Narrative:

Due to late call from operations, we arrived late at aircraft and maintenance had not started APU and as a result the aircraft was very hot with the flight attendants having opened exit doors. In an effort to cool things off quickly, I closed the outflow valves to force the air forward in the cabin. I thought getting the exit doors closed was more important than following the preflight positioning of the outflow valves. Operations procedurally is supposed to ask if they can close the main cabin door. In a rush to be out on time they failed to do so and as a result when they closed the cabin door considerable pressure was felt by all on the ears with the outflow valves closed. In retrospect, I am not sure my decision was correct, even though I am very uncomfortable with having main cabin doors open with the passenger onboard, especially children. There seems to be little enforcement of company policies in regard to agents checking with flight crew whether they have the required paper work, closeout mgl (performance data for takeoff) and whether they may close the door. Ironically we were 2 steps from opening the outflow valves on the preflight checklist when the agent closed the door. I am sure if he/she had asked to close the door this would have prompted an earlier opening of the outflow valves or if the ground crew were active participants in the preparation for passenger boarding, the APU would have been started and pack valves opened which would have precluded the entire incident. In fairness, if operations had given our correct wakeup call, this also would have precluded the entire incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP OPERATING PROCS SUFFER FROM LACK OF GND CREW FLC COORD. PIC LOST CTL OF SIT.

Narrative: DUE TO LATE CALL FROM OPS, WE ARRIVED LATE AT ACFT AND MAINT HAD NOT STARTED APU AND AS A RESULT THE ACFT WAS VERY HOT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAVING OPENED EXIT DOORS. IN AN EFFORT TO COOL THINGS OFF QUICKLY, I CLOSED THE OUTFLOW VALVES TO FORCE THE AIR FORWARD IN THE CABIN. I THOUGHT GETTING THE EXIT DOORS CLOSED WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN FOLLOWING THE PREFLT POSITIONING OF THE OUTFLOW VALVES. OPS PROCEDURALLY IS SUPPOSED TO ASK IF THEY CAN CLOSE THE MAIN CABIN DOOR. IN A RUSH TO BE OUT ON TIME THEY FAILED TO DO SO AND AS A RESULT WHEN THEY CLOSED THE CABIN DOOR CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE WAS FELT BY ALL ON THE EARS WITH THE OUTFLOW VALVES CLOSED. IN RETROSPECT, I AM NOT SURE MY DECISION WAS CORRECT, EVEN THOUGH I AM VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH HAVING MAIN CABIN DOORS OPEN WITH THE PAX ONBOARD, ESPECIALLY CHILDREN. THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPANY POLICIES IN REGARD TO AGENTS CHKING WITH FLC WHETHER THEY HAVE THE REQUIRED PAPER WORK, CLOSEOUT MGL (PERFORMANCE DATA FOR TKOF) AND WHETHER THEY MAY CLOSE THE DOOR. IRONICALLY WE WERE 2 STEPS FROM OPENING THE OUTFLOW VALVES ON THE PREFLT CHKLIST WHEN THE AGENT CLOSED THE DOOR. I AM SURE IF HE/SHE HAD ASKED TO CLOSE THE DOOR THIS WOULD HAVE PROMPTED AN EARLIER OPENING OF THE OUTFLOW VALVES OR IF THE GND CREW WERE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PREPARATION FOR PAX BOARDING, THE APU WOULD HAVE BEEN STARTED AND PACK VALVES OPENED WHICH WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE ENTIRE INCIDENT. IN FAIRNESS, IF OPS HAD GIVEN OUR CORRECT WAKEUP CALL, THIS ALSO WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE ENTIRE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.