Narrative:

On climb out after departure from mht, the first officer, who was hand flying the aircraft, went through the first couple of assigned altitudes when leveling off. The maximum deviation I saw was +200 ft, and there were no conflicts with other traffic, no TCASII or ATC advisories or special instructions. It was only our second leg together and his first turn as PF. When I saw that the first leveloff was going to be close, I tried to coach the first officer and he was taking the appropriate actions of reducing pitch and (very importantly) thrust. We still went through assigned altitude. ATC cleared us to climb another 1000 ft, and I thought he would be more careful now, having just gone through assigned altitude once already. My first officer responded by pitching up too far and applying climb thrust, which very quickly put us in a 2000-2500 FPM climb. I immediately started making altitude callouts as we rapidly approached our assigned altitude and he attempted to make another leveloff, but again we went through assigned altitude. It all happened so fast and so unexpectedly for me, I couldn't figure out fast enough what was going on with my first officer. Because he was taking corrective action and responding to the situation, I resisted taking control of the aircraft, thinking that it would only make things worse. Finally we were given further climb clearance above 10000 ft and the flight proceeded normally from there. Once we had time to talk, I tried to offer some advice for making good leveloff when hand flying this very high performance airplane. It is a challenge to hand fly, especially leveloffs. He was genuinely interested in my advice, and although he told me he had spent much of his time so far with the company in the training department, I had no idea just how little experience in the airplane he had. He seemed confident, capable and was a mature ex-military pilot, and I never would've guessed that he would have a problem like this. I would think that any line pilot sitting next to me would have received enough training and checking for this not to be an issue, especially someone who has spent time in the training department as an instructor. Perhaps there is too much emphasis placed on the autoplt in training and not enough hand flying skills are taught -- that's left to each pilot to experiment with on their own, once they start flying the line. When I'm placed in a situation such as this, with the suddenness it happens and the surprise factor, I feel almost helpless to resolve it in time to prevent a violation. There needs to be more training in this area. Also, I need to develop some simple commands to talk a person through a potentially bad leveloff in progress, as well as some words of wisdom in my crew briefings, takeoff briefings, etc. Along with flying advice, I need to remind my first officer's that traffic separation depends on faultless performance by the crew in complying with ATC instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CAPT CONCERNED ABOUT FO INABILITY TO HANDLE ACFT FOR SMOOTH ON ALT LEVELOFF.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT AFTER DEP FROM MHT, THE FO, WHO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT, WENT THROUGH THE FIRST COUPLE OF ASSIGNED ALTS WHEN LEVELING OFF. THE MAX DEV I SAW WAS +200 FT, AND THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC, NO TCASII OR ATC ADVISORIES OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS ONLY OUR SECOND LEG TOGETHER AND HIS FIRST TURN AS PF. WHEN I SAW THAT THE FIRST LEVELOFF WAS GOING TO BE CLOSE, I TRIED TO COACH THE FO AND HE WAS TAKING THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS OF REDUCING PITCH AND (VERY IMPORTANTLY) THRUST. WE STILL WENT THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. ATC CLRED US TO CLB ANOTHER 1000 FT, AND I THOUGHT HE WOULD BE MORE CAREFUL NOW, HAVING JUST GONE THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT ONCE ALREADY. MY FO RESPONDED BY PITCHING UP TOO FAR AND APPLYING CLB THRUST, WHICH VERY QUICKLY PUT US IN A 2000-2500 FPM CLB. I IMMEDIATELY STARTED MAKING ALT CALLOUTS AS WE RAPIDLY APCHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND HE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ANOTHER LEVELOFF, BUT AGAIN WE WENT THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. IT ALL HAPPENED SO FAST AND SO UNEXPECTEDLY FOR ME, I COULDN'T FIGURE OUT FAST ENOUGH WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH MY FO. BECAUSE HE WAS TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION AND RESPONDING TO THE SIT, I RESISTED TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT, THINKING THAT IT WOULD ONLY MAKE THINGS WORSE. FINALLY WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER CLB CLRNC ABOVE 10000 FT AND THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY FROM THERE. ONCE WE HAD TIME TO TALK, I TRIED TO OFFER SOME ADVICE FOR MAKING GOOD LEVELOFF WHEN HAND FLYING THIS VERY HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRPLANE. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO HAND FLY, ESPECIALLY LEVELOFFS. HE WAS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN MY ADVICE, AND ALTHOUGH HE TOLD ME HE HAD SPENT MUCH OF HIS TIME SO FAR WITH THE COMPANY IN THE TRAINING DEPT, I HAD NO IDEA JUST HOW LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN THE AIRPLANE HE HAD. HE SEEMED CONFIDENT, CAPABLE AND WAS A MATURE EX-MIL PLT, AND I NEVER WOULD'VE GUESSED THAT HE WOULD HAVE A PROB LIKE THIS. I WOULD THINK THAT ANY LINE PLT SITTING NEXT TO ME WOULD HAVE RECEIVED ENOUGH TRAINING AND CHKING FOR THIS NOT TO BE AN ISSUE, ESPECIALLY SOMEONE WHO HAS SPENT TIME IN THE TRAINING DEPT AS AN INSTRUCTOR. PERHAPS THERE IS TOO MUCH EMPHASIS PLACED ON THE AUTOPLT IN TRAINING AND NOT ENOUGH HAND FLYING SKILLS ARE TAUGHT -- THAT'S LEFT TO EACH PLT TO EXPERIMENT WITH ON THEIR OWN, ONCE THEY START FLYING THE LINE. WHEN I'M PLACED IN A SIT SUCH AS THIS, WITH THE SUDDENNESS IT HAPPENS AND THE SURPRISE FACTOR, I FEEL ALMOST HELPLESS TO RESOLVE IT IN TIME TO PREVENT A VIOLATION. THERE NEEDS TO BE MORE TRAINING IN THIS AREA. ALSO, I NEED TO DEVELOP SOME SIMPLE COMMANDS TO TALK A PERSON THROUGH A POTENTIALLY BAD LEVELOFF IN PROGRESS, AS WELL AS SOME WORDS OF WISDOM IN MY CREW BRIEFINGS, TKOF BRIEFINGS, ETC. ALONG WITH FLYING ADVICE, I NEED TO REMIND MY FO'S THAT TFC SEPARATION DEPENDS ON FAULTLESS PERFORMANCE BY THE CREW IN COMPLYING WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.