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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 331617 |
Time | |
Date | 199603 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : phl |
State Reference | PA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Fokker 100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 190 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 680 |
ASRS Report | 331617 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 200 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Departed cvg to phl in a new dornier 328-110. The runways 17 and 27R were active. When we checked in with approach control we were assigned runway 17. Given the wind condition runway 17 seemed appropriate. We were asked to reduce our airspeed from 250 KTS to 150 KTS to follow slower commuter traffic. We had visual contact with our traffic and runway 17 and we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 17 and told to hold short of runway 27R. Runway 17 at phl is only 5459 ft long and from the landing threshold to the intersection of runway 27R, according to our chart, is only 4400 ft. We have no landing data in our performance charts to indicate that we can make such a landing so we immediately replied to the controller that we were 'unable' to hold short of runway 27R. There was no reply. When we were on about a 2 or 3 mi final approach to runway 17 we advised phl tower that we were unable to hold short of runway 27R. The tower said, 'okay air carrier X is cleared to land runway 17, full length is available.' my first officer replied, 'air carrier X is cleared to land runway 17, full length.' I touched down on the 1000 ft marker in the landing threshold in gusty xwinds. As I was rolling out trying to slow down and maintain centerline, the phl tower tells us to turn off at taxiway K. At the same time my first officer says to me 'traffic!' out of the corner of my eye, I saw a fokker 100 less than 75 ft off the ground getting ready to touch down on runway 27R threshold which is right near the intersection of runway 17. I went into maximum reverse and stood on the toe brakes as I saw the fokker's main wheels touch down right in front of me. I barely made the right turnoff onto taxiway K which I estimate to be about 3300 ft from where I touched down. I got a 'brake temperature high' on our 'EICAS' screen and on our 'mfd' saw the brake temperatures rising. After deplaning all the passenger, I called the phl tower on the telephone and spoke to the tower chief. I explained to him my anger and concern regarding the unsafe operation of the phl tower and the disaster that I narrowly avoided because of their operation. He said that if we could not turn off at taxiway K we should have said unable and they would have sent the FK100 on a go around. First of all, I told him in an ongoing problem, ATC should not be giving instructions to flcs during critical phases of flight such as landing and rolling out and expect us to comprehend, evaluate and reply back to ATC when we're guiding our acfts at high speeds on the surface. Second of all, even if we did reply, unable to turn off at taxiway K, and he told the FK100 to go around at that late point in time, it would be doubtful that the FK100 could have gone around without its main wheels hitting our high wing aircraft or our vertical and horizontal 'T' tail stabilizers. Third of all, we were 'cleared to land runway 17 full length available.' what the heck was that FK100 doing there at that time anyway! I told the FAA supervisor about the high speed abilities of the dornier 328 and in the future do not assign any of our aircraft to runway 17 if they really want us to hold short of runway 27R because we will be unable to hold short. In the future, we will keep our speed up at 250 KTS and get in the line-up with all the jets to runway 27R.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF A DORNIER 328-110 WAS FORCED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION DURING LNDG ROLL BY GOING TO MAX REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKING DUE TO ANOTHER ACFT LNDG ON AN INTERSECTING RWY.
