Flight crew of an large transport overshot descent altitude and crossing fix speed restr.

Attributes
ACN	310490
Time
Date	199507
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : cce
State Reference	FL
Altitude	msl bound lower : 9400 msl bound upper : 10000
Environment
Flight Conditions	Mixed
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	descent other
Route In Use	arrival other enroute : on vectors enroute : direct enroute airway : zma
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : commercial pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 245 flight time total : 18000 flight time type : 2342
ASRS Report	310490
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance other anomaly other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

We were on vectors to avoid thunderstorms descending into miami. When able to avoid thunderstorms, we were cleared direct to worpp (cle 110 degrees 46 NM). Center said we were #1 and keep the airspeed up. We were now cleared to cross worpp at 250 KIAS and 10000 ft. The first officer was flying at 315 KIAS. As we descended through 14000 ft, center called and what we thought was, maintain 13000 ft for traffic, that is what we read back. There was other communication traffic that overrode our incoming and outgoing xmissions. Center soon called and asked, were we going to make worpp at 10000 ft? That's when we discovered the miscom. I had asked the first officer to slow the aircraft down because of cumulus buildups up to 11000 ft. He argued with me because center asked us to keep the airspeed up. I was about to tell center about our decreased airspeed. Now when center asked about us getting down to 10000 ft, the clouds were behind us. The first officer was slowing down to get the 250 KIAS speed under control. I told him to get down to 10000 ft first with speed brakes out and then get the 250 KIAS because altitude was more critical. He started arguing with me again while in descent and ran through 10000 ft down to 9400 ft and then came back up to 10000 ft. There was heated discussion in the cockpit during an attempted critique. I believe, WX, communication, changing conditions and priorities were all tested.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LGT OVERSHOT DSCNT ALT AND XING FIX SPD RESTR.

Narrative: WE WERE ON VECTORS TO AVOID TSTMS DSNDING INTO MIAMI. WHEN ABLE TO AVOID TSTMS, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO WORPP (CLE 110 DEGS 46 NM). CTR SAID WE WERE #1 AND KEEP THE AIRSPD UP. WE WERE NOW CLRED TO CROSS WORPP AT 250 KIAS AND 10000 FT. THE FO WAS FLYING AT 315 KIAS. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 14000 FT, CTR CALLED AND WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS, MAINTAIN 13000 FT FOR TFC, THAT IS WHAT WE READ BACK. THERE WAS OTHER COM TFC THAT OVERRODE OUR INCOMING AND OUTGOING XMISSIONS. CTR SOON CALLED AND ASKED, WERE WE GOING TO MAKE WORPP AT 10000 FT? THAT'S WHEN WE DISCOVERED THE MISCOM. I HAD ASKED THE FO TO SLOW THE ACFT DOWN BECAUSE OF CUMULUS BUILDUPS UP TO 11000 FT. HE ARGUED WITH ME BECAUSE CTR ASKED US TO KEEP THE AIRSPD UP. I WAS ABOUT TO TELL CTR ABOUT OUR DECREASED AIRSPD. NOW WHEN CTR ASKED ABOUT US GETTING DOWN TO 10000 FT, THE CLOUDS WERE BEHIND US. THE FO WAS SLOWING DOWN TO GET THE 250 KIAS SPD UNDER CTL. I TOLD HIM TO GET DOWN TO 10000 FT FIRST WITH SPD BRAKES OUT AND THEN GET THE 250 KIAS BECAUSE ALT WAS MORE CRITICAL. HE STARTED ARGUING WITH ME AGAIN WHILE IN DSCNT AND RAN THROUGH 10000 FT DOWN TO 9400 FT AND THEN CAME BACK UP TO 10000 FT. THERE WAS HEATED DISCUSSION IN THE COCKPIT DURING AN ATTEMPTED CRITIQUE. I BELIEVE, WX, COM, CHANGING CONDITIONS AND PRIORITIES WERE ALL TESTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.