Narrative:

Flight was near the end of a hnl-sfo leg. Upon initial contact with the second bay approach controller we were told of widebody transport traffic at 2 O'clock, approximately 6 mi. Simultaneous visuals were in progress. I told the captain I had the traffic, but he didn't so he told the controller 'looking.' after 2 or 3 more pointouts from the controller along the progress of the approach, the captain finally called traffic in sight. We were then given a 340 degree heading to intercept runway 28L localizer, cleared visual runway 28L, maintain visual separation from the traffic, speed 180 KTS to brijj. At 1/2 - 3/4 mi before localizer capture, the captain told me to start turning the plane toward the airport which I had no problem with since 340 degrees was such a large intercept angle. At some point before handoff to the tower, the captain mentioned to the approach controller that he wasn't sure we'd be able to keep from passing the traffic. Approach control had no response. Noting the concern in his voice, I called for gear down, final flap settings, and slowed the plane to final approach speed (145 KTS) before reaching brijj. This speed did seem to be better matched with our traffic. Upon initial contact with tower, the captain again said he wasn't certain we'd be able to prevent passing our widebody transport traffic. They cleared us to land runway 28L with no response about the speed or visual separation. At this point the captain told me to get lined up on centerline and I expressed concern with making banked turns this close to traffic and getting TCASII RA's. Visually I was very nearly lined up, I had about a 1 degree intercept set up, aiming to be on centerline about 500 ft before the approach lights. However, to appease the captain, I made a very shallow turn. Not long after doing this, about 600-800 ft AGL, the captain blurted out 'this isn't working, we're passing them, take it around.' I was surprised by this saying, 'what? Really?' he said, 'yeah, go around,' then reported to tower that we were going around. Unfortunately his transmission was blocked and I told him so, but he didn't seem to hear me. He then transmitted 'what heading you want us on?' without using any type of call sign. Someone said, '350.' '350?!' I asked, extremely concerned there was an aircraft on my right, only a couple hundred ft below. The captain asked 'confirm heading 3-5-0' (no call sign). Someone else said, 'affirmative 3-5-0' (no call sign). The captain said, 'yeah, that was the heading, turn to 350 degrees.' I said 'I really don't think that was for us.' he said, 'well, I confirmed it...' with a shrug in his voice. 'But no one has been using call signs,' I said. At this point we were well above the other aircraft, I think they were just about to touch down, so I felt the dangerous time had passed. I eased the plane into a 5 degree bank, and as we were turning through 300 degrees overhead the other aircraft, tower said, 'aircraft xyz, fly heading 280.' finally a call sign was used. We continued back around for approach and landing without further incident, paired up with an MD80. It is obvious that poor communication occurred between us and ATC during the go around. I even reiterated this fact to the captain once we were safely climbing out. I also feel I wasn't forceful enough in getting the captain to properly confirm the clearance. A partial cause of this is that I'm new on the aircraft and felt I already had a full plate dealing with the mechanics of the go around. The flight engineer said nothing throughout the whole ordeal. In retrospect, I should have just flown the published miss for the tip toe, even though we weren't cleared for the charted visual. This probably would have eliminated all the confusion and extra cockpit dialog during a critical phase of flight. As for what led to the go around, I can only speculate. I did not think we were pulling ahead of the other aircraft. I was on GS, on speed, fully configured, spooled up, about 1/2 a DOT left of course and correcting. Perhaps the captain had a big concern with doing simultaneous visuals with another heavy. Perhaps he was nervous about my approach and flying. I don't know. After block-in, he shook my hand, said I did a real nice job of flying, and dashed off to catch his flight home. I was unable to gauge his sincerity or discuss the incident withhim.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT OCCURS WHEN WDB X LOSES SIGHT OF WDB Y DURING A PARALLEL VISUAL APCH RWY 28L-R INTO SFO. WDB X PIC TELLS FO TO MAKE A MISSED APCH, TURN R TOWARDS 350 DEGS, INSTEAD OF STRAIGHT OUT ON 280 DEG HDG. HDG TRACK POS DEV.

