Narrative:

Cleared for ILS runway 30L approach into san jose with instructions to cross klide at 5000 ft. My initial readback was 'cross klide at or above 5000 ft.' controller corrected to cross klide at 5000 ft because of a cessna 152 in the vicinity of klide at 5500 ft. During approach, controller pointed out the traffic several times but I was unable to see him. My first officer was flying and was looking outside for traffic during most of the approach. The controller asked us to reduce speed at some point and we complied. I was keeping track of the progress of our approach carefully as I was concerned about getting down and slowing down at the same time but this did not appear to be a problem. As we approached klide the traffic was getting closer as I was still not able to see the cessna. The first officer called for slats extend, and the handle stuck when I tried to extend the slats. As the aircraft slowed, the autothrottles became erratic because of the disagreement between the flap and slat handle position and the aircraft confign. At this time I had to pull the throttles to idle because the aircraft was rapidly accelerating. During this time I saw that we were now high and would have difficulty making the restr but that we could make it with a little effort. I pointed out to the first officer, we were high, and that we were supposed to be at 5000 ft at klide. (The flap and slat handle was now functioning normally.) when I told the first officer we were supposed to be at 5000 ft at klide he said he thought the clearance was 5000 ft or above. About that time TCASII told us to reduce descent and we did. Now I could see that we were going to be high and at the same time TCASII issued an RA of 'pull up.' I told the first officer to 'do it!' and at the same time told the controller that we were doing a TCASII resolution. As the words came out of my mouth TCASII issued a clear of conflict advisory and I said 'never mind.' at this time I saw that we were past klide and 500 ft high. Some time during the approach ATC pointed out the traffic and I said 'looking and we will be at 5000 ft at klide' but I can't remember at what point that was. After landing I talked the situation over with the first officer and was surprised that he had not heard any of my conversations with ATC concerning the altitude restr of 5000 ft at klide. I had assumed that he had since there were at least 3 xmissions stating clearly 'klide at 5000 ft' and as approach progressed it appeared that we would make it with no problem. I should not have told the controller 'never mind' the TCASII resolution, since we had already begun the maneuver. I should also have been more careful to be sure that the first officer understood the restr. It is my opinion that a cessna 152 had no business on the localizer where altitude restrs are common. Supplemental information from acn 321910: previous evening power failure at hotel so got little sleep, 5 hours. Was told to cross klide at 5000 ft. Didn't hear it but captain had acknowledged. Standard clearance every day for last year has been cross klide at or above 5000 ft. Cleared ILS runway 30L at sjc. VFR aircraft at klide was at 5500 ft. I crossed klide at 5600-5500 ft and TCASII went off with 00. I should have been below aircraft but did not hear original clearance, and captain did not say anything until minus 2 DME from klide and 600 ft high.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A ALT XING RESTR.

Narrative: CLRED FOR ILS RWY 30L APCH INTO SAN JOSE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS KLIDE AT 5000 FT. MY INITIAL READBACK WAS 'CROSS KLIDE AT OR ABOVE 5000 FT.' CTLR CORRECTED TO CROSS KLIDE AT 5000 FT BECAUSE OF A CESSNA 152 IN THE VICINITY OF KLIDE AT 5500 FT. DURING APCH, CTLR POINTED OUT THE TFC SEVERAL TIMES BUT I WAS UNABLE TO SEE HIM. MY FO WAS FLYING AND WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR TFC DURING MOST OF THE APCH. THE CTLR ASKED US TO REDUCE SPD AT SOME POINT AND WE COMPLIED. I WAS KEEPING TRACK OF THE PROGRESS OF OUR APCH CAREFULLY AS I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING DOWN AND SLOWING DOWN AT THE SAME TIME BUT THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE A PROB. AS WE APCHED KLIDE THE TFC WAS GETTING CLOSER AS I WAS STILL NOT ABLE TO SEE THE CESSNA. THE FO CALLED FOR SLATS EXTEND, AND THE HANDLE STUCK WHEN I TRIED TO EXTEND THE SLATS. AS THE ACFT SLOWED, THE AUTOTHROTTLES BECAME ERRATIC BECAUSE OF THE DISAGREEMENT BTWN THE FLAP AND SLAT HANDLE POS AND THE ACFT CONFIGN. AT THIS TIME I HAD TO PULL THE THROTTLES TO IDLE BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS RAPIDLY ACCELERATING. DURING THIS TIME I SAW THAT WE WERE NOW HIGH AND WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY MAKING THE RESTR BUT THAT WE COULD MAKE IT WITH A LITTLE EFFORT. I POINTED OUT TO THE FO, WE WERE HIGH, AND THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 5000 FT AT KLIDE. (THE FLAP AND SLAT HANDLE WAS NOW FUNCTIONING NORMALLY.) WHEN I TOLD THE FO WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 5000 FT AT KLIDE HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE CLRNC WAS 5000 FT OR ABOVE. ABOUT THAT TIME TCASII TOLD US TO REDUCE DSCNT AND WE DID. NOW I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE HIGH AND AT THE SAME TIME TCASII ISSUED AN RA OF 'PULL UP.' I TOLD THE FO TO 'DO IT!' AND AT THE SAME TIME TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE WERE DOING A TCASII RESOLUTION. AS THE WORDS CAME OUT OF MY MOUTH TCASII ISSUED A CLR OF CONFLICT ADVISORY AND I SAID 'NEVER MIND.' AT THIS TIME I SAW THAT WE WERE PAST KLIDE AND 500 FT HIGH. SOME TIME DURING THE APCH ATC POINTED OUT THE TFC AND I SAID 'LOOKING AND WE WILL BE AT 5000 FT AT KLIDE' BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER AT WHAT POINT THAT WAS. AFTER LNDG I TALKED THE SIT OVER WITH THE FO AND WAS SURPRISED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANY OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH ATC CONCERNING THE ALT RESTR OF 5000 FT AT KLIDE. I HAD ASSUMED THAT HE HAD SINCE THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 XMISSIONS STATING CLRLY 'KLIDE AT 5000 FT' AND AS APCH PROGRESSED IT APPEARED THAT WE WOULD MAKE IT WITH NO PROB. I SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD THE CTLR 'NEVER MIND' THE TCASII RESOLUTION, SINCE WE HAD ALREADY BEGUN THE MANEUVER. I SHOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN MORE CAREFUL TO BE SURE THAT THE FO UNDERSTOOD THE RESTR. IT IS MY OPINION THAT A CESSNA 152 HAD NO BUSINESS ON THE LOC WHERE ALT RESTRS ARE COMMON. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 321910: PREVIOUS EVENING PWR FAILURE AT HOTEL SO GOT LITTLE SLEEP, 5 HRS. WAS TOLD TO CROSS KLIDE AT 5000 FT. DIDN'T HEAR IT BUT CAPT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. STANDARD CLRNC EVERY DAY FOR LAST YEAR HAS BEEN CROSS KLIDE AT OR ABOVE 5000 FT. CLRED ILS RWY 30L AT SJC. VFR ACFT AT KLIDE WAS AT 5500 FT. I CROSSED KLIDE AT 5600-5500 FT AND TCASII WENT OFF WITH 00. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN BELOW ACFT BUT DID NOT HEAR ORIGINAL CLRNC, AND CAPT DID NOT SAY ANYTHING UNTIL MINUS 2 DME FROM KLIDE AND 600 FT HIGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.