Narrative:

I was working at phl tower as controller in charge while supervisor took a break. I noticed a ship that was docked above the tower on the river getting ready to depart. We have procedures in a letter of agreement with the airport operator; the city of philadelphia; for them to give us at least a 30 minute heads-up when a large ship will be passing the final for runway 35. When large ships pass the runway 35 final; they penetrate the approach path safety zone and we must stop arrs to that runway. I called down to the operations manager for the shift and asked if they got a call from the city about this ship. He said no; and called the city supervisor to find out what was going on. The operations manager called me back and said the city knew nothing about it. About 4 minutes later; as the ship was directly on the final for runway 35 the radar approach; under the direction of the operations manager; tried to give us an aircraft to land runway 35. The local controller told the arrival controller to break the aircraft out when the aircraft was on about a 3 mile final. The procedure (LOA) for this operation is not efficient; reliable or safe. We often do not get the 30 minute calls as required and we'll get our first call when the ship is 10 minutes out or less. When this happens we must take all aircraft already off the fixes to one runway which that runway can't handle. This causes us to vector aircraft around; often several aircraft at the same altitude until the ship is called clear; which is normally 15 to 20 minutes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COORDINATION PROCS BETWEEN ATC AND THE ARPT TO NOTIFY ATC OF LARGE SHIP MOVEMENT IN THE RIVER CHANNEL ADJACENT TO RWY 35 HAS NOT BEEN CONSISTENT RESULTING IN SHIPS ENTERING THE SAFETY ZONE FOR ARRIVING ACFT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING AT PHL TWR AS CIC WHILE SUPVR TOOK A BREAK. I NOTICED A SHIP THAT WAS DOCKED ABOVE THE TOWER ON THE RIVER GETTING READY TO DEPART. WE HAVE PROCS IN A LETTER OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ARPT OPERATOR; THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; FOR THEM TO GIVE US AT LEAST A 30 MINUTE HEADS-UP WHEN A LARGE SHIP WILL BE PASSING THE FINAL FOR RWY 35. WHEN LARGE SHIPS PASS THE RWY 35 FINAL; THEY PENETRATE THE APCH PATH SAFETY ZONE AND WE MUST STOP ARRS TO THAT RWY. I CALLED DOWN TO THE OPERATIONS MANAGER FOR THE SHIFT AND ASKED IF THEY GOT A CALL FROM THE CITY ABOUT THIS SHIP. HE SAID NO; AND CALLED THE CITY SUPVR TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE OPS MANAGER CALLED ME BACK AND SAID THE CITY KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT. ABOUT 4 MINUTES LATER; AS THE SHIP WAS DIRECTLY ON THE FINAL FOR RWY 35 THE RADAR APCH; UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE OPS MANAGER; TRIED TO GIVE US AN ACFT TO LAND RWY 35. THE LOCAL CTLR TOLD THE ARR CTLR TO BREAK THE ACFT OUT WHEN THE ACFT WAS ON ABOUT A 3 MILE FINAL. THE PROC (LOA) FOR THIS OPERATION IS NOT EFFICIENT; RELIABLE OR SAFE. WE OFTEN DO NOT GET THE 30 MINUTE CALLS AS REQUIRED AND WE'LL GET OUR FIRST CALL WHEN THE SHIP IS 10 MINUTES OUT OR LESS. WHEN THIS HAPPENS WE MUST TAKE ALL ACFT ALREADY OFF THE FIXES TO ONE RWY WHICH THAT RWY CAN'T HANDLE. THIS CAUSES US TO VECTOR ACFT AROUND; OFTEN SEVERAL ACFT AT THE SAME ALT UNTIL THE SHIP IS CALLED CLEAR; WHICH IS NORMALLY 15 TO 20 MINUTES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.