Narrative: FLT WAS NEAR THE END OF A HNL-SFO LEG. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE SECOND BAY APCH CTLR WE WERE TOLD OF WDB TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK, APPROX 6 MI. SIMULTANEOUS VISUALS WERE IN PROGRESS. I TOLD THE CAPT I HAD THE TFC, BUT HE DIDN'T SO HE TOLD THE CTLR 'LOOKING.' AFTER 2 OR 3 MORE POINTOUTS FROM THE CTLR ALONG THE PROGRESS OF THE APCH, THE CAPT FINALLY CALLED TFC IN SIGHT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A 340 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 28L LOC, CLRED VISUAL RWY 28L, MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THE TFC, SPD 180 KTS TO BRIJJ. AT 1/2 - 3/4 MI BEFORE LOC CAPTURE, THE CAPT TOLD ME TO START TURNING THE PLANE TOWARD THE ARPT WHICH I HAD NO PROB WITH SINCE 340 DEGS WAS SUCH A LARGE INTERCEPT ANGLE. AT SOME POINT BEFORE HDOF TO THE TWR, THE CAPT MENTIONED TO THE APCH CTLR THAT HE WASN'T SURE WE'D BE ABLE TO KEEP FROM PASSING THE TFC. APCH CTL HAD NO RESPONSE. NOTING THE CONCERN IN HIS VOICE, I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, FINAL FLAP SETTINGS, AND SLOWED THE PLANE TO FINAL APCH SPD (145 KTS) BEFORE REACHING BRIJJ. THIS SPD DID SEEM TO BE BETTER MATCHED WITH OUR TFC. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH TWR, THE CAPT AGAIN SAID HE WASN'T CERTAIN WE'D BE ABLE TO PREVENT PASSING OUR WDB TFC. THEY CLRED US TO LAND RWY 28L WITH NO RESPONSE ABOUT THE SPD OR VISUAL SEPARATION. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT TOLD ME TO GET LINED UP ON CTRLINE AND I EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH MAKING BANKED TURNS THIS CLOSE TO TFC AND GETTING TCASII RA'S. VISUALLY I WAS VERY NEARLY LINED UP, I HAD ABOUT A 1 DEG INTERCEPT SET UP, AIMING TO BE ON CTRLINE ABOUT 500 FT BEFORE THE APCH LIGHTS. HOWEVER, TO APPEASE THE CAPT, I MADE A VERY SHALLOW TURN. NOT LONG AFTER DOING THIS, ABOUT 600-800 FT AGL, THE CAPT BLURTED OUT 'THIS ISN'T WORKING, WE'RE PASSING THEM, TAKE IT AROUND.' I WAS SURPRISED BY THIS SAYING, 'WHAT? REALLY?' HE SAID, 'YEAH, GAR,' THEN RPTED TO TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND. UNFORTUNATELY HIS XMISSION WAS BLOCKED AND I TOLD HIM SO, BUT HE DIDN'T SEEM TO HEAR ME. HE THEN XMITTED 'WHAT HDG YOU WANT US ON?' WITHOUT USING ANY TYPE OF CALL SIGN. SOMEONE SAID, '350.' '350?!' I ASKED, EXTREMELY CONCERNED THERE WAS AN ACFT ON MY R, ONLY A COUPLE HUNDRED FT BELOW. THE CAPT ASKED 'CONFIRM HDG 3-5-0' (NO CALL SIGN). SOMEONE ELSE SAID, 'AFFIRMATIVE 3-5-0' (NO CALL SIGN). THE CAPT SAID, 'YEAH, THAT WAS THE HDG, TURN TO 350 DEGS.' I SAID 'I REALLY DON'T THINK THAT WAS FOR US.' HE SAID, 'WELL, I CONFIRMED IT...' WITH A SHRUG IN HIS VOICE. 'BUT NO ONE HAS BEEN USING CALL SIGNS,' I SAID. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WELL ABOVE THE OTHER ACFT, I THINK THEY WERE JUST ABOUT TO TOUCH DOWN, SO I FELT THE DANGEROUS TIME HAD PASSED. I EASED THE PLANE INTO A 5 DEG BANK, AND AS WE WERE TURNING THROUGH 300 DEGS OVERHEAD THE OTHER ACFT, TWR SAID, 'ACFT XYZ, FLY HDG 280.' FINALLY A CALL SIGN WAS USED. WE CONTINUED BACK AROUND FOR APCH AND LNDG WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT, PAIRED UP WITH AN MD80. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT POOR COM OCCURRED BTWN US AND ATC DURING THE GAR. I EVEN REITERATED THIS FACT TO THE CAPT ONCE WE WERE SAFELY CLBING OUT. I ALSO FEEL I WASN'T FORCEFUL ENOUGH IN GETTING THE CAPT TO PROPERLY CONFIRM THE CLRNC. A PARTIAL CAUSE OF THIS IS THAT I'M NEW ON THE ACFT AND FELT I ALREADY HAD A FULL PLATE DEALING WITH THE MECHS OF THE GAR. THE FE SAID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE ORDEAL. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE JUST FLOWN THE PUBLISHED MISS FOR THE TIP TOE, EVEN THOUGH WE WEREN'T CLRED FOR THE CHARTED VISUAL. THIS PROBABLY WOULD HAVE ELIMINATED ALL THE CONFUSION AND EXTRA COCKPIT DIALOG DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. AS FOR WHAT LED TO THE GAR, I CAN ONLY SPECULATE. I DID NOT THINK WE WERE PULLING AHEAD OF THE OTHER ACFT. I WAS ON GS, ON SPD, FULLY CONFIGURED, SPOOLED UP, ABOUT 1/2 A DOT L OF COURSE AND CORRECTING. PERHAPS THE CAPT HAD A BIG CONCERN WITH DOING SIMULTANEOUS VISUALS WITH ANOTHER HVY. PERHAPS HE WAS NERVOUS ABOUT MY APCH AND FLYING. I DON'T KNOW. AFTER BLOCK-IN, HE SHOOK MY HAND, SAID I DID A REAL NICE JOB OF FLYING, AND DASHED OFF TO CATCH HIS FLT HOME. I WAS UNABLE TO GAUGE HIS SINCERITY OR DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITHHIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.