yes, he was' and started descending about 2000 FPM. At about 48 DME we were still at about 19000 ft and 2000 FPM. I knew that, with the tailwind, we were going to have trouble making the crossing restr. I said to him 'are you sure you're going to make 30 at 11000 ft?' he said he would, and pulled remaining power off and we started a steeper descent of about 4500 FPM. With about 4 mi to the fix and descending at 4500 FPM, I thought he might make it, but he started slowing his descent and we crossed the 30 DME fix at about 12000 ft and were at 27 DME before reaching 11000 ft. I felt that what I had done to prevent this was about all I could have done other than physically taking the aircraft. I had advised him twice with time for him to correct the situation. We had flown 2 previous legs that day and he was well aware of the strong tailwinds we were experiencing. What really bothered me was that, although he was advised of the problem well in advance, he almost seemed indifferent about it. He said 'I consider 11000 ft crossing as anything out of 12000 ft.' he seemed to be proficient in his other flying and adhered to 250 KT restr below 10000 ft, so I was a little shocked he wasn't more concerned with crossing restrs. ATC never questioned us about the crossing altitude and there was no traffic conflict that I am aware of. In retrospect, if it happens again to me, I will be more forceful earlier to make him or her know I feel he or she can't make the crossing restr. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter has been a reserve first officer on the dc- 9 for 2 or 3 yrs. The reporter had never flown with his captain before. The captain apparently forgot about the strong tailwinds and he was not concerned about the fact that he had missed a crossing. The reporter wishes that he had been more assertive to cause the captain to do something.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: XING RESTR MISSED ON DSCNT.

Narrative: ZOB HAD GIVEN US A XING RESTR WHEN WE WERE CRUISING AT FL230 FROM PIT TO SYR TO CROSS 30 MI SW OF SYR AT 11000 FT. WE WERE APPROX 85 MI FROM SYR AT TIME. WINDS ALOFT WERE OUT OF THE W AT ABOUT 150 KTS. AT ABOUT 65 DME, I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS AWARE THAT WE WERE TO CROSS 30 DME AT 11000 FT. HE SAID 'YES, HE WAS' AND STARTED DSNDING ABOUT 2000 FPM. AT ABOUT 48 DME WE WERE STILL AT ABOUT 19000 FT AND 2000 FPM. I KNEW THAT, WITH THE TAILWIND, WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TROUBLE MAKING THE XING RESTR. I SAID TO HIM 'ARE YOU SURE YOU'RE GOING TO MAKE 30 AT 11000 FT?' HE SAID HE WOULD, AND PULLED REMAINING PWR OFF AND WE STARTED A STEEPER DSCNT OF ABOUT 4500 FPM. WITH ABOUT 4 MI TO THE FIX AND DSNDING AT 4500 FPM, I THOUGHT HE MIGHT MAKE IT, BUT HE STARTED SLOWING HIS DSCNT AND WE CROSSED THE 30 DME FIX AT ABOUT 12000 FT AND WERE AT 27 DME BEFORE REACHING 11000 FT. I FELT THAT WHAT I HAD DONE TO PREVENT THIS WAS ABOUT ALL I COULD HAVE DONE OTHER THAN PHYSICALLY TAKING THE ACFT. I HAD ADVISED HIM TWICE WITH TIME FOR HIM TO CORRECT THE SIT. WE HAD FLOWN 2 PREVIOUS LEGS THAT DAY AND HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE STRONG TAILWINDS WE WERE EXPERIENCING. WHAT REALLY BOTHERED ME WAS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ADVISED OF THE PROB WELL IN ADVANCE, HE ALMOST SEEMED INDIFFERENT ABOUT IT. HE SAID 'I CONSIDER 11000 FT XING AS ANYTHING OUT OF 12000 FT.' HE SEEMED TO BE PROFICIENT IN HIS OTHER FLYING AND ADHERED TO 250 KT RESTR BELOW 10000 FT, SO I WAS A LITTLE SHOCKED HE WASN'T MORE CONCERNED WITH XING RESTRS. ATC NEVER QUESTIONED US ABOUT THE XING ALT AND THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT THAT I AM AWARE OF. IN RETROSPECT, IF IT HAPPENS AGAIN TO ME, I WILL BE MORE FORCEFUL EARLIER TO MAKE HIM OR HER KNOW I FEEL HE OR SHE CAN'T MAKE THE XING RESTR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR HAS BEEN A RESERVE FO ON THE DC- 9 FOR 2 OR 3 YRS. THE RPTR HAD NEVER FLOWN WITH HIS CAPT BEFORE. THE CAPT APPARENTLY FORGOT ABOUT THE STRONG TAILWINDS AND HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE FACT THAT HE HAD MISSED A XING. THE RPTR WISHES THAT HE HAD BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE TO CAUSE THE CAPT TO DO SOMETHING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.