Narrative: DEPARTED CVG TO PHL IN A NEW DORNIER 328-110. THE RWYS 17 AND 27R WERE ACTIVE. WHEN WE CHKED IN WITH APCH CTL WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 17. GIVEN THE WIND CONDITION RWY 17 SEEMED APPROPRIATE. WE WERE ASKED TO REDUCE OUR AIRSPD FROM 250 KTS TO 150 KTS TO FOLLOW SLOWER COMMUTER TFC. WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH OUR TFC AND RWY 17 AND WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. RWY 17 AT PHL IS ONLY 5459 FT LONG AND FROM THE LNDG THRESHOLD TO THE INTXN OF RWY 27R, ACCORDING TO OUR CHART, IS ONLY 4400 FT. WE HAVE NO LNDG DATA IN OUR PERFORMANCE CHARTS TO INDICATE THAT WE CAN MAKE SUCH A LNDG SO WE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED TO THE CTLR THAT WE WERE 'UNABLE' TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. THERE WAS NO REPLY. WHEN WE WERE ON ABOUT A 2 OR 3 MI FINAL APCH TO RWY 17 WE ADVISED PHL TWR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. THE TWR SAID, 'OKAY ACR X IS CLRED TO LAND RWY 17, FULL LENGTH IS AVAILABLE.' MY FO REPLIED, 'ACR X IS CLRED TO LAND RWY 17, FULL LENGTH.' I TOUCHED DOWN ON THE 1000 FT MARKER IN THE LNDG THRESHOLD IN GUSTY XWINDS. AS I WAS ROLLING OUT TRYING TO SLOW DOWN AND MAINTAIN CTRLINE, THE PHL TWR TELLS US TO TURN OFF AT TXWY K. AT THE SAME TIME MY FO SAYS TO ME 'TFC!' OUT OF THE CORNER OF MY EYE, I SAW A FOKKER 100 LESS THAN 75 FT OFF THE GND GETTING READY TO TOUCH DOWN ON RWY 27R THRESHOLD WHICH IS RIGHT NEAR THE INTXN OF RWY 17. I WENT INTO MAX REVERSE AND STOOD ON THE TOE BRAKES AS I SAW THE FOKKER'S MAIN WHEELS TOUCH DOWN RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. I BARELY MADE THE R TURNOFF ONTO TXWY K WHICH I ESTIMATE TO BE ABOUT 3300 FT FROM WHERE I TOUCHED DOWN. I GOT A 'BRAKE TEMP HIGH' ON OUR 'EICAS' SCREEN AND ON OUR 'MFD' SAW THE BRAKE TEMPS RISING. AFTER DEPLANING ALL THE PAX, I CALLED THE PHL TWR ON THE TELEPHONE AND SPOKE TO THE TWR CHIEF. I EXPLAINED TO HIM MY ANGER AND CONCERN REGARDING THE UNSAFE OP OF THE PHL TOWER AND THE DISASTER THAT I NARROWLY AVOIDED BECAUSE OF THEIR OP. HE SAID THAT IF WE COULD NOT TURN OFF AT TXWY K WE SHOULD HAVE SAID UNABLE AND THEY WOULD HAVE SENT THE FK100 ON A GAR. FIRST OF ALL, I TOLD HIM IN AN ONGOING PROB, ATC SHOULD NOT BE GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO FLCS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT SUCH AS LNDG AND ROLLING OUT AND EXPECT US TO COMPREHEND, EVALUATE AND REPLY BACK TO ATC WHEN WE'RE GUIDING OUR ACFTS AT HIGH SPDS ON THE SURFACE. SECOND OF ALL, EVEN IF WE DID REPLY, UNABLE TO TURN OFF AT TXWY K, AND HE TOLD THE FK100 TO GAR AT THAT LATE POINT IN TIME, IT WOULD BE DOUBTFUL THAT THE FK100 COULD HAVE GONE AROUND WITHOUT ITS MAIN WHEELS HITTING OUR HIGH WING ACFT OR OUR VERT AND HORIZ 'T' TAIL STABILIZERS. THIRD OF ALL, WE WERE 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 17 FULL LENGTH AVAILABLE.' WHAT THE HECK WAS THAT FK100 DOING THERE AT THAT TIME ANYWAY! I TOLD THE FAA SUPVR ABOUT THE HIGH SPD ABILITIES OF THE DORNIER 328 AND IN THE FUTURE DO NOT ASSIGN ANY OF OUR ACFT TO RWY 17 IF THEY REALLY WANT US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R BECAUSE WE WILL BE UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT. IN THE FUTURE, WE WILL KEEP OUR SPD UP AT 250 KTS AND GET IN THE LINE-UP WITH ALL THE JETS TO RWY 27R.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.