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Attributes | |
ACN | 358493 |
Time | |
Date | 199701 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : abq |
State Reference | NM |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : den |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Gates Learjet Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 15800 flight time type : 2500 |
ASRS Report | 358493 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other controllera other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
Airport | other physical facility |
Narrative:
On the evening of jan xx 97 we were instructed to taxi from the FBO to runway 21 via taxiway G and taxiway C and to hold short of taxiway C on taxiway G. As we were approaching taxiway C a DC8 was taxiing south on taxiway C. The ground controller then instructed us to make a left on taxiway C. As copilot, I then looked down at the airport diagram to see where our next intersection would be and the next command from ground control was for us to stop where we were. I looked up and after a second or 2 realized we were in the center of runway 30 at about the mid point of the runway. The next comment from ground control was that we were to continue on as the aircraft on final to runway 30 was going around. I looked toward the approach end of that runway to see a beechcraft bonanza climbing out. As we continued our taxi to runway 21, another aircraft coming from the GA ramp was issued the same instructions and he, too, inadvertently crossed runway 30 again causing the same bonanza to make another go around. In neither our case, nor the second aircraft which crossed the runway, was there anything said about the go around by ground control or the tower, nor do I have any idea whether the go around was initiated by the pilot flying the bonanza or the tower. This airport has been under constant disarray since it began improvements in jan 96. Our business takes us to this airport every 3-4 months and each time we come we have not taxied to the runway the same way twice. To add to the confusion this day, the tower was allowing operations on all the runways simultaneously with the exception of runway 17/35. When you turn onto taxiway C from taxiway G, south of runway 30, the distance between taxiway C and the runway is short enough that one should really stop on taxiway G or make only a half turn on taxiway C and stop. Another factor which adds confusion to this intersection is the way the ramp and txwys appear to curve, it is easy to lose perspective on where the taxiway G is in relationship to the runway 30. In our case I believe 2 factors contributed to this runway incursion. The first being my misunderstanding of what I thought ground control meant, when we were told to make the left turn onto taxiway C behind the DC8, was to continue on taxiway C. The captain must have understood these instructions in the same way as he continued to taxi as I diverted my attention to the airport diagram, and at the same time not realizing our actual position relative to a runway. The other factor, it appears, was that the coordination between the tower and ground control may have not been at its best. I feel from listening to instructions given by ground control and the tower to other aircraft that they may have been a little behind in coordinating their efforts considering they were operating 3 runways at the same time. I realize this situation could have had grave consequences. And in light of what had recently happened at an uncontrolled airport in illinois, it drove the point home even more. In the future, I will research the airport diagrams better, especially at abq, in order to prevent the possibility of this situation from occurring again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CPR LEARJET CLRED TO RWY 21 VIA TXWY G AND TXWY C HOLD SHORT TXWY C ON TXWY G. CLRED L TURN ON TXWY C AFTER DC8. MADE TURN AND FAILED TO CHK RWY 30 FOR XING. ACFT ON APCH RWY 30 MADE GAR. CONSTRUCTION ON THE ARPT CAUSED CONFUSION.
Narrative: ON THE EVENING OF JAN XX 97 WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI FROM THE FBO TO RWY 21 VIA TXWY G AND TXWY C AND TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C ON TXWY G. AS WE WERE APCHING TXWY C A DC8 WAS TAXIING S ON TXWY C. THE GND CTLR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE A L ON TXWY C. AS COPLT, I THEN LOOKED DOWN AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM TO SEE WHERE OUR NEXT INTXN WOULD BE AND THE NEXT COMMAND FROM GND CTL WAS FOR US TO STOP WHERE WE WERE. I LOOKED UP AND AFTER A SECOND OR 2 REALIZED WE WERE IN THE CTR OF RWY 30 AT ABOUT THE MID POINT OF THE RWY. THE NEXT COMMENT FROM GND CTL WAS THAT WE WERE TO CONTINUE ON AS THE ACFT ON FINAL TO RWY 30 WAS GOING AROUND. I LOOKED TOWARD THE APCH END OF THAT RWY TO SEE A BEECHCRAFT BONANZA CLBING OUT. AS WE CONTINUED OUR TAXI TO RWY 21, ANOTHER ACFT COMING FROM THE GA RAMP WAS ISSUED THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS AND HE, TOO, INADVERTENTLY CROSSED RWY 30 AGAIN CAUSING THE SAME BONANZA TO MAKE ANOTHER GAR. IN NEITHER OUR CASE, NOR THE SECOND ACFT WHICH CROSSED THE RWY, WAS THERE ANYTHING SAID ABOUT THE GAR BY GND CTL OR THE TWR, NOR DO I HAVE ANY IDEA WHETHER THE GAR WAS INITIATED BY THE PLT FLYING THE BONANZA OR THE TWR. THIS ARPT HAS BEEN UNDER CONSTANT DISARRAY SINCE IT BEGAN IMPROVEMENTS IN JAN 96. OUR BUSINESS TAKES US TO THIS ARPT EVERY 3-4 MONTHS AND EACH TIME WE COME WE HAVE NOT TAXIED TO THE RWY THE SAME WAY TWICE. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION THIS DAY, THE TWR WAS ALLOWING OPS ON ALL THE RWYS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RWY 17/35. WHEN YOU TURN ONTO TXWY C FROM TXWY G, S OF RWY 30, THE DISTANCE BTWN TXWY C AND THE RWY IS SHORT ENOUGH THAT ONE SHOULD REALLY STOP ON TXWY G OR MAKE ONLY A HALF TURN ON TXWY C AND STOP. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH ADDS CONFUSION TO THIS INTXN IS THE WAY THE RAMP AND TXWYS APPEAR TO CURVE, IT IS EASY TO LOSE PERSPECTIVE ON WHERE THE TXWY G IS IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE RWY 30. IN OUR CASE I BELIEVE 2 FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS RWY INCURSION. THE FIRST BEING MY MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT I THOUGHT GND CTL MEANT, WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO MAKE THE L TURN ONTO TXWY C BEHIND THE DC8, WAS TO CONTINUE ON TXWY C. THE CAPT MUST HAVE UNDERSTOOD THESE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SAME WAY AS HE CONTINUED TO TAXI AS I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM, AND AT THE SAME TIME NOT REALIZING OUR ACTUAL POS RELATIVE TO A RWY. THE OTHER FACTOR, IT APPEARS, WAS THAT THE COORD BTWN THE TWR AND GND CTL MAY HAVE NOT BEEN AT ITS BEST. I FEEL FROM LISTENING TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY GND CTL AND THE TWR TO OTHER ACFT THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BEHIND IN COORDINATING THEIR EFFORTS CONSIDERING THEY WERE OPERATING 3 RWYS AT THE SAME TIME. I REALIZE THIS SIT COULD HAVE HAD GRAVE CONSEQUENCES. AND IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAD RECENTLY HAPPENED AT AN UNCTLED ARPT IN ILLINOIS, IT DROVE THE POINT HOME EVEN MORE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL RESEARCH THE ARPT DIAGRAMS BETTER, ESPECIALLY AT ABQ, IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS SIT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.